

















Beginning in 1999, a series of events generated speculation that the 
Chinese Party-state might be prepared to breathe new life into the 
country’s long dormant constitution.  In recent years, as the Party-state 
has strictly limited constitutional adjudication and moved aggressively to 
contain some citizen constitutional activism, this early speculation has 
turned to pessimism about China’s constitutional trajectory.  Such 
pessimism obscures recognition of alternative or hybrid pathways for 
resolving constitutional disputes in China.  Despite recent developments, 
Chinese citizens have continued to constitutionalize a broad range of 
political-legal disputes and advance constitutional arguments in a variety 
of forums.  This article argues that by shifting focus from the individual 
legal to the collective political dimension of constitutional law, a 
dimension dominant in China’s transitional one-party state, we can better 
understand the significance of the constitution in China and identify 
patterns of bargaining, consultation, and mediation across a range of both 
intrastate and citizen-state constitutional disputes.  Administrative 
reconciliation and “grand mediation,” dispute resolution models at the 
core of recent political-legal shifts in China, emphasize such consultative 
practices.  This zone of convergence reveals a potential transitional path 
                                                 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.  
Former Beijing Director and Senior Fellow, The China Law Center, Yale Law School 
(2005–2008) and Senior Counsel, U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China 
(2002–2005).  The author thanks Donald Clarke, Michael Dowdle, Bruce Hand, Nicholas 
Howson, Hilary Josephs, Chimène Keitner, Tom Kellogg, Evan Lee, Benjamin Liebman, 
Lin Xifen, Carl Minzner, Randall Peerenboom, Zhang Qianfan, colleagues at the UC 
Hastings Junior Faculty Workshop, and members of the Chinalaw List for their thoughtful 
comments and feedback on drafts of the article.  The author also thanks the editorial staff 
of the University of Pennsylvania East Asia Law Review for oustanding comments and 
editing and Nolan Shaw, Wang Jingzhi, and one unnamed student for their invaluable 
research assistance.  The author bears all responsibility for the final product. 
52 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW    [Vol. 7 
 
for resolving constitutional disputes.  Specifically, the Party-state could 
choose to adapt and apply the grand mediation model in the context of 
constitutional disputes.  Grand mediation involves a multilevel, Party-
state political consultation that preserves a limited but meaningful role for 
the judiciary.  An adaptation of the grand mediation framework would 
provide an indigenous dispute resolution model for resolving 
constitutional disputes, regularizing informal constitutional dispute 
resolution practices, and bringing judges to the constitutional 
interpretation table.  At the same time, it would take account of the 
realities of China’s current political environment.  Chinese reformers 
could use such a mechanism (or existing informal dispute resolution 
practices) to advance their long-term goals of facilitating citizen-state 
consultation, reform concessions, and the diffusion of constitutional norms 
through the Chinese polity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article identifies patterns of bargaining, consultation and 
mediation in the resolution of constitutional disputes in the People’s 
Republic of China (“PRC”) and explores the possibility that an emerging 
dispute resolution framework called “grand mediation” could provide a 
transitional model for resolving such disputes.  In recent years, a series of 
events has raised concerns that China has abandoned its stated 
commitment to rule in accordance with the law.  Chinese leaders, in a 
pronounced shift from the 1990s and the early 2000s, have placed 
progressively heavier emphasis on popular opinion and the mediation of 
disputes, rather than judicial professionalism and formal adjudication 
according to law.1  Through a series of personnel changes and political 
campaigns, Chinese Communist Party (“CCP” or “Party”) leaders have 
focused on the role of legal institutions in safeguarding Party leadership.  
They have also made clear that law enforcement and judicial institutions 
must not mechanically apply the law and must consider social stability 
impacts and other extra-legal factors in resolving disputes.2  At the same 
time, in an effort to eliminate perceived threats to Party power, the Party-
state 3  has suppressed rights lawyers, nascent non-governmental 
organizations, and citizen activists.4  In response to these developments, 
some commentators have observed that China has “turned against” or 
“abandoned” law.5 
                                                 
1 Carl Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935, 938–39 (2011); 
Randall Peerenboom, More Law, Less Courts, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 
IN ASIA 175–76 (Tom Ginsburg & Albert Chen eds., 2008). 
2  See Willy Lam, CCP Tightens Control over the Courts, 11.11 CHINA BRIEF (The 
Jamestown Found., Washington, D.C.), June 17, 2011, at 2, 
http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/cb_11_05.pdf; Willy Lam, The Politicisation of 
China’s Law-Enforcement and Judicial Apparatus, CHINA PERSPECTIVES, no. 2, 2009 
[hereinafter Lam, Politicization], at 42–51; Minzner, supra note 1. 
3 The PRC Constitution enshrines the leadership role of the Chinese Communist Party in 
China’s government.  See generally XIANFA [PRC CONST.] [hereinafter XIANFA] pmbl. 
(LawInfoChina) (China).  State institutions in China are integrated with the Party and 
subject to Party control.  This article uses the term “Party-state” to refer generally to 
China’s institutions of governance. 
4 See Joshua Rosenzweig, Op-Ed., China Abandons the Law, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704425804576220102254442640.html; 
Patrick Kar-wai Poon, Exec. Sec’y of the China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Grp., 
Presentation at the 2011 Gwangju Asia Forum: Rights Defense Lawyers and the Rule of 
Law in China (May 16, 2011). 
5 See, e.g., Minzner, supra note 1; Rosenzweig, supra note 4; Evan Osnos, Is China Giving 
Up on Western Rule of Law?, THE NEW YORKER BLOG (Mar. 2, 2011), 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/evanosnos/2011/03/is-china-giving-up-on-
western-rule-of-law.html (asserting that Party-state officials have “mothballed previous 
attempts to improve Chinese courts as a site of conflict-resolution”); Jiang Ping, «Lüshi 
Wenzhai» 2009 Nian Nianhui Fayan: Zhongguo de Fazhi Chuzai Yige Da Daotui de Shiqi 
[Speech at the 2009 Meeting of Lawyers Digest: China’s Rule of Law Is in a Period of 
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In the realm of constitutional law, the Party-state has strictly 
limited efforts to promote the development of constitutional adjudication 
mechanisms.6  Since the National People’s Congress (NPC) created a 
citizen right to offer proposals for review of the constitutionality of some 
legal provisions, the NPC Standing Committee has not issued any formal 
public rulings on citizen proposals and has done little to improve the 
opaque process for handling them.  In an apparent attempt to curtail 
efforts to “judicialize” the PRC Constitution, the Supreme People’s Court 
formally annulled a key 2001 decision that authorized a provincial court to 
apply a constitutional provision as a legal basis for deciding a civil case.7  
At the same time, senior Party leaders have declared that China has 
established a socialist legal system “on schedule.”8  A 2011 State Council 
white paper entitled “The Socialist Legal System with Chinese 
Characteristics” repeats this declaration and places heavy emphasis on the 
socialist dimensions of the Constitution.  While confirming that 
constitutional rights are enforced through the adoption of laws and 
regulations, the white paper is silent on constitutional review and 
adjudication.9  Such events and rhetoric have generated pessimism about 
prospects for constitutional review and enforcement in China.10 
China’s constitutional trajectory provides a reminder of the statist 
orientation of the country’s political-legal system.  As Mirjan Damaska 
has emphasized, structures of state authority and the fundamental 
                                                                                                               
Major Retreat] (Feb. 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.gongfa.org/bbs/redirect.php?tid=4037&goto=lastpost; Teng Biao, Op-Ed., The 
Law on Trial in China, WASH. POST, July 27, 2009, at A19 (describing China’s persecution 
of rights lawyers); Fu Hualing, The Varieties of Law, CHINA L. PROF BLOG (June 28, 2011), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china_law_prof_blog/2011/06/fu-hualing-on-the-
varieties-of-law.html  (“It is the combination of the Party’s confidence and its vulnerability 
that has produced the recent repression and explains China’s recent turn against the 
law[.]”). 
6 As used in this article, the term “constitutional adjudication” refers broadly to the formal 
adjudication of constitutional disputes either by a court or the NPC Standing Committee. 
7 See Guanyu Feizhi 2007 Niandi Yiqian Fabu de Youguan Sifa Jieshi de Jueding 
[Decision of the SPC on Abolishing the Relevant Judicial Interpretations (the Seventh 
Batch) Promulgated before the End of 2007] [hereinafter SPC Decision on Annulling 
Judicial Interpretations] (issued by the SPC, Dec. 18, 2008, effective Dec. 24, 2008) 2008 
FA SHI [SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. INTERP.] no. 15 (LawInfoChina, Peking Univ. Beida Fabao 
series CLI.3.111685), available at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=272499. 
8 Socialist System of Laws Established in China, CHINA INTERNET INFORMATION CENTER, 
Mar. 10, 2011, available at http://www.china.org.cn/china/NPC_CPPCC_2011/2011-
03/10/content_22099470.htm. 
9 INFO. OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL, THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM OF LAWS WITH CHINESE 
CHARACTERISTICS, at §§ II, III (Oct. 2011).  There is no mention of constitutional 
enforcement or review mechanisms in the section of the white paper focusing on future 
improvements to the legal system.  Id. at § IV. 
10 See infra notes 83 and 84 for pessimistic appraisals of China’s constitutional reform 
prospects. 
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orientation of the political system shape procedure.11  China law scholars 
have discussed the statist orientation of China’s system and argued that an 
acknowledgment of this characteristic is essential to understanding the 
function of the Constitution and other legal phenomena.12  In hindsight, 
observers of the emerging constitutional dynamics of a decade ago may 
have been too quick to look past the basic orientation of China’s system 
and interpret these dynamics as a sign that the Party-state might be 
prepared to embrace more robust constitutional adjudication 
mechanisms.13 
However, it would be a mistake to replace such early optimism 
with an excessive pessimism that obscures reform possibilities and 
citizen-state constitutional discourse that does exist in China.  As Mark 
Warren and Baogang He demonstrate, meaningful public deliberation with 
the potential to shape official decision-making is possible within China’s 
authoritarian system.14  Kevin O’Brien and Liangjian Li have documented 
the sometimes successful efforts of rural Chinese citizens to use central 
laws and policies to redress local grievances (a dynamic they call “rightful 
resistance”).15  Recent scholarship on citizen constitutional activism in 
                                                 
11 MIRJAN DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE 
APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 1–15, 47, 184 (1986).  Damaska constructs ideal types of 
state authority (“hierarchical” and “coordinate” systems with horizontal distributions of 
authority) and system orientation (“activist” states focused on social transformation and 
policy implementation and “reactive” states focused on constraining state power and 
providing impartial conflict resolution).  Id.  He argues that procedural form is a product of 
combinations of these ideal types and the degree to which a state approaches the ideal 
types.  Id. 
12 See Donald Clarke, Puzzling Observations in Chinese Law: When Is a Riddle Just a 
Mistake, in UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM 101–02 (Stephen Xu ed., 2003) 
[hereinafter Clarke, Puzzling Observations]; Jerome Cohen, Op-Ed., Law Unto Itself, S. 
CHINA MORNING POST (Mar. 30, 2011), available at http://www.cfr.org/china/law-unto-
itself/p24538; Donald Clarke, China’s Jasmine Revolution and the Legal System, CHINA L. 
PROF BLOG, May 26, 2011, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china_law_prof_blog/2011/05/chinas-jasmine-
crackdown-and-the-legal-system.html.  See also RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG 
MARCH TO RULE OF LAW 55–126, 304 (2002) (discussing competing conceptions of rule of 
law and characterizing “statist socialist” rule of law); Zhu Suli, Guanyu Nengdong Sifa yu 
Datiaojie [On Judicial Activism and Grand Mediation], ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINA LEGAL 
SCI.], no. 1, 2010, at 5, 6–7, 15–16 (discussing ruling Party demands on courts to realize 
goals of harmonious development and the judicial activism necessary to address such 
demands). 
13 Lam, Politicization, supra note 2 (arguing that while the Party-state has increasingly 
emphasized the political role of legal institutions in recent years, this political role has 
always been a feature of the system). 
14 Baogang He & Mark E. Warren, Authoritarian Deliberation: The Deliberative Turn in 
Chinese Political Development, PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS, Jun. 2011, at 268, 269–74.  For 
a detailed discussion of these emerging dynamics and institutions in China, see generally 
THE SEARCH FOR DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN CHINA (Ethan J. Leib & Baogang He eds., 
2010). 
15 KEVIN O’BRIEN & LIANGJIAN LI, RIGHTFUL RESISTANCE IN RURAL CHINA 3 (2006). 
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China suggests that such dynamics are present in the realm of 
constitutional law.16  Michael Dowdle highlights the slow, accretional 
processes of constitutional learning and adaptation generated by ongoing 
state-society interactions in China and notes that opportunities for 
constitutional reform may emerge even during cycles of official 
repression.17 
Could China’s steps away from formal constitutional adjudication 
and its perceived “turn against law” divert attention from alternative paths 
for resolving constitutional disputes?  In the United States, theories of 
popular constitutionalism have challenged the concept of judicial 
supremacy and explored the role of political processes involving popular 
mobilization, deliberation, and bargaining in constitutional interpretation 
and enforcement.18  Both Chinese and Western scholars have emphasized 
the need to look beyond formal adjudication and explore China’s 
indigenous institutions and unwritten constitutional conventions to 
understand the country’s evolving constitutional dynamics. 19   Some 
Chinese legal scholars have concluded that a “latent” or “sub rosa” 
mediation mechanism for resolving constitutional disputes already 
exists.20  Jiang Shigong characterizes such consultative conventions as 
elements of China’s “unwritten” Constitution.21  While some Chinese 
                                                 
16 See Keith Hand, Using Law for a Righteous Purpose: The Sun Zhigang Incident and 
Evolving Forms of Citizen Action in the People’s Republic of China, 45 COLUM. J. TRANS. 
L. 114, 116 (2006) (discussing efforts by legal reformers to use and expand space within 
China’s authoritarian system); Thomas Kellogg, Constitutionalism with Chinese 
Characteristics? Constitutional Development and Civil Litigation in China, 7 INT. J. 
CONST. L. 215, 218 (2009) (discussing citizen efforts to judicialize the Constitution). 
17 Michael W. Dowdle, Of Parliaments, Pragmatism, and the Dynamics of Constitutional 
Development: The Curious Case of China, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 1, 3 (2002).  For a 
discussion of reform opportunities during cycles of repression, see Michael W. Dowdle, 
Popular Constitutionalism and the Meaning of Charter 08 (unpublished ms.) (on file with 
author) [hereinafter Popular Constitutionalism].  The Party-state’s active efforts to 
publicize and implement the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL) during the conservative 
retrenchment that followed protests in 1989 provides an interesting example of such 
“double movement.”  The ALL provided Chinese citizens with the first statutory right to 
sue the state for unlawful administrative acts.  Pitman B. Potter, The Administrative 
Litigation Law of the PRC: Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Reform, in DOMESTIC LAW 
REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA 274–76 (Pittman B. Potter ed., 1994). 
18 See infra Part III(A). 
19 See infra Part II. 
20 Deng Shaoling, “Sun Zhigang An yu Weixian Shencha” Xuexi Yantaohui Zongshu 
[Summary of Study Workshop on “the Sun Zhigang Case and Constitutional Review”], 
ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINA LEGAL SCI.], no. 4, 2003, at 190.  According to Beijing 
University legal scholar Wang Lei, this mechanism does not operate “according to the 
standards and norms in the written constitution, but instead is a dispute resolution system 
similar to civil mediation.”  Tong Zhiwei et al., Sun Zhigang An yu Weixian Shencha [The 
Sun Zhigang Case and Constitutional Review], ZHONGGUO XIANFA JIAOXUE YU YANJIU 
WANG [CHINA CONSTITUTION TEACHING AND RESEARCH NET], Apr. 24, 2004, at 3. 
21 Jiang Shigong, Written and Unwritten Constitutions: A New Approach to the Study of 
Constitutional Government in China, 36 MODERN CHINA, no. 1, Jan. 2010, at 12, 31–37. 
2011]  RESOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL DISPUTES IN CHINA         57      
 
scholars emphasize the importance of moving beyond these latent 
processes, others conclude that constitutional dispute resolution in the 
current system is feasible only through informal coordination.22 
The actions of Chinese citizens also highlight the possibility of 
alternative pathways.  Despite a string of setbacks, Chinese citizens have 
not abandoned constitutional argument.  Instead, they have continued to 
constitutionalize a broad range of political-legal disputes and advance 
increasingly sophisticated constitutional arguments concurrently through 
litigation, petitions, review proposals, academic and popular literature, 
media commentary, and other forums.23  These ongoing efforts provide 
evidence that Chinese citizens seeking to apply the written Constitution 
and establish it as a legal restraint on the Party-state have identified space 
within the existing political-legal structure to advance their long-term 
goals.  Such sustained constitutional activism provides another indication 
that non-adjudicative constitutional dispute resolution processes are 
worthy of study. 
This article reveals a potential evolutionary pathway for resolving 
constitutional disputes by identifying a zone of convergence in China’s 
existing, informal constitutional dispute resolution practices and broader 
trends in its political-legal system.24  At their core, constitutional disputes 
in China implicate unresolved tensions between the leadership role of the 
Party and constitutional provisions on legal supremacy and citizen rights.  
In the context of a weak judicial system and a dominant but pragmatic 
Party-state focused on maintaining stability, these tensions create fertile 
ground for bargaining and consultation.  By shifting focus from the 
individual legal dimensions of constitutional law to its collective political 
dimensions, we can better understand the significance of the Constitution 
and identify patterns of bargaining, consultation, and mediation across a 
range of both intrastate and citizen-state constitutional disputes in China.25  
                                                 
22 Compare Tong Zhiwei et al., The Sun Zhigang Case and Constitutional Review, supra 
note 20 (citing statements of PKU scholar Wang Lei about the problem with operating 
outside “standards and norms in the written constitution”) and Tong Zhiwei, China’s 
Constitutional Research and Teaching: A State of the Art, in BUILDING 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA 107 (Stephanie Balme and Michael W. Dowdle eds., 2009). 
23 See infra Part III(C). 
24 The article focuses on disputes over the meaning and application of the text of the 
Constitution, including disputes over rights provisions and the allocation of state powers 
and responsibilities set out in the Constitution.  The article does not focus on disputes over 
the body of statutes, conventions, and norms that constitute the broader constitutional order.  
ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 36–47 (2010).  
While an analysis of this broader range of constitutional disputes is potentially rich, it is 
also less focused, and it diverts attention from the significance of a text that both Party-
state actors and many citizens recognize as having supreme legal effect.  The article 
contributes to an understanding of China’s broader constitutional order by identifying 
unwritten constitutional conventions for resolving disputes over the constitutional text. 
25  Of course, the distinction between “individual legal” and “collective political” 
dimensions is not always black and white.  The point here is to focus on collective claims 
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Administrative reconciliation and “grand mediation,” dispute resolution 
models at the core of the Party-state’s perceived turn against law, 
emphasize such consultative practices in the context of citizen-state and 
“polycentric” disputes that share features with constitutional disputes.26  
This convergence suggests that the Party-state could choose to adapt and 
apply the grand mediation model to resolve constitutional disputes. 
This article is not intended as a proposal to the Party-state and 
does not argue that the Party-state has already established a grand 
mediation mechanism for resolving constitutional disputes.  It also does 
not seek to convince reformers that they should abandon their efforts to 
establish a constitutional court or NPC constitutional review committee 
(although it raises the possibility that a grand mediation model for 
constitutional disputes, or even existing informal processes, could provide 
better frameworks for promoting their long-term goals in the current 
environment).  Instead, the objective of the article is to analyze the 
political dimensions of constitutional law and their prominence in China, 
identify potential evolutionary pathways within China’s current political-
legal framework, and assess the potential of such pathways to advance the 
long-term interests and objectives of constitutional reformers.  The article 
argues that grand mediation presents a plausible transitional model for 
resolving constitutional disputes within the current political-legal 
framework.  Grand mediation involves a multilevel, Party-state political 
consultation that preserves a limited but meaningful role for the judiciary.  
An adaptation of the grand mediation framework would provide an 
indigenous dispute resolution model for resolving constitutional disputes, 
regularize informal constitutional dispute resolution practices, and bring 
judges to the constitutional interpretation table.  Chinese constitutional 
reformers could use such a mechanism (or existing informal dispute 
resolution practices) to advance their long-term goals of facilitating 
citizen-state consultation, reform concessions, and further the diffusion of 
constitutional norms through the Chinese polity. 
For both comparative law scholars and China specialists, the 
article offers new insights into the dynamics of constitutional dispute 
resolution, the interplay of law and politics in an authoritarian state 
engaged in legal construction and reform, and the objectives and strategies 
of constitutional reformers.  For China specialists, the article presents a 
nuanced story of constitutional development, one that both recognizes the 
fundamental orientation of the Party-state and acknowledges space within 
China’s authoritarian framework.  Constitutional law and dispute 
                                                                                                               
and assess their broader political impacts, rather than to focus exclusively on the success or 
failure of an individual claim in a court or similar legal forum. 
26 See Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394–97 
(1978) (characterizing “polycentric” disputes as disputes that involve multiple parties or 
centers, complicated and interacting webs of interests, and fluid circumstances). 
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resolution in China may evolve in unexpected ways.  Although China’s 
developmental path resembles those of other East Asian states in some 
striking respects, China has a long history of frustrating the visions and 
expectations of foreigners.27  Observers should stay attuned both to the 
possibility that unique or hybrid models may emerge in China and the 
potential that such models may hold for Chinese reformers. 
Part II provides an overview of recent constitutional law 
developments in China and related scholarship.  Part III explains why a 
focus on the collective political dimension of constitutional law reveals 
more about the role of the Constitution in contemporary China than a 
focus on the individual legal dimension does.  Part III also demonstrates 
that constitutional argument is important even in the absence of a formal 
constitutional adjudication mechanism, and that Chinese reformers are 
using such argument to shape public opinion, promote constitutional 
consciousness, and build long-term pressures for fundamental reform.  
Part IV identifies and analyzes patterns of bargaining, consultation, and 
mediation patterns across a range of intrastate and citizen-state 
constitutional disputes.  Part V explores the emerging practices of 
administrative reconciliation and grand mediation and identifies 
convergence between these practices and informal patterns of 
constitutional dispute resolution discussed in Part IV.  Part V then 
discusses the applicability of the grand mediation model in the 
constitutional dispute context, factors that might motivate the Party-state 
to consider such a model, and the implications of such a model for 
constitutional reformers. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA 
Although scholars have discussed China’s Constitution and key 
constitutional law developments elsewhere, a brief review of recent events 
provides a necessary foundation for this article’s discussion.  China’s 
current Constitution was adopted in 1982 and has been amended on four 
occasions.  Like other socialist constitutions, China’s Constitution 
contains a long list of robust civil, political, and socio-economic rights.  It 
also enshrines the political leadership of the CCP, establishes duties to 
maintain public order and uphold the integrity of the motherland, and 
provides that citizens may not infringe on the interests of the state, society, 
                                                 
27 JONATHAN SPENCE, TO CHANGE CHINA (1969).  China’s size, complexity, history, 
political environment, position on the international stage, and large-scale legal construction 
efforts complicate comparisons with transitions in other East Asian jurisdictions.  For one 
thoughtful comparison of China and Taiwan, see Randall Peerenboom & Weitseng Chen, 
Developing the Rule of Law, in POLITICAL CHANGE IN CHINA: COMPARISONS WITH TAIWAN  
155 (Bruce Gilley & Larry Diamond eds., 2008). 
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or collective in exercising their rights.28  The Constitution explicitly states 
that it is supreme law, and Party-state leaders routinely confirm that the 
Constitution has supreme legal effect.29  However, enforcement of the 
Constitution is limited in practice and there is a large gap between the 
structure and values set out in the constitutional text and political reality.30  
As the late William Jones observed in 1985, “the Constitution seems to 
bear no relation to the actual government of China.”31  In this context, 
some observers have characterized the Constitution as a national 
declaration or aspirational text rather than as a legally enforceable 
charter.32 
The leadership’s characterization of the Constitution as supreme 
law and its stated commitment to build a socialist rule of law state create 
tensions in China’s political-legal system.  The operation of the 
                                                 
28 XIANFA pmbl., arts. 1, 33–49, 51–55.  Article 33 provides for a balancing of rights and 
duties. 
29 Id. pmbl., art. 5.  The Party is subject to the PRC Constitution.  Id.  For four examples of 
leadership statements on constitutional supremacy that span the reform era, see 
Communiqué of the Third Plenary Sess. of the 11th Centr. Comm. of the Chinese 
Communist Party (Dec. 22, 1978), at § 3, translated at 
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/special/30yearsofreform/2008-11/29/content_167170.htm 
[hereinafter Third Plenum Communiqué]; Hu Jintao: Xianfa Wei Jianshe Xiaokang Shehui 
Tigong Falü Baozhang (Fu Jianghua Quanwen) [Hu Jintao: the Constitution Provides a 
Legal Guarantee for Building a Well-Off Society (Full Text of Speech Attached)], 
CHINA.COM.CN, Dec. 12, 2002, http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/2002/Dec/241944.htm; 
Wu Bangguo: Jianchi Weihu Xianfa Zuowei Guojia Genbenfa de Quanwei Diwei [Wu 
Bangguo: Persist in Upholding the Authoritative Status of the Constitution as the Nation’s 
Fundamental Law], NEWSSC.ORG, May 10, 2011, 
http://china.newssc.org/system/2011/03/10/013097464.shtml; Weihe Shuo Xianfa Shi 
Zhongguo Tese Shehui Zhuyi Falü Tixi de Hexin [Why We Say the Constitution Is the Core 
of the Socialist Legal System with Chinese Characteristics], XINHUA NET (Mar. 11, 2011, 
2:29 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/observation/2011-03/11/c_121177013.htm. 
30 Clarke, Puzzling Observations, supra note 12, at 103–05; Jiang Shigong, supra note 21, 
at 13; Albert Chen, Constitutions and Values in Three Chinese Societies, Sept. 17, 2009 
[hereinafter Chen, Constitutions and Values], at 50, 54, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1474731; Surya Deva, The 
Constitution of China: What Purpose Does it (Not) Serve?, 2 JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. 55, 
74 (2011).  But see YASH GHAI, HONG KONG’S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 84–86, 89–92 
(1997) (asserting that the preamble, rather than operative provisions of the Constitution, is 
the “secret” to understanding the PRC Constitution). 
31 William C. Jones, The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 63 WASH. U. L. 
QUART. 707, 712 (1985). 
32  See, e.g., id. at 712–14; Clarke, Puzzling Observations, supra note 12, at 105 
(characterizing the Constitution as performing a function similar to that of a “National 
Declaration”); Andrew J. Nathan, Sources of Chinese Rights Thinking, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 125, 130–31 (1986) (describing Chinese constitutional rights as 
“programmatic goals rather than immediate claims on government”); Cai Dingjian, Xianfa 
Zhidu de Fazhan yu Gaige [Development and Reform of the Constitutional System], 
LINGDAOZHE [THE LEADER], no. 25, 2008, available at 
http://reading.caing.com/105849/105893.html (stating that in China the Constitution was 
long viewed as a political outline and declaration rather than as a legally enforceable text). 
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Constitution is shaped by a broad body of constitutional rules and 
conventions, the most important being the principle of Party leadership.33  
While China’s current Constitution must be understood within this 
framework, many citizens have argued that the Constitution should act as 
a legal restraint on the Party-state in practice.34  The leadership’s rhetoric 
creates space for citizens to raise arguments that are grounded in the 
constitutional text, discuss the constitutional implications of public 
disputes, and offer constitutional visions that incorporate more meaningful 
legal restraints on the Party-state.  In some cases, these citizens’ 
arguments shape Party-state action.35 
The 1982 Constitution did not incorporate a formal judicial review 
mechanism.  Neither the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) nor the lower 
people’s courts exercise the power to review and annul administrative and 
legislative provisions that conflict with the Constitution.36  Prior to 2001, 
the prevailing jurisprudential assumption in China was that courts could 
not apply the Constitution in the absence of concrete legislation 
implementing constitutional provisions,37 and courts only occasionally 
referenced the Constitution in their decisions.38  Instead, the NPC and the 
NPC Standing Committee (NPCSC) are charged with supervising the 
                                                 
33 See generally Jiang Shigong, supra note 21; ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 49–73 (4th ed., 2011). 
34 See Clarke, Puzzling Observations, supra note 12, at 106–08; Jiang Shigong, supra note 
21, at 15; Stephanie Balme, The Judicialisation of Politics and the Politicisation of the 
Judicary (1978-2005), 5 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS 1, 4, 6, 18, 22  (Jan. 1, 2005).  See also 
infra Parts III(A), III(C) and IV. 
35 See generally infra Part IV. 
36 ALBERT CHEN, supra note 33, at 61.  The drafters of the 1982 Constitution considered 
but rejected a constitutional court.  Tong Zhiwei, A Comment on the Rise and Fall of the 
Supreme People’s Court’s Reply to Qi Yuling’s Case, 43 SUFFOLK  L. REV. 669, 679 (2010). 
37 Chinese scholars typically cite a 1955 SPC reply regarding a criminal case and a 1986 
SPC rule on sources of law that may be cited in judicial judgments as the legal foundations 
for this understanding.  Some scholars have challenged the conclusion that these decisions 
prohibit judicial application of the Constitution.  WANG ZHENMIN, ZHONGGUO WEIXIAN 
SHENCHA ZHIDU [CHINA’S CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW SYSTEM] 171–74 (2004).  In 2009, the 
SPC issued a new rule on the citation of legal sources in judicial judgments.  While the 
rule does not explicitly prohibit the citation of the Constitution, it does not include the 
Constitution in a list of sources of law that may be cited in judgments.  Zuigao Renmin 
Fayuan Guanyu Caipan Wenshu Yinyong Falü, Fagui deng Guifanxing Falü Wenjian de 
Guiding [Provisions of the SPC on Citation of Laws, Regulations, and other Normative 
Legal Documents in Judgment Documents] [hereinafter SPC Provisions on Legal Citation] 
(issued by the SPC, Oct. 26, 2009, effective Nov. 4, 2009) 2009 FA SHI [SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. 
INTERP.] no. 14 (LawInfoChina, Peking Univ. Beida Fabao series CLI.3.122772), available 
at http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/sfjs/201002/t20100210_1065.htm. 
38 See infra Part III(C); Otto Malmgren, Fragile Constitutionalism in China 8–11 (Aug. 31, 
2010) (unpublished ms.), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1978169; Kellogg, supra note 16, at 
228–34.  See also Tong Zhiwei, Xianfa Shiyong Ying Yixun Xianfa Benshen Guiding de 
Lujing [Application of the Constitution Should Follow the Path of the Constitution’s Own 
Provisions], ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINA LEGAL SCI.], no. 6, 2008, at 22, 28–29. 
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enforcement of the Constitution. 39   The NPCSC is responsible for 
interpreting the Constitution and annulling lower-level legislation that 
conflicts with the Constitution. 40   The NPC and the NPCSC have 
implemented the Constitution principally through the adoption of concrete 
legislation and have fulfilled their other duties to supervise and effectuate 
its enforcement only in limited and largely non-transparent respects.41 
Beginning in 1999,42 a series of rhetorical, legislative, and judicial 
shifts suggested that the dynamics of constitutional enforcement might be 
changing.  In January 1999, then President and Party General Secretary 
Jiang Zemin made a statement that seemed to open the door to the 
establishment of a more robust constitutional enforcement mechanism.  
While emphasizing Party leadership, Jiang stated: 
 
We must progressively establish the authority of the 
Constitution in the entire society and establish and perfect 
a vigorous supervision mechanism to guarantee 
implementation of the Constitution . . . .  The most 
important thing is to standardize and restrict the power of 
state organs according to law and ensure that state power 
is exercised strictly in accordance with the 
Constitution. . . .  We must adopt more forceful measures 
to strengthen effective guarantees for implementation of 
the Constitution, including perfecting concrete systems for 
implementation of the Constitution, launching regular 
investigation and supervision of the implementation of the 
Constitution, and correcting violations of the Constitution 
in a timely manner . . . .43 
 
Three months later, in March 1999, the NPC amended Article 5 of the 
Constitution to add the phrase “[t]he People's Republic of China practices 
                                                 
39 XIANFA arts. 62(2), 67(1). 
40 See id. art. 67(7)–(8).  Some Chinese scholars argue that the NPC Standing Committee’s 
interpretation authority is final rather than exclusive.  Kellogg, supra note 16, at 226–27. 
41 Tong Zhiwei, supra note 38, at 22–23; The Legislative System of China, ZHONGGUO 
WANG [CHINA NET], Sept. 28, 2003 (“Legislation of the NPC and its Standing Committee: 
For a Better Legislative Institution”); Huang Li, Gongmin Weiquan Ke Bu Keyi Yuanyin 
Xianfa [Can the Constitution Be Cited in Citizen Rights Defense?], NANFANG ZHOUMO [S. 
WEEKEND], Jan. 15, 2009, available at 
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=141533. 
42 Of course, constitutional development is an ongoing process and the selection of any 
particular date might be questioned.  Arguments could be made for selecting an earlier date, 
such as the Party’s decision in the mid-1990s to adopt the socialist rule of law formulation. 
43 Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengqiu Dangwai Renshi dui Xiugai Xianfa Bufen Neirong de 
Yijian [Party Central Solicits Opinion of Non-Party Members on Amendment of Portions 
of the Constitution], XINHUA NET (Jan. 31, 1999, 9:15 PM), available at 
http://news.sina.com.cn/richtalk/news/china/9901/013112.html. 
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ruling the country in accordance with the law and building a socialist rule 
of law state.”44   A senior judicial official later tied the two statements 
together, arguing that a basic condition for ruling the country in 
accordance with law is “ruling the country in accordance with the 
Constitution.”45 
Legislative and judicial shifts reinforced the perception that Party-
state attitudes toward the Constitution were evolving.  In 2000, the NPC 
provided citizens the first statutory right to submit proposals challenging 
the constitutionality of administrative rules and regulations to the 
NPCSC.46  In 2001, the SPC issued a major decision authorizing a 
provincial court to apply a constitutional provision on the right to 
education as a basis for deciding a civil case.  The Qi Yuling reply and the 
subsequent provincial high court decision in the case (collectively, “Qi 
Yuling”) generated significant controversy.47  Characterizations of Qi 
Yuling as China’s first constitutional case and as a case in which a 
people’s court relied on the Constitution as the sole legal basis for 
deciding a claim are questionable.48  However, Qi Yuling was a milestone 
                                                 
44 XIANFA const’l amend. III (1999). 
45 Huang Songyou, Xianfa Sifahua Ji Qi Yiyi—Cong Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Jintian de 
Yige «Pifu» Tanqi [Judicialization of the Constitution and its Significance: A Discussion 
Beginning with Today’s SPC “Reply”], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO [PEOPLE’S COURT DAILY], 
Aug. 13, 2001, available at http://constitutionalism.fyfz.cn/art/399444.htm.  SPC Vice 
President Huang Songyou, the architect of the Qi Yuling decision discussed below, was 
elevated to the SPC in the spring of 1999.  Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu 
Weiyuanhui Renming Mingdan [List of NPCSC Appointments], June 28, 1999, available 
at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=96647.  SPC President Xiao Yang, also a 
Guangdong native, likely approved the Qi Yuling decision.  Xiao Yang was appointed to 
the SPC in March 1998. For additional discussion, see Balme, supra note 34, at 20–21. 
46 Lifa Fa [Legislation Law] [hereinafter PRC Legislation Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000) 2000 
QUANGUO RENMIN DAIBIAO DAHUI CHANGWU WEIYUANHUI GONGBAO [STANDING COMM. 
NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ.] no. 112 (LawInfoChina, Peking Univ. Beida Fabao series 
CLI.1.26942), at art. 90.  During the drafting process of the PRC Legislation Law, Chinese 
scholars advocated the establishment of a constitutional and legislative supervision 
committee and included provisions to this effect in expert drafts of the law.  Li Buyun, 
Explanations of the Proposed Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND CHINA 224–25 (Li Buyun ed., 2006).  Detailed provisions for a 
NPC Constitution Committee were included in early official drafts of the Legislation Law, 
but these provisions were abandoned after 1997.  Li Yahong, The Law-making Law: A 
Solution to the Problems in the Chinese Legislative System?, 20 HONG KONG L. J. 120, 
133–135 (2000). 
47 Chen Hongyi, Qi Yuling An “Pifu” de Feizhi yu “Xianfa Sifahua” he Fayuan Yuanyin 
Xianfa Wenti [The Repeal of the Qi Yuling Case and the Problem of Judicialization of the 
Constitution and Judicial Citation of the Constitution], FALÜ SIXIANG WANG [LAW-
THINKER.COM] (Mar. 21, 2009), http://www.law-thinker.com/news.php?id=2241; Huang Li, 
supra note 41; Tong Zhiwei, supra note 38, at 34–37 (critiquing the Qi Yuling decision 
and highlighting its most controversial aspects). 
48 Some observers have characterized Qi Yuling as China’s “first constitutional case” or the 
“first case of judicialization of the Constitution.”  This claim is subject to challenge.  In 
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1988, the SPC issued a reply to the Tianjin Higher People’s Court on a worker injury case.  
In that reply, the SPC directly referenced the Constitution.  The SPC concluded that an 
employer’s effort to contract out of liability for work injuries was “not in accord with the 
Constitution” and that such a contract should be considered “a civil act without validity.”  
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Guyong Hetong “Gong Shang Gai Bu Fuze” Shifou 
Youxiao de Pifu [SPC Reply on Whether an Employment Contract with “No 
Responsibility for Workplace Injury” Is Valid] (issed by the SPC, Oct. 14, 1988, effective 
Oct. 14, 1988) 1988 MIN TA ZI [SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. CIVIL CASES] no. 1, available at 
http://www.lawtime.cn/zhishi/laodongfa/xiangguanfagui/2007042663439.html.  In 1999, a 
Shanghai Intermediate People’s Court cited Article 38 of the Constitution as a legal basis 
for deciding a defamation case.  Tong Zhiwei, supra note 38, at 34.  Some observers have 
suggested that the Constitution was the sole basis for deciding the right to education claim 
in Qi Yuling.  However, the Shandong Higher People’s Court specified that the violation of 
Qi Yuling’s rights continued until the date of its decision and also cited Articles 9 and 81 
of the 1995 PRC Education Law in support of the claim that Qi’s right to education had 
been violated.  Article 9 of the Education Law and Article 46 of the Constitution are 
almost identical, and Article 81 of the Education Law provides for civil liability.  Although 
the violation of Qi Yuling’s rights began in 1990, before the NPCSC adopted the 
Education Law, the Shandong Higher People’s Court’s judgment calculated compensation 
for the entire period, including indirect damages for employment losses from 1993 to 2001.  
Qi Yuling Su Chen Xiaoqi Maoming Dingti Dao Luqu Qi de Zhongzhuan Xuexiao jiu Du 
Qinfan Xingming Quan, Shou Jiaoyu Quan de Quanli Sunhai Peichang An [Qi Yuling 
Case Against Chen Xiaoqi Seeking Compensation for False Use of Her Name to Enroll as 
a Student in Her Technical School, Violation of Her Right to Her Name and Right to 
Education] (Shandong Higher People’s Ct. Aug. 23, 2001) (no official reporter info. 
available), available at 
http://www.ishenglaw.com/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=4350.  In a note attached to 
the judgment, a case editor explains that because the violation was continuous and the 
Education Law was in effect at the time of the lawsuit, application of the Education Law 
provisions was possible.  Id.  Tong Zhiwei states that the Shandong Higher People’s Court 
applied the Education Law.  Tong Zhiwei, supra note 38, at 34.  Shen Kui contests this 
view.  Despite the fact that the Shandong court cited the Education Law in its judgment, he 
asserts that it did not decide the claim under the Education Law and could not have done so 
without applying the law retroactively.  Shen Kui, Is it the Beginning or the End of the Era 
of the Rule of the Constitution?, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 199, 214–16 (2003).  It should 
be noted that Article 84 of the Legislation Law contains an exception to the general rule 
prohibiting retroactive application of legal provisions.  The exception allows retroactive 
application of “special provisions formulated for the purpose of better protecting the rights 
and interests of citizens, legal persons, and other organizations.”  PRC Legislation Law, 
supra note 46, at art. 84.  Because provisions in the Education Law gave concrete legal 
effect to and enchanced protection of the pre-existing constitutional right to educuation, it 
could be argued that the Legislation Law provided a legal basis for applying the Education 
Law.  In short, the proposition that the Constitution was the sole legal basis for deciding 
the right to education claim is contested.  Some courts after Qi Yuling have relied on the 
Constitution, in connection with other laws, as a legal basis for deciding cases, and many 
courts both before and after Qi Yuling have referenced the Constitution in their judgments.  
Tong Zhiwei, supra note 38, at 34–37; infra Part III(C).  In his explanation of the Qi 
Yuling case, Huang Songyou attempted to distinguish the 1988 SPC reply cited above and 
argued that the right to education claim in Qi Yuling could not have been adjudicated 
without direct application of the Constitution.  Huang Songyou, supra note 45.  At the very 
least, given the language of the 1988 reply, the citation of the Education Law in the final 
judgment of the Shandong Higher People’s Court, and related commentary, the 
characterization of  Qi Yuling as China’s first constitutional case must be qualified. 
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in other respects.  In an article published on the same day as the SPC’s Qi 
Yuling reply, SPC Vice President Huang Songyou compared the decision 
to Marbury v. Madison and argued that ordinary people’s courts could 
reference the practice of American courts and directly apply the 
Constitution as a legal basis for judgments.49  Huang’s explicit statement 
on the need to implement the Constitution and for the courts to play a 
more active role in implementing the Constitution was historical.  Some 
Chinese commentators referred to Qi Yuling as China’s Marbury v. 
Madison.50 
Statements by Party leaders reinforced the apparent significance 
of these legal changes.  In 2002, Party General Secretary Hu Jintao gave a 
speech to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the 1982 Constitution and 
made the Constitution the subject of the first Politburo study session under 
his tenure as General Secretary.51  Hu’s speech emphasized the importance 
of constitutional enforcement and encouraged citizens to view the 
Constitution as a “legal weapon” to safeguard citizen rights.52  Senior 
Chinese judicial officials expanded on such messages.53 
This series of events catalyzed a wave of citizen constitutional 
activism.  In March 2003, a banner headline in the progressive newspaper 
Southern Weekend declared “The Road to Constitutionalism: Begin By 
Respecting the Constitution!” 54   Only weeks later, Chinese scholars 
leveraged public outrage over the death of a young man in state custody 
and filed a groundbreaking review proposal with the NPCSC that 
challenged the constitutionality and legality of the regulation under which 
the young man was detained.  Reform-minded Chinese citizens viewed the 
government’s subsequent decision to repeal the regulation as a milestone 
                                                 
49 Huang Songyou, supra note 45. 
50 Tong Zhiwei, supra note 38, at 35–36; Shen Kui, supra note 48, at 199; Balme, supra 
note 34, at 19–21. 
51 Lam, Politicisation, supra note 2, at 44. 
52 Hu Jintao Qiangdiao Jin Yibu Shuli Xianfa Yishi yu Quanwei (Fu Quanwen) [Hu Jintao 
Stressed Progressively Establishing Constitutional Consciousness and Authority (Full Text 
Attached)], ZHONGGUO XINWEN WANG [CHINANEWS.COM], Dec. 4, 2002, 
http://www.chinanews.com/2002-12-04/26/250121.html. 
53 Zui Gao Yuan Xiao Yang: Lun Xianfa de Quanwei—Jinian Xianfa Banxing 20 Zhou 
Nian [SPC Xiao Yang: Discussing the Authority of the Constitution and Memorializing the 
20th Anniversary of the Promulgation of the Constitution], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], 
Dec. 4, 2002, available at http://www.southcn.com/law/fzxw/200212040511.htm. 
54 Xianzheng Zhilu: Cong Zunzhong Xianfa Kaishi! [The Road to Constitutionalism: Begin 
By Respecting the Constitution!], NANFANG ZHOUMO [S. WEEKEND], Oct. 3, 2003, 
available at www.hongfan.org.cn/file/upload/2010/05/19/1274678369.pdf.  The issue 
featured interviews with leading scholars who discussed the meaning of constitutionalism 
and its potential in China. 
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in China’s legal reform effort.  In the wake of this incident, a citizen rights 
defense movement gained new cohesion and momentum.55 
Such events raised the possibility that the Party-state might be 
prepared to infuse the Constitution, long dormant as a legally enforceable 
text, with new life.  Although Qi Yuling generated significant controversy, 
prominent Chinese scholars argued for “judicialization” of the 
Constitution and raised numerous constitutional claims in the people’s 
courts in an effort to build on the case.56  Other scholars focused on the 
development of an improved constitutional review mechanism within the 
NPC.57  In an effort to breathe life into the nascent NPCSC constitutional 
review procedure, citizens filed numerous constitutional review proposals 
and discussed the significance of constitutional review in both official and 
unofficial media. 58   Western observers explored the potential for 
constitutional review and the development of a “fragile” or “nascent” 
constitutionalism in China.59 
The Party-state responded to this constitutional activism with 
some tolerance and with modest reform measures.  As will be discussed in 
Parts III and IV, the Party-state allowed limited constitutional discourse in 
official media, established a specific office and more concrete procedures 
within the NPCSC for review of citizen constitutional review proposals, 
                                                 
55 For a discussion of the Sun Zhigang case and its impacts, see infra Part IV(B).  See also 
Deva, supra note 30, at 76 (discussing the impact of China’s Constititution in “facilitating 
stakeholder activism”). 
56 For a detailed discussion of the judicialization movement, see generally Kellogg, supra 
note 16.  Some scholars promoting judicialization have been careful to distinguish between 
judicial application of the Constitution and constitutional review.  Id. at 225–26. 
57 See generally Zhu Guobin, Constitutional Review in China: An Unaccomplished Project 
or a Mirage?, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 625, 650–53 (2009); Tong Zhiwei, supra note 36, at 
677–79. 
58 For a detailed discussion of citizen review proposal efforts, see generally Keith Hand, 
Citizens Engage the Constitution: The Sun Zhigang Incident and Constitutional Review 
Proposals in the People’s Republic of China, in BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA, 
supra note 22, at 221–42, and Keith Hand, Can Citizens Vitalize the Constitution?, 170 
FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, no. 4, at 15–18 (May 2007).  Other scholars have 
employed the research and analysis presented in the foregoing sources in their own work 
on constitutional reform in China.  See, e.g., Richard Balme and Yang Lihua, The Politics 
of Constitutional Reform in China: Rule of Law as a Condition or as a Substitute for 
Democracy?, 5 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STAATS- UND EUROPAWISSENSCHAFTEN [J. FOR 
COMPARATIVE GOV. & EUROPEAN POL.], no. 3–4, at 463–68 (Dec. 2007) (republished in 
CROSSING BORDERS, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONALISATION 153–
178 (Floria Grotz & Theo A. J. Toonen eds., 2007) and THE CITIZEN AND THE CHINESE 
STATE (Perry Keller ed., 2011)). 
59 Balme, supra note 34, at 22 (tracing the emergence of a nascent constitutionalism); 
Kellogg, supra note 16; Randall Peerenboom, Law and Development of Constitutional 
Democracy: Problem or Paradigm?, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 185, 204 (2005–2006) 
(outlining China’s “nascent” constitutionalism); Malmgren, supra note 38, at 1 (“fragile 
constitutionalism” is taking hold in China); Hand, Citizens Engage the Constitution, supra 
note 58.  For further discussion of these dynamics, see generally BUILDING 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA, supra note 22. 
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and adopted constitutional amendments in 2004 that, at least on paper, 
enhanced property rights protections and confirmed the state’s 
commitment to protect human rights.  In several instances, governmental 
organs also adopted reforms that appeared responsive to constitutional 
arguments.60 
However, the Party-state also took steps to limit the scope and 
impact of emerging constitutional demands.  In 2003 and 2004, Party 
institutions restricted discussion of constitutional reform and senior Party 
leaders began to reemphasize Party supremacy in legislative and judicial 
work.61  The NPCSC, fearful of encouraging an avalanche of citizen 
claims, has intentionally avoided issuing formal public responses or 
rulings on citizen constitutional review proposals.62  Frustrated activists 
liken the submission of a constitutional review proposal to “throwing a 
rock into the ocean.” 63   Chinese “netizens” have reported online 
censorship of terms such as “constitutionalism.”64  Law professors have 
reported the cancelation of courses on constitutional law, interference with 
constitutional law conferences, and the closure of law school centers 
focused on constitutional issues.65  Although Chinese scholars actively 
                                                 
60 Michael Dorf has raised the possibility that the Party-state initially viewed limited 
constitutional litigation as a “useful tool for controlling provincial and local authorities.”  
Michael Dorf, What a Chinese Height Discrimination Case Says about Chinese (and 
American) Constitutional Law, FINDLAW.COM, May 26, 2004, 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20040526.html. 
61 John Pomfret, China Orders Halt to Debate on Reforms, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2003, at 
A1; Jiang Xun, Scholar Put Under Round-the-Clock Watch for Voicing Opinion on 
Constitutional Reforms, YAZHOU ZHOUKAN [ASIA WEEKLY], Oct. 26, 2003 available in 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service [hereinafter FBIS].  Lam concludes that Hu’s 
emphasis on the Constitution began “petering out” in 2004.  Lam, Politicization, supra 
note 2, at 45. 
62 Wang Xiuzhe, Gongmin Qidong Weixian Shencha de Falü Kunjing yu Zhidu Wanshan 
[On the Legal Predicament and System Perfection of the Unconstitutional Review Initiated 
by Citizens], 19 BEIFANG FAXUE 29, 33 (2010); Author Interview with Legal Scholar 
(2007). 
63 “Fagui Weixian Shencha Jianyi Quan” de Kunjing [The Difficulties of “the Right to 
Propose Constitutional Review of Regulations”], LÜSHI JIAOYU WANG [LAWYER 
EDUCATION NET], May 17, 2006, 
http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/15300/157/2006/5/xi882811710171560023223-0.htm. 
64  Ren Kejing, “Xianzheng” Mingan ma? [Is “Constitutionalism” Sensitive?], NANFANG 
ZHOUMO [S. WEEKEND] (Dec. 17, 2010, 5:46 PM), http://www.infzm.com/content/53658. 
65 See Zhongguo Zhengfa Daxue Jiaoshou Xiao Han Bei Tingke Shijian Diaocha 
[Investigation into the Suspended Courses of China University of Politics and Law 
Professor Xiao Han], NANFANG ZHOUMO [S. WEEKEND] (Mar. 25, 2010, 3:35 PM), 
http://nf.nfdaily.cn/nfzm/content/2010-03/25/content_10465543.htm (noting that several 
constitutional law courses were suddenly canceled in 2010).  In 2005 a Sino-Foreign 
conference on “Constitutionalism and Political Democratization in China” was canceled.  
E-mail from Tom DeLuca to author (May 21, 2005) (on file with author); Xianzheng 
Jiangtan Di’er Qi: Zhongguo Fazhi de Kunjing yu Tupo [Second Constitutionalism 
Forum: the Predicament and Breakthrough of China’s Rule of Law], RENDA YU YIHUI 
WANG [CENTER FOR PEOPLE’S CONGRESS AND FOREIGN LEGISLATURE STUDY], May 26, 
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promoted the establishment of a constitutional supervision committee 
during drafting discussions for the PRC Supervision Law, NPC officials 
objected to these proposals and the final law failed to provide for such an 
entity.66 
The Party-state has been particularly careful to limit further 
developments related to constitutional litigation in the courts.  Party 
officials expressed concern about Qi Yuling and viewed constitutional 
litigation as a “latent threat.”67  Following Qi Yuling, senior Party-state 
officials issued internal directives confirming that Qi Yuling should not be 
taken as a precedent.68  Books on constitutional litigation were blocked 
from publication. 69   Senior officials also made public statements 
confirming that the Constitution is not a basis for litigation and that China 
would not establish a constitutional court.70  Finally, as noted above, the 
                                                                                                               
2011 [hereinafter Second Constitutionalism Forum], at para. 1, available at http://www.e-
cpcs.org/newsinfo.asp?Newsid=23342 (noting scholars’ difficulty in scheduling a 
conference on constitutionalism at Beijing University); Beijing Daxue Gonggao [Beijing 
University Notice], Mar. 25, 2010, 
http://www.pku.edu.cn/homepage/notice/bdtz.html?id=59007 (announcing the closure of 
five centers, including the Beijing University Law School Women’s Law Research and 
Service Center and the Beijing University Constitutionalism Research Center.) 
66 Jiandu Fa: Minzhu Zhengzhi Shengzhang Dian [Supervision Law: Development Point 
for Democratic Politics], NANFANG ZHOUMO [S. WEEKEND], Sept. 6, 2002, available at 
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=64130.  The final version of the 
Supervision Law included provisions on NPCSC review of the constitutionality and 
legality of Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate judicial 
interpretations.  Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Geji Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu 
Weiyuanhui Jiandu Fa [Law on the Supervision of Standing Committees of People’s 
Congresses at Various Levels] [hereinafter PRC Supervision Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective Jan. 1, 2007) 2006 ZHUXI 
LING [PRESIDENTIAL ORDER] no. 53, at arts. 31–34 (LawInfoChina, Peking Univ. Beida 
Fabao series CLI.1.78894), available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=5421. 
67 Zhang Qianfan, Zhongguo Xianzheng de Lujing yu Kunjing [The Paths and Difficulties 
of China’s Constitutionalism], CAIJING WANG [FINANCE NET] (Jan. 28, 2011), 
http://blog.caijing.com.cn/expert_article-151521-16381.shtml. 
68 See Huang Li, supra note 41; Second Constitutionalism Forum, supra note 65, at para. 9 
(comments of Jiang Ping); Malmgren, supra note 38, at 14; Beijing Shi Gaoji Renmin 
Fayuan Guanyu Guifan Panjueshu Yuanyin Falü deng Youguan Wenti de Zhidao Yijian 
[Beijing Municipality Higher People’s Court, Guiding Opinion on Relevant Problems of 
Citing Laws, etc., in Standard Judgments] (Beijing Municipality Higher People’s Ct. Dec. 
12, 2005) 2005 JING GAO FAFA [BEIJING HIGHER PEOPLE’S CT. DOC.] no. 341, at § 10, 
available at http://www.chinalawedu.com/falvfagui/fg23079/89204.shtml.  In its decision 
annulling the Qi Yuling reply, the SPC listed “application already suspended” as the 
reason for annulment.  SPC Decision on Annulling Judicial Interpretations, supra note 7.  
SPC provisions published in 2009 did not include the Constitution in a list of legal sources 
that courts were authorized to cite in judicial judgments.  SPC Provisions on Legal Citation, 
supra note 37. 
69 Second Constitutionalism Forum, supra note 65, at para. 10 (comments of Jiang Ping). 
70 Harry Doran, Beijing Rules Out Constitutional Court—Decision Increases Fears that 
NPC Rights Amendment May be Little More than Window Dressing, S. CHINA MORNING 
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SPC formally annulled its Qi Yuling reply in late 2008.  Chinese scholars 
attributed the annulment of the Qi Yuling reply to numerous factors, 
including legal infirmities in the original decision, incompatibility with 
China’s political system and constitutional structure, weak courts, and 
leadership changes.71 
Some observers placed the annulment of the Qi Yuling reply in the 
context of a broader political tightening in China.  Since 2004, the Party 
has launched a series of “socialist legal education” campaigns to shore up 
Party loyalty, identified “rights defense” lawyers as threats, and 
intensified harassment of rights activists.72  In 2008, the NPC appointed 
Wang Shengjun—who rose in the Party political-legal bureaucracy and 
lacked a legal education and formal judicial experience—to head the SPC.  
At about the same time, China’s political-legal institutions launched a new 
campaign to promote Hu Jintao’s “Three Supremes” slogan.  The 
campaign emphasizes that in implementing the law, legal institutions must 
consider the Party’s interest, public opinion, and the Constitution and 
other laws.73  Party-state leaders retreated from earlier rhetoric on the 
Constitution and emphasized instead that China should not blindly copy 
Western systems of government and the concept of separation of powers.74 
Strangely, a case that provided an important and more direct 
catalyst for the formal annulment of the Qi Yuling reply has drawn less 
attention.  In early 2007, a migrant worker named Wang Denghui was hit 
by a truck and suffered severe injuries during his commute home from 
work in a factory in southern China.75  Crushed by a mountain of medical 
                                                                                                               
POST, May 22, 2004, available at http://iw.newsbank.com; Woguo You Renda Jiandu 
Xianfa Shishi, Xianfa Reng Buneng Chengwei Susong Genju [China Implements the 
Constitution through NPC Supervision, Constitution Still Cannot Constitute a Basis for 
Litigation], RENMIN WANG, Dec. 2, 2004, 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/1060/3028137.html.   Scholar Huang Jie claims that 
at a June 2003 symposium with constitutional law scholars held at the Great Hall of the 
People, NPCSC Chairman Wu Bangguo explicitly rejected a proposal to incorporate a 
system of judicial review into the Constitution.  Huang Jie, The Urgent Task of 
Establishing the Judicial Review System, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND CHINA 245 (Li 
Buyun ed., 2006). 
71 See, e.g., Chen Hongyi, supra note 47, at 1–2; Tong Zhiwei, supra note 36, at 677–79; 
Huang Li, supra note 41. 
72 Luo Gan, Shenru Kaizhan Shehuizhuyi Fazhi Linian Jiaoyu, Qieshi Jiaqiang Zhengfa 
Duiwu Sixiang Zhengzhi Jianshe [Deeply Carry Out Education on Socialist Rule of Law 
Concepts, Strengthen the Ideological and Political Construction of the Political-Legal 
Team], QIUSHI [SEEKING TRUTH], Apr. 11, 2006, § III(4) (asserting that “enemy forces” are 
using “the pretence of rights defense to engage in sabotage”), available at 
http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2006/200612/200907/t20090708_8767.htm. 
73 Lam, Politicisation, supra note 2, at 45–46. 
74 See, e.g., We Should Not Copy Western System: Wu, RENMIN WANG, Mar. 10, 2009, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/6610213.html. 
75 This discussion of the Wang Denghui case is based primarily on two sources:  Wang 
Jian, Zhongguo Xianfa Ziyou Diyi An [China First Case of Constitutional Freedom], 
MINZHU YU FAZHI [DEMOCRACY AND LAW], May 5, 2008, and ZHONGGUO XIANFA SHILI 
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bills, Wang applied to the local labor and social security bureau for a 
determination that the injury was work-related.  On the basis of its 
investigation and the Regulations on Work Injury Insurance, the bureau 
determined that the injury was work-related and that the factory was liable 
for compensation.  Subsequently, the factory filed an administrative 
lawsuit challenging the bureau’s determination.  In support of its 
challenge, the factory argued that its employee manual prohibited workers 
from spending the night outside of the facility.  Because Wang had done 
so without permission, the factory argued, he was at fault and the resulting 
injury should not be considered work-related. 
In rejecting this argument and upholding the bureau’s 
determination, the district people’s court handed down a significant 
constitutional decision.  In its judgment, the court stated the following: 
 
China’s Constitution endows citizens with very wide-
ranging rights and freedoms.  Freedom of the person and 
freedom of residence are rights of human dignity that 
citizens enjoy.  The third party [Wang Denghui] was a 
worker and, after a day of stressful labor, returned home 
to rest and attend to housework and his personal life.  This 
conforms with convention, is an important component of 
personal freedom, and is also the most basic right in a 
citizen’s life.  It should be respected.  With regard to the 
plaintiff’s complaint that “the company prohibits workers 
from spending the night outside the facility for the 
purposes of management and consideration of worker 
safety,” this view is contrary to the spirit of the 
Constitution and conflicts with the progressive 
development of a civilized society.  Therefore this court 
will not uphold it.76 
 
The court’s decision expanded on Qi Yuling in several sensitive 
respects.  First, the court applied the Constitution in an administrative case.  
Second, the case was characterized as “China’s first case involving the 
constitutional right to personal freedom.”77  Third, some commentators 
asserted that the court applied the Constitution as a basis for deciding the 
case (although scholars have contested this characterization in subsequent 
                                                                                                               
YANJIU (SI) [STUDY OF CHINA’S CONSTITUTIONAL CASES (FOUR)] 1–28 (Han Dayuan, ed. 
2010) [hereinafter STUDY OF CHINA’S CONSTITUTIONAL CASES (FOUR)]. 
76 STUDY OF CHINA’S CONSTITUTIONAL CASES (FOUR), supra note 75, at 16. 
77 See, e.g., Wang Jian, supra note 75; Liu Xiaomei, “Xifang Guojia Xianfa Jiandu Zhidu 
Bijiao Yanjiu” Yantaohui Zongshu [Summary of Roundtable on“Comparative Research on 
Constitutional Supervision Systems in Western Countries”], ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINA 
LEGAL SCI.] (Sept. 19, 2008) [hereinafter Summary of Roundtable], available at 
http://www.iolaw.org.cn/shownews.asp?id=17294. 
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commentary).78  The case generated significant interest and debate in 
scholarly circles.  The vice dean of one of China’s elite law schools 
expressed “excitement” at the case and a belief that, as courts move from 
constitutional review of private rights to enterprises to non-governmental 
organizations, the trend will spill over to review of state acts and the full 
impact of constitutional review will be realized. 79   At a scholarly 
conference, an SPC judge publicly placed the Wang Denghui case on par 
with Qi Yuling as a “peg” for judicialization of the Constitution, while 
other commentators noted that the case represented a new height for 
constitutional litigation.80 
This sensitive case set off alarm bells in the Party-state ranks.  
Official media sources, including Xinhua, People’s Daily, and Legal Daily, 
appear to have avoided substantive discussion of the case.81  Discussion 
and analysis of the case has been confined to a limited number of 
scholarly sources and blogs.  More importantly, the SPC moved to 
formally annul its Qi Yuling reply only months after the local court issued 
its decision in the Wang Denghui case.  The timing of the SPC’s move, 
after it had allowed its Qi Yuling reply to stand for nearly seven years and 
limited its impact quietly through internal directives, suggests that the 
Wang Denghui case played an important role in the decision to formally 
annul the Qi Yuling reply.82 
Collectively, these events have led to pessimistic assessments of 
China’s constitutional reform potential.  Chinese and Western 
commentators have characterized the annulment of the Qi Yuling reply as 
the end of constitutional litigation and a setback for constitutional 
                                                 
78 See, e.g., Tong Zhiwei, supra note 38, at 39–40; STUDY OF CHINA’S CONSTITUTIONAL 
CASES (FOUR), supra note 75. 
79 Wang Jian, supra note 75 (citing Jiao Hongchang, Vice Dean of the Chinese University 
of Politics and Law). 
80 Summary of Roundtable, supra note 77 (citing statement of SPC Judge Li Bangyou); 
Huang Li, supra note 41 (alluding to the Wang Denghui case). 
81 In extensive online searching, the author was unable to locate any official Chinese mass 
media sources that discuss the case in detail.  Xinhua reprinted a Beijing News compilation 
of “2008 constitutional cases” that lists “Guangdong Court Holds That Enterprise 
Prohibition on Workers Spending the Night Outside the Facility Contravenes the Spirit of 
the Constitution.”  The list contains no substantive discussion of the Wang Denghui case.  
2008 Shida Xianfa Shili Pingxuan Jiexiao [Selection of China’s Ten Major Constitutional 
Cases for 2008 Revealed], XINHUA NET (Dec. 27, 2008, 9:10 AM), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2008-12/27/content_10565849.htm.  The People’s Daily 
Website mentioned the case in an article buried in its fashion section.  See Yuangong 
Xiaban Tuzhong Zaoyu Chehuo bei Fayuan Rending Shu Gongshang [Worker in Car 
Accident on Commute from Work, Court Determines it Was a Work Injury], RENMIN WANG, 
Mar. 3, 2008, http://lady.people.com.cn/GB/1089/6946133.html. 
82 See Tong Zhiwei, supra note 36, at 677 (concluding that China’s leaders repealed the Qi 
Yuling reply because judicial enforcement of the Constitution would “undermine China’s 
political structure”).  The first “constitutional right to freedom” case would certainly have 
magnified this perceived threat. 
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reform.83  Many observers remain pessimistic about the prospects for 
meaningful movement toward the development of a constitutional review 
mechanism (either within the courts or under the NPC) for the foreseeable 
future.84  In the wake of the stillborn push for judicialization of the 
Constitution and the apparent lack of progress in establishing a more 
robust NPCSC review mechanism, Chinese reformers face the challenge 
of finding alternative pathways through which to resolve constitutional 
disputes and promote their constitutional visions. 
A growing body of scholarship on constitutional law has stressed 
the need to look beyond formal adjudication in assessing China’s 
constitutional system.  In part in reaction to the judicialization movement, 
some Chinese and Western scholars have criticized the domination of 
Western, court-focused constitutional theories in discussions of China’s 
constitutional development.  One leading scholar, Jiang Shigong, argues 
that observers must eschew formalism and explore the interaction  
between the constitutional text and the broader body of constitutional rules, 
conventions, and practices that comprise China’s “unwritten 
Constitution.”85  Such conventions include the “fundamental law” of Party 
leadership of the NPC, the relationship between Party and State 
institutions, consultative practices embedded in the principle of 
democratic centralism, constitutional statutes, and other components.86  
Jiang concludes that constitutional theories in China must take account of 
China’s “unique political tradition,” “political reality,” and the interaction 
between these written and unwritten components.87  Other scholars such as 
Tong Zhiwei, Yu Xingzhong, Chen Duanhong, and Zhu Suli emphasize 
the tensions in adapting liberal Western practices to China’s transitional 
political reality and highlight the need to explore the popular demands and 
                                                 
83 Huang Li, supra note 41; Chen, Constitutions and Values, supra note 30, at 50; Zhang 
Qianfan, supra note 67, at §§ 1, 3. 
84 Author Interviews; Huang Li, supra note 41; Zhu Guobin, supra note 57, at 652; 
Thomas E. Kellogg, The Death of Constitutional Litigation in China, 9.7 CHINA BRIEF 
(The Jamestown Found., Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2, 2009, at 4, 
http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/cb_009_7_02.pdf. 
85 Jiang notes that the majority of constitutional law scholarship in China is focused on the 
interpretation and application of the text of the Constitution according to Western models.  
Jiang Shigong, supra note 21, at 13–14, 34–36. 
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indigenous or hybrid institutions that are shaping China’s constitutional 
order.88 
Western scholars have echoed these concerns.  In a foundational 
article on China’s constitutional development, Michael Dowdle argues 
that judicial enforcement of constitutional norms is more likely to be a 
product of, rather than a motor for, constitutional development.  A focus 
on judicial review, he concludes, may obscure China’s existing 
constitutional potential.  Dowdle highlights the consultative and 
deliberative dynamics of China’s legislative institutions and, more 
recently with Stephanie Balme, the expressions of China’s politically 
engaged citizenry, as engines of constitutional development.89 
Some scholars have proposed hybrid or alternative models for 
resolving constitutional disputes, but these proposals leave many open 
questions.  On the issue of constitutional review, for example, some 
Chinese scholars conclude that the most practical mechanism would be 
some form of constitutional committee under the NPCSC. 90   Some 
proposals, such as Ji Weidong’s suggestion that China first establish a 
constitutional committee made up of judges, political figures, and legal 
scholars to issue advisory opinions on constitutional disputes, are quite 
innovative.91  However, much of the Chinese scholarship is focused on 
                                                 
88 See Chen Duanhong, “Zhongguo Renmin zai Zhongguo Gongchandang de Lingdao 
xia”—Zhongguo Xianfa de Genben Yuanze ji qi Geshihua Xiuci [“The Chinese People 
under the CCP’s Leadership”—Fundamental Principles of China’s Constitution and its 
Rhetorical Pattern], Mar. 20, 2008, available at 
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=124568 (stating that scholars who 
ignore the fundamental political fact of Party leadership cannot understand political power 
and rights protection in China); Tong Zhiwei, supra note 38 (criticizing China’s 
“judicialization” movement and arguing that China’s existing constitutional structure, legal 
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Discourse in China, 1978–2005, in BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA, supra note 22, 
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“Chineseness” and noting that the hybrid form of constitutionalism will emerge slowly), 
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89 Dowdle, Of Parliaments, supra note 17, at 7–11, 29.  For populist pathways, see 
Stéphanie Balme & Michael W. Dowdle, Introduction: Exploring for Constitutionalism in 
21st Century China, in BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA, supra note 22, at 2–5.  For 
a recent critique of the focus on American models of constitutionalism, see generally 
Michael W. Dowdle, Of Comparative Constitutional Monocropping: A Reply to Qianfan 
Zhang, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 977 (2010).  For a detailed discussion on the emergence of 
citizen constitutional discourse in China, see generally Balme, supra note 34. 
90 For a discussion of these options, see Zhu Guobin, supra note 57, at 650–52. 
91 Ji proposes a two-step process for establishing a constitutional review mechanism.  Ji 
recommends that China first establish the hybrid constitutional committee described above.  
The committee would make advisory rulings to the NPC and the NPCSC on constitutional 
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theory rather than practice,92 and it is unclear why the Party would be 
willing to give a constitutional committee any more latitude than it 
currently gives the NPCSC or the courts. 
Pan Wei has proposed a transitional “consultative rule of law” 
model.  Pan’s model preserves the Communist Party as China’s sole 
dominant party but incorporates enhanced citizen participation and more 
robust checks and balances, including an independent Supreme Court 
responsible for enforcing civil and political rights enshrined in the 
Constitution.93  While some consultative elements of Pan Wei’s model 
seems plausible, it is unlikely that the Party would voluntarily submit to 
the authority of such a court.  Pan attempts to address this concern by 
arguing that instability, citizen expectations for reform, and popular 
demands for controlling corruption will compel the Party to accept a 
consultative rule of law framework.  Arguably, such pressures would have 
to reach a very high level for the Party to voluntarily take such a dramatic 
step.94  Even if the Party did submit to such a court on paper, it seems 
unlikely that as the sole dominant party it would respect the independence 
of such an institution.95 
 Other Western scholars have discussed the need to explore 
constitutional models that emphasize the role of the Party and do not rest 
on assumptions that China is in transition to become a system that 
embodies liberal Western constitutionalism.  Larry Backer has proposed a 
constitutional review chamber within the Party itself.96  Backer’s proposal 
highlights the need to contextualize constitutional review within China’s 
existing political-legal system.  However, the establishment of an intra-
Party chamber would represent an explicit abandonment of the current 
constitutional text, which vests the power to interpret and enforce the 
                                                                                                               
violations and mediate constitutional disputes between different Party and state organs.  
After fundamental political reform or after the committee gains sufficient experience, 
China would establish a Kelsenian constitutional court.  Ji Weidong, Hexianxing Shencha 
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92 Tong Zhiwei, supra note 22, at 104–06 (criticizing constitutional law training as too 
theoretical and detached from the realities of China). 
93 Pan Wei, Toward a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China, in DEBATING POLITICAL 
REFORM IN CHINA: RULE OF LAW VS. DEMOCRATIZATION 3, 33–35 (Suisheng Zhao ed. 
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framework.  Tom Ginsburg, Confucian Constitutionalism? The Emergence of 
Constitutional Review in Korea and Taiwan, 27 L. & SOC. INQ. 763, 791–96 (2002). 
94 Pan Wei, supra note 93, at 37, 40.  In such a context, a much broader range of 
constitutional options would arguably be in play. 
95 For comparative perspectives, see infra notes 147 to 163 and accompanying text. 
96 Larry Catá Backer, A Constitutional Court for China Within the Chinese Communist 
Party: Scientific Development and a Reconsideration of the Institutional Role of the CCP, 
43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 593 (2010). 
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Constitution in the NPCSC.  As both Chinese and Western scholars have 
argued, such a retreat would raise serious legitimacy questions about the 
Party and its stated commitment to “rule of law,” and it is probably not 
politically feasible.  More importantly, while the creation of such a 
chamber would emphasize and reinforce the realities of Party power, it 
arguably would constrain efforts to balance the multifaceted visions and 
demands generated by constitutional disputes in China’s changing 
political-legal landscape.  The creation of such a chamber might also 
impede efforts to promote consensus with non-Party actors or to navigate 
a future transition. 
Randall Peerenboom also emphasizes the need to consider Party-
dominated models.  While assessing a range of constitutional alternatives, 
he concludes that the Party-state will most likely “continu[e] to muddle 
through, setting aside ideological tensions, jurisprudential puzzles and 
technical inconsistencies, while adopting a results-oriented pragmatic 
approach.”97  Peerenboom’s analysis invites a more detailed inquiry into 
transitional mechanisms that might help to navigate the “muddle” and into 
ways in which China’s constitutional reformers might use such 
mechanisms. 
The events and models discussed above highlight gaps and 
tensions between constitutional law scholarship that emphasizes the need 
to account for the realities of China’s current political-legal system and 
scholarship that focuses on citizen efforts to implement China’s 
constitutional text as a legal restraint on the Party-state. These gaps and 
tensions are worthy of further exploration.  A dynamic analysis of the 
Constitution and its significance requires not only an understanding of 
current realities and constitutional practices (what the Constitution is), but 
also an appreciation for how these conventions may operate (or be co-
opted) to accommodate new constitutional visions and popular 
expectations.  The constitutional dispute resolution model that emerges in 
a changing China, whether it is a liberal Western model, a model 
grounded in current political-legal practice, or a hybrid model, will almost 
certainly be the product of a dynamic interaction between existing 
conventions and emerging demands.98  The hybrid models proposed to 
date are either unrealistic or fail to fully capture these interactive 
dynamics. 
                                                 
97 Peerenboom’s study is focused primarily on the ideological tensions embedded in the 
Constitution and how they might be navigated, rather than on specific dispute resolution 
models.  Randall Peerenboom, Social Foundations of China’s Living Constitution 40 (Jan. 
26, 2010) (unpublished ms.), available at   
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1542463. 
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III. THE COLLECTIVE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CHINA’S ONE-PARTY STATE 
A. The Dual Political-Legal Dimensions of 
Constitutional Law 
It should not be surprising that it might be necessary to shift our 
focus away from formal adjudication in exploring the resolution of 
constitutional disputes in China.  Constitutional law sits at the juncture of 
law and politics.  Constitutions declare national goals and values, provide 
governing legitimacy, define the scope of citizen rights and the boundaries 
of state power, and allocate authority among state institutions.99  As the 
legal expression of these fundamental political orderings, constitutional 
law possesses both political and legal dimensions.100  Constitutional texts 
are the product of political bargaining and deliberation.101  The uncertain 
task of understanding elastic or abstract constitutional provisions and the 
content of unwritten constitutional conventions also creates space for 
negotiation and consensus building.102  Collective values, perceptions, and 
demands, and the degree to which powerful political actors are committed 
to a constitutional vision, shape the operation of constitutional 
constraints.103  The interpretation and application of constitutional law is 
intricately intertwined with the political process and the evolution of the 
broader political environment. 
In the United States, explorations of the dual dimensions of 
constitutional law have prompted some scholars to reassess the centrality 
                                                 
99 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 24, at 38–39. 
100  LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).  See also RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 1–
12 (2007); Mark Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law, 81 CHICAGO-KENT 
L. REV. 991 (2006). 
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ACKERMAN, supra note 101, at 62.  For Chinese discussion of such dynamics, see, e.g., 
Chen, Constitutions and Values, supra note 30, at 10; ZHAI XIAOBO, RENMIN DE XIANFA 
[THE PEOPLE’S CONSTITUTION] 42 (Falü Chuban She, 2009) (noting that the effectiveness 
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political actors), and Jiang Shigong, supra note 21, at 17–22, 30 (noting that the binding 
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and supremacy of courts in interpreting and implementing the American 
Constitution.  In The People Themselves, Larry Kramer argues that for 
most of American history, citizens played a central role in interpreting and 
implementing the Constitution through their political mobilizations.104  
Drawing on this historical account, Kramer characterizes constitutional 
law as a special category of law that is “political-legal” in nature and 
neither has been nor should be solely the province of courts.105  Kramer 
concludes that constitutional law should be the product of interpretations 
offered by a mobilized citizenry, political branches, and the courts, with 
the people exercising final authority.106 
Mark Tushnet offers a similar formulation.  Tushnet characterizes 
constitutional law as “political law.” 107   He also rejects a judicial 
monopoly over constitutional interpretation and argues for a “populist 
constitutional law” in which citizens, through a principled political 
process, take an active role in debating, interpreting, and implementing 
core constitutional values and creating constitutional law.108  For Kramer 
and Tushnet, constitutional or “political” law exhibits a legal dimension, 
and is distinct from ordinary political decision-making, because decisions 
are constrained by constitutional texts, conventions, and precedents 
recognized as binding.109 
Bruce Ackerman has emphasized the role of citizen mobilization 
and political movements in American constitutional transformations.  
Ackerman’s theory of popular constitutionalism focuses on periods of 
“higher lawmaking” or “constitutional politics” in which citizens raise 
collective demands and catalyze constitutional transformations through 
their political institutions. 110   His constitutional moments are the 
culmination of long periods of sustained popular mobilization during 
which reformers advance arguments, recruit supporters, defend their ideas 
against doubtful citizens and conservative opponents, and build a popular 
foundation for new constitutional arrangements.  In Ackerman’s account, 
courts do not catalyze these constitutional transformations.  Instead, they 
are forced to acknowledge the emerging constitutional visions endorsed 
                                                 
104 See generally KRAMER, supra note 100. 
105 Id. at 24. 
106 Id. at 201, Epilogue. 
107 Tushnet, supra note 100, at 991. 
108  MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).  
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109 KRAMER, supra note 100, at 24, 30–31.  Tushnet emphasizes the guidance function of 
text and precedent, rather than the binding nature of past constitutional decisions.  Tushnet, 
supra note 100, at 991, 992; TUSHNET, supra note 108, at 171, 187, 190, 192. 
110 See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) and BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998). 
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by a mobilized citizenry and eventually approve and consolidate them 
through new constitutional interpretations. 
These and other Western theories of “popular” or “political” 
constitutionalism111 highlight dimensions of constitutional law that are 
useful for understanding constitutional dispute resolution in contemporary 
China.  At a certain level of abstraction, elements of these theories 
resonate with some contemporary experiences in China.  Sustained efforts 
by Chinese reformers to constitutionalize public disputes and promote 
liberal constitutional visions remind observers of Ackerman’s emphasis on 
the long periods of political mobilization and consciousness building that 
may be necessary to challenge existing constitutional interpretations.112  
Kramer’s account of the range of political-legal acts that American 
colonials employed to enforce their constitutional understandings also 
resonates in the Chinese context.113   However, such theories do not 
provide a template or formula that can simply be transposed onto China.  
China is a one-party state with a distinct political-legal system, culture, 
and, history.  Instead, these theories bring the duality of constitutional law 
into sharper relief and remind us that even in the United States, where 
there is a long tradition of judicial review, the respective roles of citizen 
mobilization, political institutions, and court adjudication in enforcing and 
interpreting the Constitution are the subject of active and ongoing debate. 
To varying degrees, these theories also provide insight into 
dynamics of consultation and bargaining in the process of constitutional 
interpretation and enforcement.  For example, in Kramer’s departmental 
theory, the political branches of government and the courts offer 
interpretations of the constitution that are neither final nor authoritative.  
Divergent constitutional interpretations are addressed through a process of 
deliberation and negotiation in which the people, acting through their 
political institutions, are the final arbiters. 114   The Supreme Court’s 
                                                 
111 For two other approaches, see Robert Post & Reva Siegal, Popular Constitutionalism, 
Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF.  L. REV. 1027 (2004) (supporting a 
robust role for the courts and arguing that popular constitutionalism and constitutional law 
pronounced by courts shape, balance, and mutually reinforce each other) and BELLAMY, 
supra note 100 (arguing that judicial review represents arbitrary rule and that the 
democratic political process is a more effective mechanism for upholding rights than the 
judicial enforcement of written constitutions advocated by “legal constitutionalists”). 
112 Ackerman subsequently discussed this dynamic in the context of liberal transformations 
in Eastern Europe.  See generally ACKERMAN, supra note 101. 
113 Colonists undertook a range of political-legal acts to enforce their constitutional 
understandings, including public assemblies and denunciations, pamphleteering, letters of 
petition to the government, jury nullification, collective resistance to acts of law 
enforcement, and mob action.  KRAMER, supra note 100, at 25–29.  As this article 
demonstrates, Chinese reformers are using a similar range of political-legal acts to advance 
their constitutional visions. 
114 KRAMER, supra note 100, at 109, 249–53. 
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constitutional interpretations shape this process.115  By recognizing the 
historical role of political institutions in constitutional interpretation and 
enforcement, popular constitutionalists give full play to the processes of 
deliberation, bargaining, and negotiation that characterize such 
institutions.116 
In China’s socialist one-party system, additional layers are added 
to the political-legal duality of constitutional law.  In Marxist legal theory, 
law is an instrument of politics.117  The rhetoric, institutional designs, and 
practice of the Party embody this firm linkage between politics and law.  
Courts, prosecutors, police, state security institutions, justice bureaus, and 
the legal profession are all considered components of a larger zhengfa or 
“political-legal” system, and Party political-legal committees coordinate 
and oversee the work of such institutions at each level of 
administration.118  Political-legal institutions are instructed to consider not 
only concrete legal provisions, but also the political interests of the Party, 
public opinion, and impacts on stability, in resolving legal disputes.119  
The Constitution itself, with its long preamble and textual references to 
the leading role of the Party, the socialist system, and socialist legality, 
firmly anchors China’s constitutional framework in the political primacy 
of the Party. 
While China’s legal system is heavily politicized, its political 
system has also been progressively legalized in the reform era.120  In 1978, 
the Party adopted the construction of a “socialist legal system” as a pillar 
of China’s reform and opening program.121  In 1982, it incorporated the 
concept of the supremacy of the law into the Constitution.122   In the mid-
1990s, the Party endorsed the concept of building a socialist rule of law 
state and administering the country in accordance with the law.  These 
concepts were incorporated into the Constitution in 1999.123  As discussed 
                                                 
115  As the highest judicial organ, the Supreme Court’s interpretations are accorded 
significant weight.  In the many cases in which political opposition is insufficient to 
overcome procedural hurdles and to implement alternative interpretations, Supreme Court 
interpretations may stand as final.  KRAMER, supra note 100, at 235, 252. 
116 Id. at 238–41. 
117  William Jones, Trying to Understand the Current Chinese Legal System, in 
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM 25–28 (C.S. Hsu ed., 2003). 
118 PEERENBOOM, supra note 12, at 302–309.  For a recent Party text that lays out the goals 
and basic mission of the zhengfa system, see Xuexi Shijian Kexue Fazhan Guan ji Shenru 
Kaizhan “Da Xuexi, Da Taolun” Huodong Duben [Textbook Reader on Studying 
Implementation of the Scientific Development Outlook and Deepening Development of 
“Major Study and Major Discussion” Activities], Mar. 3, 2009 [hereinafter Political-Legal 
Textbook]. 
119 See infra Part V(A). 
120 For a foundational discussion and analysis of this process for the period from 1978 to 
2005, see generally Balme, supra note 34. 
121 Third Plenum Communiqué, supra note 29. 
122 XIANFA  pmbl., art. 5. 
123 Id. at art. 5, §1. 
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above, senior Party leaders routinely emphasize that the Constitution is 
supreme law, and the NPC has amended the Constitution to provide 
explicitly that the state protects and safeguards human rights.  The Party 
has adopted such formulations to shore up its governing legitimacy, ease 
pressures for broader political reform, address local governance problems, 
and maintain social stability. 124   In the context of China’s tightly 
controlled political environment, this rule of law campaign has funneled 
many political demands into the legal arena and made courts an important 
forum for political expression and protest. 125   Chinese reformers, 
conscious of the risks of direct political resistance, have attempted to 
leverage and expand these legal innovations to implement constitutional 
rights, push for the establishment of a meaningful constitutional review 
process, and promote the concept of a constitution that restrains political 
actors in practice. 126   In short, Chinese citizens have magnified the 
political significance of constitutional law. 
In a one-party state experiencing rapid economic and legal 
development, the political dimensions of constitutional law arguably are at 
their height.  Fundamental questions concerning allocations of power 
among state institutions, the practical operation of constitutional 
constraints on the Party, the relationship between citizens and the Party-
state, and the role of the Constitution and legal institutions in mediating 
these relationships are unsettled and are the subject of ongoing 
                                                 
124  PEERENBOOM, supra note 12, at 9–26. 
125 Wang Qinghua, Zhongguo Xingzheng Susong: Duozhong Xin Zhuyi de Sifa [China’s 
Administrative Litigation: Polycentric Adjudication], 5 ZHONGWAI FAXUE [PEKING U. L. J.]  
513, 517, 530–531 (2007), available at 
http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/21601/21712/148/2008/12/wy84953835496221800213
30-0.htm (part one) and 
http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/21601/21712/148/2008/12/wy95501449622180022840
-0.htm (part two).  See also Balme & Dowdle, supra note 89, at 6; Deva, supra note 30, at 
76 (explaining that the Constitution facilitates stakeholder activism and provides a 
reference point for reform demands).  State publications have praised such efforts.  See, 
e.g., Cao Lin, Feichang Zeren Weihu Xianfa Quanwei [Special Responsibility to Defend 
the Authority of the Constitution], GUANGMING RIBAO [GUANGMING DAILY], June 6, 2003 
(praising legal scholars for “taking the path of citizen petitions to participate in politics” 
and “solving problems within the constitutional framework”).  Chinese legal activists have 
acknowledged this dynamic.  See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Petitioners Urge China to Enforce 
Legal Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 2, 2003 at A3; Zhang Fan, Lüshi Gei Renda Daibiao 
Zhunbei “Chengshi Fangwu Chaiqian Fa” Yian [Lawyer Prepares Proposal on “Urban 
Housing Demolition and Relocation Law” for NPC Delegate], ZHONGGUO JINGJI SHIBAO 
[CHINA ECON. TIMES], Mar. 2, 2005, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2005-
03/02/content_2638652.htm. 
126 Hand, supra note 16, at 145–47; Randall Peerenboom, Middle Income Blues: The East 
Asian Model and Implications for Constitutional Development in China, in BUILDING 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA, supra note 22, at 98; Zhang Qianfan, supra note 67, at § 2, 
para. 4. 
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contention.127  At their core, all of these questions implicate unresolved 
tensions between the leadership role of the Party and constitutional 
provisions on legal supremacy and citizen rights. 128   Chinese 
commentators characterize this underlying constitutional issue as one of 
sovereignty.129  In the words of one scholar: 
 
In China's current political environment the difficult 
problem of sovereignty is largely encapsulated in [the 
following]: how can the constitutional concept of ‘the 
Chinese people of all nationalities led by the Communist 
Party’ (Preamble of the Constitution) and the political 
reform principle of ‘persisting in the organic unity of 
leadership of the Party and people as masters of their own 
house,’ be implemented through a structure of legal 
rights?130 
 
In this context, the very act of interpreting and applying the Constitution 
implicates fundamental and unresolved political questions.  Political 
processes that facilitate negotiation and a balancing of interests can thus 
be expected to play a central role in resolving constitutional disputes. 
Chinese legal scholars recognize the dual political-legal 
dimensions of constitutional law and the prominence of the political 
dimension in contemporary China.  Veteran Chinese legal scholar Liang 
Zhiping explains that “even if the Constitution has a legal nature, it is 
                                                 
127 Peerenboom, supra note 97, at 22; Balme, supra note 34, at 18–20; Chen, Constitutions 
and Values, supra note 30, at 49; Dowdle, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 17, at 15–
17; Wang Qinghua, supra note 125, at 525.  See also Tong Zhiwei, supra note 22, at 107 
(“[The] striking feature of constitutional scholarship is the lack of a common constitutional 
culture and set of values amidst constitutional experts[.]”); Cai Dingjian, supra note 32, at 
§ 2 (explaining that perceptions of the Constitution have shifted over the reform era, and 
the Constitution is now viewed as a theoretical and legal weapon for citizen rights 
defense); Huang Songyou, supra note 45 (arguing that in China’s transition, the legal 
quality of the Constitution must be strengthened and the Constitution is needed to address 
new social relations, and noting that citizen rights consciousness is rising, resulting in large 
numbers of constitutional disputes). 
128 Peerenboom, supra note 97, at 36; Balme, supra note 34, at 18–20.  See also WANG 
ZHENMIN, supra note 37, at 378 (asserting that the core problem in building constitutional 
review is the reconstruction of political power); Second Constitutionalism Forum, supra 
note 65, at paras. 7, 52 (noting that a core problem with a constitutional court and the 
socialist legal system more broadly is balancing the authority of legal processes and the 
leadership of the Party); GHAI, supra note 30, at 85 (observing that the extra-constitutional 
status of the Party is a core contradiction in socialist constitutions that claim to be moving 
toward legality).  Zhang Qianfan notes that the judicialization of the Constitution failed 
because the Party viewed it as a latent threat.  Zhang Qianfan, supra note 67, § 3, para. 3. 
129 Chen Duanhong, supra note 88, at 1; Jiang Shigong, supra note 21, at 25–26; ZHAI 
XIAOBO, supra note 103, at 1–2. 
130 ZHAI XIAOBO, supra note 103, at 2. 
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different from other laws” because it also incorporates “political elements, 
philosophical elements, and political morals that are intricately related.”  
The “extra-legal” elements, he explains, shape the interpretation of the 
Constitution.”  As Liang concludes, while China recognizes the 
Constitution as fundamental law, the lack of justiciability weakens its 
legal characteristics.131  Jiang Shigong expresses a corresponding idea.  
“We can never regard the Constitution as only a legal document,” he 
asserts.  “Why?  Because the Constitution cannot guarantee itself.  The 
Constitution must be ensured by a political power beyond the law.”132   
Similar themes emerge in other Chinese scholarly sources.133 
Constitutional law scholar Zhang Qianfan captures the duality in 
his concept of “official” and “populist” paths for Chinese 
constitutionalism.  The “official” path, he explains, was embodied in 
efforts to judicialize the Constitution, died a premature death due to 
political constraints, weak courts, and a lack of broad popular 
consciousness and demand.134  However, “populist” efforts to realize 
constitutional rights through political mobilizations, while facing 
significant systemic constraints, have demonstrated meaningful potential 
to promote implementation of the Constitution.135  “The experience of 
constitutionalism in China,” he concludes, “provides proof of Professor 
Larry Kramer’s core point about popular constitutionalism: if the people 
do not actively participate in formulating and implementing the 
Constitution, a Constitution cannot transform into constitutionalism.”136 
B. Obstacles to Formal Adjudication of Constitutional 
Disputes in China 
In this context, China’s courts are poorly positioned to resolve 
complex constitutional disputes or catalyze constitutional transformations 
through expansive interpretations of China’s constitutional text.  Some 
Chinese legal scholars argue that judicialization of the Constitution 
                                                 
131 Second Constitutionalism Forum, supra note 65, at para. 39. 
132  Ji Weidong, Legal Discourse in Contemporary China, in BUILDING 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA, supra note 22, at 132–33 (citing Jiang Shigong). 
133 See, e.g., ZHAI XIAOBO, supra note 103, at 4 (arguing that “judicial constitutionalism” is 
in conflict with China’s Constitution and advocating “popular constitutionalism”); Cai 
Dingjian, The Development of Constitutionalism, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 2, 27–30 (2005); 
Cai Dingjian, supra note 32, at §§ 1, 2; Chen Duanhong, supra note 88; Huang Songyou, 
supra note 45 (noting that while the Constitution has had a strong political influence, it 
must be recognized that the Constitution has both political and legal qualities). 
134 See generally Zhang Qianfan, supra note 67, at § 3, paras. 3–5.  Other scholars offer 
similar fourmualtions that distinguish between the path of judicialization and the path of 
popular constitutional enforcement represented by the Sun Zhigang case.  Tong Zhiwei, 
supra note 38, at § 1. 
135 Zhang Qianfan, supra note 67,  at §§ 4, 5. 
136 Id. at § 6, para. 1. 
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violates China’s constitutional structure and the principle of rule of law.137  
Even if Chinese courts successfully challenged such constitutional 
assumptions and applied constitutional provisions as the basis for deciding 
cases, they exercise neither the power of judicial review nor the power of 
constitutional interpretation.  One attempt by a local court to exercise such 
powers in a mundane contract case generated national controversy and 
legislative backlash.138  There is no system of formal, binding precedent in 
China, a condition that would facilitate the incremental development of 
constitutional principles through an evolving body of case law. 139  
Collegial panels composed of up to three judges hear cases, and court 
rules require adjudication committees made up of senior court leaders to 
approve decisions in “major” or “complex” cases.140  The Party also 
exercises tight control over court appointments and promotions through its 
nomenklatura system, and it closely monitors the work of legal 
institutions through Party Political-Legal Committees and Party cells.141  
These features constrain the work of courts and individual judges, who 
may view themselves more as civil servants implementing policy than as 
independent judicial officials.142  The NPCSC is subject to similar political 
constraints.143 
Chinese courts are also weak with respect to other state actors. 
Law enforcement personnel often outrank judges on the Party political-
legal committees that oversee the work of courts (although recent 
developments suggest that this power dynamic may be changing).144  
                                                 
137 See, e.g., id. at §§ 1, 3. 
138 See infra Part IV(A)(2). 
139  STANLEY LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 294 (1999).  
Chinese courts are instituting a system of “guiding” cases.  While the cases may act as de 
facto precedents, they have no formal binding effect.  Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu 
Yinfa “Renmin Fayuan Di Sange Wunian Gaige Gangyao (2009–2013)” de Tongzhi 
[Supreme People’s Court’s Notice on “People’s Courts’ Third Five-Year Reform Outline 
(2009–2013)”] (issued by the Sup. People’s Ct., Mar. 17, 2009, effective Mar. 17, 2009) 
2009 FAFA [SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. CIRCULAR] no. 14 (LawInfoChina, Peking Univ. Beida 
Fabao series CLI.3.114912), available at 
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=chl&gid=114912.  Moreover, 
senior court leaders tightly control the selection of guiding cases.  Author’s Discussions 
with Chinese Judicial Officials (Summer 2008). 
140 See generally Susan Finder, 2010 Reforms in the Chinese Courts: Reforming Judicial 
Committees, 3 BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS—ASIA PACIFIC, no. 5 (2010). 
141 PEERENBOOM, supra note 118, at 302–04; Zhang Qianfan, supra note 67, at § 3, paras. 4, 
5; Zhu Suli, supra note 88, at 26–27.  For  information about the nomenklatura system, see 
KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA 234–37 (2004). 
142 Zhu Suli, supra note 88, at 60. 
143 Jiang Shigong, supra note 21, at 25. 
144 There are signs that the Party may institute reforms to address this imbalance.  For both 
past practice and contemporary reform discussions, see Wang Liping, You Gaoyuan 
Yuanzhang Ren Zhengfawei Shuji Xiangdao [Thoughts From the Appointment of a 
Provincial High Court President as Secretary of the Political-Legal Committee], ZHENGYI 
WANG [JUSTICE NET] (Nov. 26, 2011), http://wlp2026.fyfz.cn/art/1046573.htm (tracing the 
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Local governments control court budgets and judicial salaries and often 
pressure courts.  In the administrative law context, courts are turning to 
“reconciliation” rather than adjudication in part to avoid issuing 
judgments on the legality of administrative actions that may anger local 
state actors and are difficult to enforce.145  These dynamics would be 
heightened in constitutional cases involving sensitive issues of human 
rights and constitutional constraints on Party-state power. 
Even if China established a constitutional court or committee, 
such a body would likely apply the Constitution conservatively.  In some 
cases, people’s courts have cited constitutional provisions enshrining 
Party leadership or conditioning rights with duties in order to negate or 
deflect constitutional rights arguments.146  A constitutional adjudication 
institution could adopt a similar, conservative balancing of constitutional 
rights and duties.147  Popular concern about threats to social stability and 
                                                                                                               
historical evolution of Political-Legal Committees) and Chen Youxi, Sifa Duli Shenpan 
Ying Cong Youhua Zhengfawei Jiegou Rushou [Independent Judicial Adjudication Should 
Commence by Optimizing the Structure of the Political-Legal Committee], NANFANG 
ZHOUMO [S. WEEKEND], Nov. 30, 2011, available at 
http://www.qstheory.cn/zz/fzjs/201111/t20111130_126607.htm (discussing the 
significance of the appointment of the President of the Sichuan province Higher People’s 
Court to the position of Secretary of the provincial Political-Legal Committee, but noting 
that this is only a single appointment). 
145 See infra Part V(B). 
146 See, e.g., Suqian Intermediate People’s Court of Jiangsu Province, Criminal Verdict, 
(issued by the Suqian Interm. Crim. 2d Div., Oct. 16, 2009) (no official reporter info. 
available), translated in 
http://www.duihua.org/work/verdicts/verdict_Guo%20Quan_en.htm (translating the 
verdict in the criminal trial of Guo Quan, a subversion case in which the Jiangsu court 
cited constitutional provisions on public order to reject defendant’s argument that he was 
exercising constitutional rights of freedom of speech and association).  See also Jinshan Su 
360 Dongshizhang Mingyu Qinquan An Zhongshen Luochui: Zhou Hongyi Bei Pan 
Shanchu Wuruxing Weibo Bing Pei 5 Wan Yuan [Final Verdict in Defamation Case of 
Jinshan Against 360 CEO: Zhou Honghei Ordered to Delete Offensive Microblog Postings 
and Pay 50,000 Yuan in Compensation], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], Aug. 31, 2011, 
available at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/society/content/2011-
09/05/content_2926758.htm?node=28813 (discussing a defamation case in which a Beijing 
court confirmed that the Constitution protects the right to expression but also noted that 
citizens posting on Weibo should avoid attacking others with offensive words). 
147 Singapore is a soft authoritarian system that engages in such balancing.  Singapore’s 
Constitution authorizes the legislature to adopt statutes restricting some civil and political 
rights in the interest of security, public order, health, or morality.  CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE arts. 14–16 (Sing.).  Singapore’s courts have interpreted such 
provisions broadly to validate restrictions on some civil and political rights and to limit the 
role of the courts in policing related policies.  Li-ann Thio, Rule of Law within a Non-
Liberal ‘Communitarian’ Democracy: The Singapore Experience, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF 
RULE OF LAW 199–208 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004).  In some cases, Singaporean 
courts have referenced Asian cultural values to qualify rights.  Ang Hean Leng, 
Constitutional Rights Adjudication in Asian Societies, 2011 The Law Rev. (Thomson 
Reuters) at 262–264, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1903697. 
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conservative attitudes toward law and rights might also influence the 
decisions of such an institution. 148   In the unlikely event that a 
constitutional adjudication institution adopts a balancing of constitutional 
rights and duties that senior Party-state leaders oppose, such leaders could  
issue directives prohibiting lower courts from following the 
interpretation,149 or the NPC could simply amend the Constitution and 
negate the ruling with a two-thirds majority vote.150  Party control over the 
NPC and its agenda would present a constitutional check on any 
expansive court decisions. 
The experience of constitutional courts in South Korea and 
Taiwan suggests that the impact of such an institution would be limited in 
China’s authoritarian system.  Both South Korea and the Republic of 
China established constitutional courts under post-war constitutions.151  
Authoritarian governments effectively marginalized these institutions for 
decades.152  The Guomindang in Taiwan and a succession of military 
governments in Korea employed a variety of mechanisms to marginalize 
constitutional courts, including strict political control over judicial 
appointments, executive control of judicial budgets and administration, the 
ongoing threat of corruption prosecutions, and tight restrictions on entry to 
                                                 
148 Peerenboom & Chen, supra note 27, at 148.  Zhang Qianfan attributes the failed 
judicialization of China’s Constitution in part to a lack of popular consciousness and 
support.  Zhang Qianfan, supra note 67, at § 3, para. 5. 
149 Such steps were taken to limit the impact of the Qi Yuling case.  See supra note 68 and 
accompanying text. 
150 XIANFA art. 62(1), 64.  When Singapore’s Court of Final Appeal issued an expansive 
interpretation of Singapore’s due process clause to limit the effect of the Internal Security 
Act, the ruling People’s Action Party amended the Constitution to curtail judicial review 
and undermine the effect of the precedent.  Gordon Silverstein, Singapore: The Exception 
that Proves Rules Matter, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN 
REGIMES 78–83 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008) [hereinafter RULE BY LAW].  
For a similar incident in Korea, see infra note 157 and accompanying text.   
151 In Korea, a succession of different institutions exercised the power of constitutional 
review.  THOMAS GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 208–213 (2003). 
152 See generally GINSBURG, supra note 151, at 106–09, 117–35, 208–13; Sean Cooney, 
The Effects of Rule of Law Principles in Taiwan, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW, 
supra note 147, at 411, 420–22; Tsung-fu Chen, The Rule of Law in Taiwan: Culture, 
Ideology, and Social Change, in UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 117, 
at 378–85, 389–91. 
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the legal profession.153  Many sensitive political cases were handled in 
military courts or through administrative processes.154 
Authoritarian governments also erected procedural obstacles to 
make it difficult to raise constitutional claims and issue constitutional 
decisions.  For example, from 1948 to 1958, Taiwan’s Council of Grand 
Justices (CGJ) could issue a constitutional interpretation only in response 
to a petition by a central or local government agency.  From 1958 to 1993, 
an individual could file a constitutional claim only if he or she disputed 
the constitutionality of a legal provision relied on by a court of final resort 
and exhausted all remedies.155  Until the late 1970s, the CGJ had no power 
to review the constitutionality of lower court decisions. 156   In both 
jurisdictions, national statutes required supermajorities of two thirds to 
three fourths of justices for the adoption of constitutional interpretations, 
making it unlikely that these institutions would challenge political 
actors.157 
Constitutional courts also faced the threat of political backlash.  
When Korea’s Supreme Court invalidated provisions of a government 
compensation statute and a statutory provision requiring a two-thirds 
supermajority for constitutional decisions, authoritarian President Park 
Chung-Hee engineered amendments to the Korean Constitution that 
vested him with the power to re-nominate judges to a weakened Supreme 
                                                 
153 GINSBURG, supra note 151, at 122, 129–30, 211–12; Tsung-fu Chen, supra note 152, at 
390–91, 398.  For restrictions on the legal profession during authoritarian eras and the 
importance of expanded access to the profession in liberalizations in Taiwan and South 
Korea, see generally Tom Ginsburg, Law and the Liberal Transformation of the Northeast 
Asian Legal Complex, Illinois Public Law Research Paper no. 6-03, May 2006, 1, 7–9, 12–
13, 14–27. 
154 GINSBURG, supra note 151, at 114; Tsung-fu Chen, supra note 152, at 390–92; Cho Kuk, 
Korean Criminal Law and Democratization, in LEGAL REFORM IN KOREA 75–77 (Tom 
Ginsburg ed., 2004). 
155 History of the Justices Authority, JUSTICES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, JUDICIAL 
YUAN (May 26, 2009), 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/CONSTITUTIONALCOURT/en/p01_05.asp [hereinafter CGJ 
History]. 
156 Id.; GINSBURG, supra note 151, at 135–36, 211–13.  In Korea, only an ordinary court 
could ask the Constitutional Committee of the First Republic (1948–1960) to rule on the 
constitutionality of a law.  The Supreme Court retained authority to adjudicate the 
constitutionality of administrative regulations.  From 1972 to 1986, only the Supreme 
Court could refer questions to the Constitutional Committee.  Id. at 211–13. 
157 CGJ History, supra note 155 (stating that a supermajority of two thirds of voting judges 
was required to issue a constitutional interpretation from 1948–1958, and a quorum of 
three quarters of justices and a three-quarters supermajority was required to issue an 
interpretation from 1958–1993); GINSBURG, supra note 151, at 132, 211–12 (stating that 
the Korean Court Organization Act was amended in 1970 to raise the threshold for a 
constitutional interpretation to two thirds in an attempt to preempt an unfavorable ruling in 
a sensitive case).  This threshold was later raised to require the votes of seven of nine 
members of the Korean Constitutional Committee.  INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL 
SYSTEM OF KOREA 263 (Sang-Hyun Song ed., 1983). 
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Court and shifted the power of constitutional review to a new 
constitutional committee that he controlled. 158   Park subsequently 
excluded the Supreme Court justices who had voted against him.  
Similarly, a 1950s CGJ decision angered the Guomindang-controlled 
legislature, which responded by curtailing the Council’s jurisdiction and 
raising the threshold for a constitutional interpretation.159  In the face of 
the authoritarian constraints described here, constitutional courts in both 
jurisdictions remained largely dormant during authoritarian eras and 
emerged as activist guardians of constitutional rights only after political 
openings and constitutional reform in the 1980s and early 1990s.160 
In China’s current political environment, it is unlikely that a court 
or an NPC committee would apply the Constitution expansively.  
Fundamental questions related to the Constitution are unsettled.  Law in 
China (and constitutional law in particular) is highly politicized, and the 
Party carefully monitors both judicial and legislative institutions.  Even if 
a constitutional court or similar institution were created on paper, Party 
leaders would have many tools to limit the impact of such an institution.  
Already, Chinese courts are distancing themselves from sensitive 
administrative law cases that expose the limits of their authority and 
generate backlash.161  As the records of similar institutions in South Korea, 
Taiwan and other jurisdictions demonstrate, constitutional courts are more 
likely to consolidate, rather than create, political openings.162  In short, a 
commitment to political reform is almost certainly a precondition to the 
establishment of effective constitutional adjudication and meaningful 
rights enforcement in China.163 
                                                 
158 GINSBURG, supra note 151, at 211–13. 
159 Id. at 131–33.  The CGJ found only one statute unconstitutional between 1948 and 1976.  
The government simply ignored that ruling.  The CGJ decision represented an effort to 
assert judicial control over court finances.  Id. at 124, 133–34. 
160 Once political transitions were underway, both the CGJ in Taiwan and the Korean 
Constitutional Court took an active role in dismantling the pillars of authoritarian 
governance and interpreting constitutional provisions expansively to restrain state power.  
GINSBURG, supra note 151, at 157, 208–13, 240–44; Tsung-fu Chen, supra note 152, at 
386–96.  Even political reform is no guarantee of an activist court, however.  Japan’s 
Supreme Court has struck down only a handful of statutes or government acts as 
unconstitutional.  The court has been characterized as one of the most conservative in the 
world.  See David S. Law, Why Has Judicial Review Failed in Japan?, 88 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1425–28 (2010–2011). 
161 See infra Part V(B). 
162 Randall Peerenboom, CHINA MODERNIZES: THREAT TO THE WEST OR MODEL FOR THE 
REST (2007).  See Dowdle, Of Parliaments, supra note 17, at 25–26 (“[W]ith the exception 
of South Africa, judicial review played little role in the third wave of democratic 
transitions.”); Hand, supra note 58, at 19. 
163 See WANG ZHENMIN, supra note 37, at 378 (arguing that resolving the problem of 
constitutional review depends on political reform); Jiang Ping, supra note 5; Cai Dingjian, 
supra note 32, at §§ 1, 2; Ji Weidong, supra note 91, at 9; Zhang Qianfan, supra note 67, at 
§§ 1, 3, 6; Peerenboom, supra note 126, at 88, 95.  Even in the wake of a transformative 
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C. Using the Constitution to Shape China’s Political 
Environment 
In such an environment, how might citizens use the Constitution 
to create pressures for the type of political reforms that would enable a 
constitutional adjudication institution to perform a more meaningful role?  
O’Brien and Li’s concept of “rightful resistance” in rural China provides 
one perspective.164  Chinese citizens are citing central laws and policies, 
leveraging elite allies, and applying multiple and escalating measures to 
challenge local injustices.  O’Brien and Li characterize these tactics as a 
type of “boundary-spanning” behavior that occupies a gray zone between 
accepted and transgressive contention.  To navigate this uncertain zone, 
rightful resisters remain focused on clear-cut violations of central laws and 
have generally refrained from broader constitutional arguments. 165  
Prominent rights defenders have applied similar tactics in the context of 
constitutional law, and O’Brien and Li suggest that rightful resistance 
could be shaping popular attitudes in potentially transformational ways.166  
However, given the flexibility and tensions in China’s Constitution, 
rightful resistance in the realm of constitutional law arguably involves 
some dynamics that differ from the rural dynamics that O’Brien and Li 
document. 
 Dowdle’s model of pragmatic constitutional development 
provides insight into such broader dynamics.  Dowdle argues that 
successful constitutionalism is the product of a slow, transformative 
process of constitutional learning.  This process is fueled by ongoing 
patterns of discourse between and within state and society and a slow, 
accretional process he calls “discursive benchmarking.”167  The center 
identifies innovations to address social problems through consultative 
processes and validates them through legal or policy changes.  Other 
social and political actors adapt and expand innovations to their own 
needs.  This process of adaptation and expansion in turn diffuses, 
legitimizes, and embeds new constitutional practices and visions.  Dowdle 
emphasizes the cooperative dynamics of constitutions and the processes of 
deliberation, consultation, and bargaining necessary to establish consensus 
                                                                                                               
political shift, judicial protection of rights may be constrained until a new political 
consensus is constitutionalized.  ACKERMAN, supra note 101, at 112. 
164 O’BRIEN & LI, supra note 15. 
165 Id. at 60, 122. 
166 Id. at 116–29. 
167 Dowdle, Of Parliaments, supra note 17, at 140–60.  See also Peter L. Lorentzen & 
Suzanne E. Scoggins, Rising Rights Consciousness: Undermining or Undergirding 
China’s Stability?, at 10–11 (Sept. 1, 2011) (unpublished ms.), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1722352 (arguing that rising rights 
consciousness involves an interaction between changing state policies and shifts in values 
and the perception of values held by others). 
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about the content and operation of abstract or evolving constitutional 
norms.168 
Baogang He and Mark Warren’s concept of authoritarian 
deliberation also provides a useful framework for understanding the 
potential impacts of constitutional argument.  He and Warren theorize that 
controlled but genuine deliberation that influences decision-making is 
possible in authoritarian systems.169  They find evidence of such dynamics 
in the emergence of a range of consultative and deliberative practices in 
China, including village elections, public hearings, the solicitation of 
public comment in lawmaking, deliberative polling, and limited debate in 
the press and on the Internet.170  They also note that rights-based actions 
have catalyzed deliberative interactions.171  Assessing the implications of 
such patterns for China’s political development, He and Warren conclude 
that authoritarian deliberation will most likely assist the Party-state in co-
opting opposition forces and enhancing its capacity and legitimacy.  
However, they also acknowledge that such processes could promote 
democratic political dynamics by fueling the incremental development of 
institutions and related citizen expectations that are not easily contained.172 
The heavy emphasis that domestic Chinese actors place on 
consensus building and evolutionary development processes in the context 
of constitutional disputes reinforces these theoretical perspectives.  It also 
suggests that some Chinese constitutional reformers are synthesizing 
rightful resistance and discursive benchmarking dynamics.  Many Chinese 
commentators argue that the resolution of constitutional disputes and the 
development of constitutionalism in China will be the product of an 
interactive process involving top-down decision-making, grassroots 
pressure, and sustained citizen-state dialogue and compromise.173  For 
                                                 
168 Dowdle argues that in an emerging constitutional system such as China’s, legislatures 
have unique capacities to promote these dynamics.  Dowdle, Of Parliaments, supra note 
17, at 1, 3–4, 161–65. 
169 He & Warren, supra note 14, at 269–74.  He and Warren define deliberation as an 
enabling of discursive space in which participants are not merely consulted but in which 
arguments, ideas, and preferences are exchanged and actually influence decision-making.  
Id. 
170 Id. at 274–80. 
171 Id. at 278. 
172 Id. 282–84. 
173 For examples of these themes in academic literature, see generally Zhang Qianfan, 
supra note 67, at § 2, paras. 3–4, § 6; Cai Dingjian, supra note 133, at 27–29.  For media 
commentary, see Chen Zhishi, Shehui Wending Xuyao Zhongjianpai [Social Stability 
Requires a Moderate Faction], NANFANG ZHOUMO [S. WEEKEND], June 26, 2010, at F29, 
available at http://www.infzm.com/content/47000 (praising the resolution of a 
constitutional dispute over electoral reform in Hong Kong through moderation and 
political compromise and suggesting that the mainland should borrow this model); Cao 
Zhenghan, Baochi Shehui Wending: Ying Gaijin ‘Fensan Shaoguolu’ de Zhili Fangshi—
Zouchu ‘Zhongyang Zhi Guan, Difang Zhimin Jiu Geju [Preserving Social  Stability: We 
Should Improve On the “Scattered Burning Furnances” Model of Governance—Leaving 
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example, the late Cai Dingjian characterized the process of exercising 
constitutional rights as a “negotiation” with the Party-state and 
constitutionalism as the product of a slow interactive and step-by-step 
process of grassroots demands and corresponding Party-state 
accommodation.174  Zhai Xiaobo emphasizes the existence of divergent 
views on elastic constitutional provisions and the building of 
constitutional compromises and consensus through an interactive process 
involving “popular, political, deliberative and democratic channels.”175  
China’s constitutional text is one of multiple sources of authority that 
shape this bargaining.176  While recognizing the necessity and challenges 
of working within China’s existing Party-state structure, Chinese 
observers emphasize that collective grassroots collective pressure is 
essential for reform, and that citizens will not realize constitutional rights 
without making collective demands on the Party-state. 177   These 
approaches represent a synthesis of rightful resistance and discursive 
benchmarking dynamics within China’s existing deliberative space. 
Sustained constitutional argument plays an important role in 
generating such collective demands.  In an authoritarian state, citizens 
may perceive the potential costs of individual resistance to constitutional 
                                                                                                               
the Old Model of “The Center Governing Officials, and Local Government Governing the 
People”], NANFANG ZHOUMO [S. WEEKEND] (June 23, 2010, 9:52 PM), 
http://www.infzm.com/content/46702/0 (discussing the necessity of sustained processes of 
negotiation, conflict and compromise, and popular validation). 
174 Cai Dingjian, supra note 133, at 28–29; Cai Dingjian, supra note 32, at § 2 (noting that 
the establishment of constitutional review will be a long process in which citizens will 
continually challenge the constitutional review system and the highest organs of state 
power will gradually adjust to the challenges). 
175 See ZHAI XIAOBO, supra note 103, at 5–7, 48 (“‘The people are true actors in 
representative institutions, the electoral process, the media and Internet, citizen exchanges 
and public movements, formal channels and informal public space, acclaims and cheers, 
and anger and blame.”). 
176 Cai Dingjian, supra note 133, at 25.  See also Peerenboom, supra note 126, at 87 
(submitting that the Constitution provides a backdrop against which legal reforms and the 
balance of power are negotiated). 
177 See Cai Dingjian, supra note 133, at 27–29; Zhang Qianfan, supra note 67, at § 6 
(emphasizing the crucial role of bottom-up forces, but noting that constitutionalism 
involves a complex balancing of ruling party interests, local interests, and citizen demands 
and cannot simply be “populist”); Second Constitutionalism Forum, supra note 65, para. 
69 (citing He Weifang); ZHAI XIAOBO, supra note 103, at 42.  It should be acknowledged 
that Chinese scholars emphasizing consultative dynamics may be motivated by different 
visions of the Chinese state.  While it seems clear that scholars such as Zhang Qianfan and 
Cai Dingjian seek to promote a liberal constitutional model for China, others may 
emphasize consultative practices and political processes of constitutional dispute resolution 
to strengthen or justify the existing system.  This possibility reinforces one of the core 
arguments in the article.  To the extent both conservative and liberal scholars view 
constitutional dispute resolution as a consultative, interactive process, divergent 
intellectual factions have at least some rhetorical common ground that can be employed to 
explore transitional mechanisms. 
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violations to be high.178  As constitutional arguments are advanced and 
discussed, they generate awareness of the Constitution and build common 
understandings of constitutional rights.179  If citizens believe that their 
understanding of the Constitution reflects a broad consensus and that 
others are acting on that understanding, they will be more likely to raise 
constitutional arguments to redress perceived violations themselves.180  
Constitutional reformers are working to raise constitutional consciousness 
both by promoting shifts in values and by strengthening the perception 
that other citizens hold similar views and will support or advance similar 
claims.181  These efforts help to drive the discursive benchmarking process 
and embed emerging constitutional visions. 
Constitutional argument may fuel this feedback dynamic even in 
the absence of a concrete legal outcome.  Certainly, concessions or 
reforms that are perceived to be responses to constitutional activism may 
generate a sense of empowerment and encourage new arguments that fuel 
the cycle further.182  However, constitutional argument builds awareness 
and promotes information exchange even in the absence of a positive state 
response.183  Citizens may view a failed constitutional argument as only 
one step in a sustained, multifaceted effort to address particular 
constitutional concerns and build shared understandings.184  Repeated 
                                                 
178 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 24, at 76.  Zhang Qianfan characterizes this as the trap that 
China’s constitutionalism and rule of law has fallen into.  Zhang Qianfan, Zhongguo 
Xianzheng Xuyao “Fen Qing” Tuidong [“Angry Youth” Must Push Forward China’s 
Constitutionalism], RENDA YU YIHUI WANG [CENTER FOR PEOPLE’S CONGRESS AND FOREIGN 
LEGISLATURE STUDY], May 31, 2011,  http://www.e-cpcs.org/newsinfo.asp?Newsid=23373. 
179 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 24, at 76. 
180 Id.; Michael W. Dowdle, Beyond “Judicial Power”: Courts and Constitutionalism in 
Modern China, in BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA, supra note 22, at 215;  
O’BRIEN & LI, supra note 15, at 92–93, 109–10. 
181 Lorentzen and Scoggins disaggregate changes in rights consciousness into three distinct 
types of change:  changes in values (increased consciousness of one’s own desire to have a 
right); policy changes (increased consciousness of the government’s willingness to grant a 
right); and equilibrium changes (increased consciousness that others in society share the 
same concepts about rights and are likely to take action to enforce them).  They argue that 
equilibrium changes are important and underemphasized in the Chinese context.  
Lorentzen & Scoggins, supra note 167. 
182 Hand, supra note 16, at 128–30; O’BRIEN & LI, supra note 15, at 103–04. 
183 Dowdle, supra note 180, at 214; Baogang He, Western Theories of Deliberative 
Democracy and the Chinese Practice of Complex Deliberative Governance, in THE 
SEARCH FOR DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN CHINA, supra note 14, at 190 (stating that 
deliberation is a citizenship-building mechanism through which participants learn about 
each other, exchange opinions, and raise their moral consciousness).  See also supra notes 
85–87 and accompanying text. 
184 See Hand, supra note 58, at 233 (documenting the motivations of Hu Xingdou in raising 
constitutional review proposals).  Of course, failures could have the opposite effect and 
discourage citizens from using the Constitution at all.  As the discussion in this article 
suggests, however, the state’s failure to establish a robust constitutional adjudication 
institution has not had such an effect.  In the labor dispute context, Mary Gallagher has 
found that many unsuccessful litigants with negative perceptions of the legal process 
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Party-state failure to respond to constitutional arguments also highlights 
the wide gap between China’s constitutional text and Party-state 
practice.185   Citizens may derive a sense of empowerment from the 
knowledge that in continuing to expose this gap, they are refusing to 
submit to and validate a perceived falsehood.186 
Of course, not all citizens advance constitutional arguments for 
these reasons.  Citizens often use multiple channels and tactics 
concurrently, including legal procedures, petitioning, media interviews, 
and protests, to pressure the Party-state to redress grievances.187  Even if 
citizens do not have a meaningful expectation that a court or the NPCSC 
will respond to a constitutional argument, such arguments bolster claims 
and generate tensions in the political-legal structure.188  Some citizens may 
use legal argument as a form of political protest.189  Cumulatively, such 
exposure creates legitimacy challenges for the Party-state and may prompt 
collective realization that citizens themselves must take an active role in 
redefining the state-society relationship and ensuring that the Party-state 
lives up to its stated values.190 
This dynamic helps to explain why Chinese citizens continue to 
raise constitutional arguments in legal forums even though they have little 
hope of a positive result or even a response.  Although it was clear by 
2005 (and any remaining doubt was erased by 2008) that the Party-state 
would not permit an expansion of constitutional litigation in the people’s 
courts, Chinese citizens have continued to raise constitutional issues in 
court proceedings.  The author has assembled more than 160 cases 
decided from 2005 to 2010 in which either a court or a party referenced 
the Constitution in the course of litigation, including at least 120 cases in 
which it is clear that a party raised a constitutional issue.191  In most cases, 
                                                                                                               
pledged to use the legal system again and derived a sense of empowerment from their 
participation and future plans.  Gallagher refers to this phenomenon as “informed 
disenchantment.”  Mary Gallagher, Using the Law As Your Weapon!: Institutional Change 
and Legal Mobilization in China, in ENGAGING THE LAW IN CHINA: STATE, SOCIETY, AND 
POSSIBILITIES FOR JUSTICE 54–84 (Neil J. Diamant et al. eds., 2005). 
185 Chen, Constitutions and Values, supra note 30, at 50. 
186 See generally Eva Pils, Rights Activism in China: The Case of Lawyer Gao Zhisheng, in 
BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA, supra note 22, at 243–60.  See also Teng Biao, 
supra note 5; Hand, supra note 58, at 241. 
187 See Carl Minzner, Xinfang: Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42 STAN. 
J. INT’L L. 103, 143–45 (2006); O’BRIEN & LI, supra note 15, 67–77. 
188 Hand, supra note 16, at 143–47, 159–60.  Given the sensitivity of constitutional 
litigation, constitutional argument may also create pressure on courts to reach a favorable 
outcome on some basis other than the Constitution. 
189 Fu Hualing, Challenging Authoritarianism through Law: Potentials and Limit, 6 NAT’L 
TAIWAN U. L. REV. 339, 356–57 (2011). 
190 Dowdle, supra note 180, at 213–15; O’BRIEN & LI, supra note 15, at 103–10. 
191 In some cases, both a party and the court referenced the Constitution.  In many cases, 
the court referenced the constitutional argument of a party.  In several cases, government 
institutions raised constitutional issues. 
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parties offered constitutional arguments or referenced the Constitution as 
one of several legal arguments raised in the proceedings.192 
Similarly, while the limitations of the NPCSC citizen proposal 
mechanism have become clear, citizens have continued to file review 
proposals.  The author has assembled more than 85 proposals filed from 
2000 to 2010.  Of these, 69 proposals were submitted from 2005 to 2010 
and 59 proposals raise arguments based on the constitutional text.  Many 
of the remaining 26 proposals identify conflicts between legal provisions 
that implicate the respective constitutional powers of state institutions.  
Because neither court judgments nor citizen review proposals are 
published in a systematic way, and because constitutional litigation is 
sensitive, these numbers provide a floor that almost certainly understates 
the number of cases and review proposals in which constitutional issues 
were raised during these periods.193 
While claimants have a variety of motives for advancing 
constitutional arguments, it is clear that many reformers are focused on 
raising citizen consciousness.  For example, proponents of “rights defense” 
and “impact litigation” strategies emphasize the importance of publicizing 
claims that relate to persistent violations experienced by a large numbers 
of people and that have the potential to educate and raise consciousness 
through large-scale dissemination.194  Leading constitutional law scholar 
Zhou Wei suggests that building constitutional consciousness may be 
more important than actually winning a constitutional case. 195  
                                                 
192  Constitutional arguments were raised in a wide range of civil, criminal, and 
administrative cases. 
193 These statistics present only imperfect data points.  The majority of court cases were 
assembled by searching an online database available in the subscription service 
LawInfoChina.  A small number were assembled from online postings and Chinese 
academic sources.  LawInfoChina provides only a selection of cases.  Because 
constitutional disputes are sensitive, courts have incentives to avoid referencing 
constitutional issues or publishing such cases.  Similarly, there are no comprehensive 
public sources that publish citizen constitutional or legislative review proposals filed with 
the NPCSC.  When new procedures for handling citizen review proposals were announced 
in 2005, domestic Chinese sources indicated that the number of citizen proposals had been 
“large.”  Quanguo Renda Changweihui Mingque Weixian Shencha Chengxu  [NPCSC 
Clarifies Constitutional Review Procedure], XINJING BAO [BEIJING NEWS], Dec. 20, 2010, 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-12-20/02017747956s.shtml [hereinafter Constitutionality 
Review Procedure Clarified]. 
194 Wu Ge, Yingxiangxing Susong Tuidong Fazhi Jinbu [Impact Litigation Promotes Legal 
Progress], XINHUA NET (Jan. 5, 2006, 8:58 AM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2006-
01/05/content_4010657.htm; Teng Biao, Shenghuo shi Weiquan Yundong de Yuantou 
Huoshui [Life is the Fountainhead of the Rights Defense Movement], BOXUN (May 30, 
2005), http://blog.boxun.com/hero/tengb/22_1.shtml; Cai Dingjian, supra note 133, at 26; 
Fu Hualing, supra note 189, at 348 (arguing that the “defining characteristic” of public 
interest law in China is the “use of litigation by other rights advocates as a strategy to 
protect a general interest that is larger than that of the individual case interest”). 
195 See Chuanda Jiaoshou “Beifa” Yigan Qishi, Yi Xianfa Mingyi Qisu [Sichuan University 
Professor “Sets Out” Against HBV Discrimination and Litigates in the Name of the 
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Constitutional law scholars and citizens who have raised constitutional 
review proposals express similar motivations.196  Professor Hu Xingdou, 
who has filed numerous proposals, captures this broad sense of purpose 
well: 
 
My main purpose is still to awaken even more people . . . .  
Rule of law advancement depends on the concern and 
effort of all the members of the entire society taking the 
form of everyone shouting to beat down constitutional 
violations.  However, most of the constitutional review 
applications are still concentrated in the hands of scholars 
and experts.  This is understandable . . . .  A minority of 
people calling unconstitutionality into question can do a 
good job of setting an example for society and 
encouraging and disseminating the greater force of 
society.197 
 
As these and other passages suggest, many citizen claimants are using 
constitutional argument as one tool in a long-term process of building 
collective consciousness and public pressure on the Party-state. 
The diffusion of constitutional argument and discourse in non-
legal forums reinforces this conclusion.  Over the past decade, Chinese 
scholars have published regular compilations of “typical” or “top” 
constitutional cases for both scholarly and popular audiences.198  In these 
                                                                                                               
Constitution], SICHUAN WANBAO [SICHUAN EVENING NEWS], Nov. 13, 2003, republished 
on SINA.COM, http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2003-11-13/05422124292.shtml (arguing that 
using litigation to establish the concepts of constitutional supremacy and properly exercise 
rights is more important than winning or losing). 
196 Shang Wei & Zhang Chen, Women Dou ceng Shangshu Quanguo Renda [We Have All 
Appealed to the NPC], ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN ZAIXIAN [CHINA YOUTH ONLINE] (Dec. 22, 
2005), http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=43766 (citing Zhao Heng 
and noting that constitutional review proposals are a “good way to educate and popularize 
the law”); Yang Tao, Wo Weishenme Yao xiang Quanguo Renda Ti Jianyi [Why I want to 
Raise a Proposal to the NPCSC], JIANCHA RIBAO [PROCURATORIAL DAILY], Aug. 4, 2005, 
available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2005-08/04/content_3307229.htm (“As an 
ordinary citizen, the role I can play is extremely small.  However, as a citizen who has 
studied law, I am also deeply aware of where a citizen’s responsibility lies. . . .  We must 
build a citizen society, and this requires all citizens to advocate for their own ‘public rights’ 
and also proactively exercise their own political rights such as voting rights and to dare to 
raise appropriate criticism and proposals to state organs.”); Cai Dingjian, supra note 32, at 
§§ 2, 3 (noting that sustained efforts to raise constitutional claims have inestimable value 
in promoting implementation of the Constitution regardless of whether the claim is 
successful in a given case). 
197 Yang Tao, supra note 196. 
198 See, e.g., ZHONGGUO XIANFA SHILI YANJIU (YI) [STUDIES OF CHINA’S CONSTITUTIONAL 
CASES (VOL. 1)] (Han Dayuan ed., 2005) (subsequent volumes in this collection published 
in 2007, 2009, and 2010); 2007 NIAN ZHONGGUO DIANXING XIANFA SHILI PINGXI 
[ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S TYPICAL CONSTITUTIONAL CASES IN 2007] (Hu Jinguang ed., 2008) 
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compilations, scholars analyze the constitutional dimensions of a wide 
range of events that have attracted public attention.  In some cases, these 
events involve constitutional claims.  In others, scholars proactively 
constitutionalize events or disputes that did not directly involve such 
claims.  Hu Jinguang, the editor of one 2007 compilation written for a 
mass audience, explained his purpose: 
 
This book . . . uses common language to engage in expert 
interpretation of core constitutional cases to allow the 
public to understand the value that the cases that have 
occurred in China and that they have learned about in 
media reports hold for them. . . .  Every person who lives 
in China may be influenced by these constitutional cases 
to one degree or another.  By disseminating constitutional 
cases, we will allow the public to understand the 
connection of these incidents to them, to broadly 
participate in constitutional cases through all types of 
channels, and thereby to better promote the establishment 
of human rights and the construction of the rule of law.199 
 
Domestic media publish annual compilations of top constitutional cases in 
which scholars offer simple discussions for a mass audience.200  It is 
notable that these volumes and media compilations have proliferated since 
2005.  As hopes for constitutional adjudication have diminished, 
reformers have turned to alternative channels to constitutionalize the 
Chinese polity.201 
                                                                                                               
[hereinafter 2007 TYPICAL CASES]; 2008 ZHONGGUO SHIDA XIANFA SHILI PINGXI 
[ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S TEN MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL CASES IN 2008] (Hu Jinguang ed., 
2008); ZHONGGUO SHIDA XIANZHENG SHILI YANJIU [RESEARCH ON CHINA’S TEN MAJOR 
CASES FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM] (Hu Jinguang ed., 2009); XIANFA: ANLI YU TUBIAO 
[CONSTITUTION: CASES AND DIAGRAM] (Wang Yueming ed., 2010). 
199 2007 TYPICAL CASES, supra note 198, at 4. 
200 Such media compilations have been published regularly since at least 2007.  For a 
sampling from the range of online media outlets publishing these compilations, see, e.g., 
2007: Zhongguo Shida Xianfa Shijian [2007: China’s Ten Major Constitutional Cases], 
FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], Jan. 30, 2008, http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zbzk/2008-
01/30/content_839455.htm; Sanlu Shijian Bei Ping Wei 2008 Nian Shida Xianfa Shili zhi 
Shou [The Sanlu Incident Is Analyzed as First of the Top Ten Major Constitutional Cases 
of 2008], XINJING BAO [BEIJING NEWS], Dec. 27, 2008, available at 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-12-27/015916928868.shtml; 2009 Niandu Shida 
Yingxiangxing Xianfa Shili [Ten Major Influential Constitutional Cases of 2009], JIANCHA 
RIBAO [PROCURATORIAL DAILY], Dec. 28, 2009, available at 
http://newspaper.jcrb.com/html/2009-12/28/content_33547.htm; 2010 Niandu Zhongguo 
Shida Xianfa Shili [China’s Ten Major Constitutional Cases of 2010], XINHUA NET (Dec. 
27, 2010, 9:27 AM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-12/27/c_12920603.htm. 
201 Pils, supra note 186, at 251. 
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Constitutional discourse is common in print, Internet, and 
broadcast media.  Mainstream media publish news articles, editorials, and 
expert commentaries that reinforce the authority of the Constitution in a 
variety of ways.  Some articles contain simple references to constitutional 
provisions or the importance of respecting the Constitution, while others 
explore the constitutional dimensions of public issues, the need to apply 
the Constitution in practice, and the importance of spreading constitutional 
consciousness.202  As one 2008 Beijing News commentary explains:   
 
The Constitution is a nation’s fundamental law and the 
systemic legal foundation underlying all efforts to build 
the nation.  Therefore, in China’s transition period, the 
entire society’s recognition of the Constitution must still 
be raised.  The dissemination and extent of constitutional 
knowledge is inadequate, and society’s conceptual 
recognition of the Constitution, the rule of law spirit 
embodied in the Constitution, democracy, and fairness 
and justice is inadequate . . . .  It should be noted that 
more and more legal experts and public intellectuals are 
calling for the establishment of a Constitution Day . . . [.]  
[T]he key is not the memorial day itself, but using this 
opportunity to call for more people to place importance on 
the Constitution and to call for the nation’s Constitution to 
                                                 
202 Such articles and commentaries are too numerous to list.  A simple Google search for 
宪法 (“xianfa”) or 宪政 (“xianzheng”) is sufficient to give the reader a sense of the range 
of discussion about the Constitution.  For a small sampling from 2008–2011, see Cai 
Dingjian, Xianfa jiu shi Na lai Yong de [The Constitution is there to be Used], NANFANG 
ZHOUMO [S. WEEKEND] (Sept. 3, 2008, 10:42 PM), http://www.infzm.com/content/16827; 
Liu Hongbo, Nashui Ren de Xianfa Quanli geng bu Ke Hushi [The Constitutional Rights of 
Taxpayers even more Cannot Be Ignored], XINJING BAO [BEIJING NEWS], Dec. 3, 2009, 
available at http://www.chinanews.com/cj/news/2009/12-03/1996839.shtml; Tong Zhiwei, 
Sixing Fuhe: Yong Fazhi Yuanze Gei Shengming Liuxia Zuihou Xiwang [Death Penalty 
Review: Use Legal Principles to Give Life a Final Hope],  NANFANG ZHOUMO [S. 
WEEKEND], June 10, 2010, at F3, available at http://www.infzm.com/content/46155; 
Zunzhong Panjue shi Gongmin he Zhengfu Jiguan de Zeren [Respecting Judgments is the 
Responsibility of Citizens and Government Organs], XINJING BAO [BEIJING NEWS], July 20, 
2010, http://epaper.bjnews.com.cn/html/2010-07/20/content_127687.htm; Dujue “Yinyan 
Huozui”, Baohu Gongmin de Yanlun Biaoda Quan [End “Speech Offenses,” Protect 
Citizens’ Freedom of Expression], NANFANG ZHOUMO [S. WEEKEND] (July 20, 2010, 8:54 
AM), http://www.infzm.com/content/48268#copy;  Aizi Xuesheng Kao Jiaoshi bei Julu, 
Zhuanggao Jiaoyu Ju Qiu Pingdeng Jiuye Quan [AIDS Student’s Application is Rejected 
after Testing to Become a Lecturer, Sues Education Bureau For Equal Right to 
Employment], ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN ZAIXIAN [CHINA YOUTH ONLINE] (Aug. 27, 2010), 
http://article.cyol.com/edu/content/2010-08/27/content_3395218.htm; Zhang Qianfan, 
Xianzheng Weilai Zaiyu Mingzhong Canyu [The Future of Constitutional Government Lies 
in Citizen Participation], CAIJING WANG [FINANCE NET] (Jan. 6, 2011), 
http://blog.caijing.com.cn/expert_article-151521-15400.shtml. 
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have the dignity of the final word in the operation of state 
power and the life of society.203 
 
In many instances, official media sources such as Xinhua Net, 
People’s Daily, China Daily, and Guangming Daily (a Party publication) 
publish stories that reinforce the authority of the Constitution or transmit 
commentaries from more progressive publications. 204   For example, 
Xinhua Net republished the Beijing News editorial quoted above. 205  
Popular news programs on Chinese China Central Television, including 
Focus and News 1+1, also broadcast analyses of public issues that involve 
limited but meaningful discussion of the Constitution.206  The proliferation 
                                                 
203 Qin Guan, “Xianfa Jie”: Tisheng Quan Shehui Zunzhong Xianfa de Qiji [“Constitution 
Day”: A Turning Point for Raising the Entire Society’s Respect for the Constitution], 
XINJING BAO [BEIJING NEWS], Apr. 22, 2008, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-04/22/content_8024926.htm. 
204 For a small sampling, see supra note 202 and Guangming Ribao: Xianfa De Shengming 
Zaiyu Rongru Gongmin Shenghuo [The Life of the Constitution Is To Enter the Life of the 
People], RENMIN WANG, Apr. 1, 2005, 
http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40551/3286618.html; Lian Hongyang, Yi Wei Gongmin 
dui Weixian Shencha de Sange Qiyuan [A Citizen’s Three Wishes for Constitutional 
Review], RENMIN WANG, Dec. 21, 2005, 
http://legal.people.com.cn/GB/42731/3960196.html; Lüshi Cheng Tudi Chubei Zhidu yu 
Min Zhengli Weibei Xianfa [Lawyers Say the Land Reserve System’s Scramble for Profit 
against the People Violates the Constitution], JIANCHA RIBAO [PROCURATORIAL DAILY], 
May 7, 2010, http://news.jcrb.com/jxsw/201005/t20100507_353208.html; Editorial, 
Improper Stipulations, CHINA DAILY, May 10, 2011, at 8, available at 
http://wendang.baidu.com/view/1e027e748e9951e79b892776.html?from=related 
(maintaining that workers have a right to demand payments in arrears and that a Shenzhen 
government bureau’s move to forbid migrant workers from visiting its offices in groups for 
this purpose was not authorized by the Constitution or “any other law”). 
205 Qin Guan, supra note 203. 
206 See, e.g., 12.4 Jiaodian Fangtan, Zhengxun Minyi Ding Guiju (Shipin yu Wenzi) [12.4 
Interview in Focus, Solicit Public Opinion to Set Rules (Video and Script)], ZHANSHENG 
YIGAN WANG [BEAT HBV NET] (Dec. 4, 2004), 
http://www.hbver.com/Article/yljz/xyyz/200412/3361.html (republishing the transcript of 
a Dec. 4, 2004 Focal Point program with extensive discussion of the PRC Constitution and 
constitutionalism); Jiaodian Fangtan: Women de Fangzi Zenme Shuo Chai jiu Chai 
[Interview in Focus: How Can [They] Raze our Homes on [Their] Say-So], ZHONGYANG 
WANG [CENTRAL NET] (Apr. 4, 2010), 
http://space.tv.cctv.com/video/VIDE1270388198219882 (transcript of this Focal Point 
program—aired on April 4 and 5, 2010 by CCTV, and discussing a demolition case in 
Yangzhou municipality, with multiple references to the Constitution—is available at 
http://news.cntv.cn/program/jiaodianfangtan/20100406/102221.shtml); Xinwen 1+1, Li 
Changkui An: Qing yu Fa, Zui yu Fa [News 1+1, the Li Changkui Case: Feeling and Law, 
Crime and Punishment], CNTV.COM (July 13, 2011), 
http://news.cntv.cn/society/20110713/109021.shtml (describing how the PRC Constitution 
provides for adjudication in accordance with law); Xinwen 1+1, Hei Mingdan, Yao Hei 
Mingbai [News 1+1, Blacklist, The Black Must be Explicit], CCTV.COM (Nov. 11, 2009), 
http://space.tv.cctv.com/video/VIDE1257951717897884 (citing Article 38 of the PRC 
Constitution in critique of an airline’s blacklist); Xinwen 1+1, Henan Lingbao, Ni Gai 
Ruhe Miandui Minzhong de Zhiyi? [News 1+1, Henan Province Lingbao City, How Will 
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of commentaries and stories in Chinese media reflects a clear effort on the 
part of scholars, editors, and other public intellectuals to constitutionalize 
public discourse.  While constitutional discourse in key official media 
sources such as Xinhua and CCTV is often less expansive than that in 
other sources, it provides one indication of the extent to which 
constitutional consciousness is diffusing in Chinese society. 
Finally, open letters, collective petitions, and commentary have 
proliferated on the Internet.  The Internet’s impact in facilitating public 
discourse that creates pressure on the Party-state has been well 
documented.207  Chinese citizens have used the Internet and social media 
to disseminate open letters and petitions that contain constitutional 
arguments.  One of the most famous, Charter 08, was a call for 
constitutional government and political reform that was eventually signed 
by more than 10,000 citizens.208  In another case, a constitutional review 
proposal that challenged restrictions on Internet publications proclaimed 
that if the NPCSC failed to conduct a review of the challenged regulation, 
the signatories would apply to a “model constitutional court” of Chinese 
scholars for review.209  Many of these open letters, petitions and blogs 
protest suppression of constitutionally-protected civil and political rights 
and attempt to expose gaps between the Constitution and Party-state 
practice.210  They are also tools for raising consciousness.  While Party-
                                                                                                               
You Face the People’s Challenge], CNTV.COM (Mar. 31, 2010), 
http://news.cntv.cn/program/xinwen1jia1/20100331/104812.shtml (discussing the 
constitutional right of citizens to criticize public figures). 
207 Min Jiang, Spaces of Authoritarian Deliberation: Online Public Deliberation in China, 
in THE SEARCH FOR DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN CHINA, supra note 14, at 261–83; 
Benjamin Liebman & Tim Wu, China’s Network Justice, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 257, 271–86 
(2007–2008). 
208  Charter 08 [Lingba Xianzhang] (Dec. 10, 2008), available at 
http://www.hrichina.org/content/238.  For a description of the authorities’ decision to 
prosecute Liu Xiaobo—one of Charter 08’s principal authors—on charges of attempting to 
subvert the state in the wake of the distribution and signing of the Charter online, see 
Sharon LaFraniere, China Indicts Prominent Dissident, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/12/world/asia/12china.html. 
209 Guanyu Yaoqiu Quxiao “Hulian Wang Xinwen Fuwu Guanli Guiding” de Jianyi Shu 
[Proposal on Demanding Cancellation of the “Provisions on the Administration of Internet 
News Information Services”] (Mar. 26, 2006).  An English-language translation of the 
proposal is available online.  See Petition on Behalf of the Aegean Sea Website et al. to 
Repeal Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information Services (Mar. 28, 
2006), available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=47693 
(proposing that the NPCSC conduct a constitutional review of a regulation cited by local 
and national officials in shutting down several popular websites, and promising to submit 
the proposal to a “model constitutional court” if the agency does not complete its review 
within a certain time period). 
210 For four additional recent examples, see Ai Xiaoming, Xianfa Mengxiu, Liangzhi 
Shouru: Zhi Tan Zuoren An Shenpan Zhang Li Guanghui de yi Feng Gongkai Xin [The 
Constitution Insulted, Conscience Humiliated: An Open Letter to Tan Zuoren Case Verdict 
Chief Li Guanghui] (June 16, 2010, 1:05 AM), 
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state censorship of the Internet and social media limits distribution of the 
most sensitive material, the Party-state cannot control such material 
completely. 
At a 2008 Beijing workshop on constitutionalism, legal scholar 
Xu Zhiyong summarized the relationship between constitutional argument 
and broader citizen efforts to condition China’s political environment: 
 
[O]ur method for upholding rights is often political.  That 
is, it appeals to public opinion, common knowledge, and 
people’s choices.  The true test of strength usually is not 
in legal tribunals, but in public opinion.  It is taking the 
power of conscience and morality and justice and resisting 
bureaucratic and conservative forces. . . .  In many 
instances, we must make use of media exposure for other 
purposes and draw support from the power of public 
opinion.  Therefore, when we are defending rights, we 
often raise the big flag of the Constitution.  Although our 
Constitution is imperfect in many respects, in the end the 
fundamental rights of citizens are all written into it.  In 
addition, the Constitution is the highest law.  This is 
indisputable and has already become a kind of common 
understanding.  However, the Constitution [consists of] 
principles, and every act of applying the Constitution 
involves interpretation.  In reality, in the process of 
defending rights, we often interpret the Constitution. . . .  
Although in China only the NPCSC has the power to 
interpret the Constitution, from another perspective, 
everyone has the right to interpret the Constitution.  We 
particularly look forward to judges having the courage to 
interpret and apply the Constitution. . . .  In addition, legal 
scholars and even citizens must all have the courage to 
interpret the Constitution.  What I want to say is this.  Do 
not belittle our interpretation of the Constitution as 
                                                                                                               
http://www.bullogger.com/blogs/XIAOMINGAI/archives/361031.aspx; China Human 
Rights Defenders, “Respect Freedom of Expression, Release Xinjiang Journalist Hailaite 
Niyazi!” (July 30, 2010), http://chrdnet.com/2010/07/30/a-public-letter-by-chinese-
citizens-urging-the-release-of-uyghur-journalist-hailaite-niyazi/; Women Weile Xinyang: 
Wei Zhengjiao Chongtu zhi Quanguo Renda de Gongmin Qingyuan Shu [We Are for 
Beliefs: Petition to the NPC on the Conflict between Politics and Religion], BOXUN (Mar. 
12, 2005), http://news.boxun.com/cgi-
bin/news/gb_display/print_versiOn.cgi?art=/gb/china/2011/05&link=201105122325.shtml; 
Yu Jie, Censorship Everywhere in China—My Second Interrogation by the Chinese Police, 
LAOGAI.ORG (July 7, 2010), http://www.laogai.org/blog/prominent-dissident-yu-jie-s-
recent-interrogation-english-translation (recounting exchanges with interrogator in which 
Yu Jie advanced constitutional arguments). 
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ordinary citizens.  Of course our interpretation is not a 
final, authoritative interpretation and of course it is not 
directly applied in judicial judgments.  However, our 
interpretation can be transformed into public opinion,  
common understandings, and a force for promoting social 
progress.  The continuous transmission of our 
interpretation through public opinion transforms it into the 
common understanding of the people and at the same time 
influences power.  At this moment, the Constitution has 
become a legitimate tool for our discourse and is playing 
an important role.  This daily use will in turn enhance the 
authority of the Constitution.211 
 
Xu Zhiyong’s reference to “raising the big flag of the Constitution” 
(a phrase often found in citizen discourse) 212  highlights distinctions 
between political-legal claims grounded in China’s constitutional text and 
those based on ordinary laws, regulations, or rules.  By its own terms, the 
Constitution is “fundamental law” (根本法) with “supreme legal authority” 
(最高法律效力) and is the “basic standard of conduct” (根本的活动准
则).213  As noted above, senior Chinese leaders regularly affirm these 
standards in public statements.  The distinction between the Constitution 
and ordinary laws and regulations is also reinforced by articles in the 
Constitution that refer to the “Constitution and law” separately and 
conventions related to the interpretation of the Constitution and laws.214  
While the Party-state has contained the Constitution’s impact in the legal 
sphere for the reasons discussed above, the Constitution’s unique status in 
China’s political-legal system (and ongoing tensions created by the gap 
                                                 
211 Xu Zhiyong, Ba Xianfa Biancheng Changshi—zai Fada Xianfa Weiquan yu Xianfa 
Jieshi Yantao Hui Shang de Fayan [Transform the Constitution into Common Sense—
Comments at the China University of Politics and Law Rights Defense and Constitutional 
Interpretation Workshop], XU ZHIYONG BLOG (June 27, 2008, 12:57 PM), 
http://blog.yam.com/xuzhiyong/article/23208195. 
212 See, e.g., Zhang Zuhua, Weixian Shencha Zhi Wu Cheng Yi Zhang Huabing, MINZHU 
ZHONGGUO [DEMOCRATIC CHINA], April 2006, available at 
http://boxun.com/hero/2006/zzh/20_1.shtml; Wo de Dushu Biji zhi Si: Xianfa Ge An de 
Xianxiang yu Fansi (4) [My Fourth Reading Notes: The Phenomenon and Rethinking of 
Constitutional Cases (4)], RENMIN WANG (Sept. 29, 2009: 6:00 PM), 
http://opinion.people.com.cn/GB/52655/10142314.html. 
213 XIANFA pmbl., art. 5.  Article 5 affirms that “no laws, administrative regulations, or 
local rules and regulations may contravene the Constitution.” 
214 Id. at arts. 5, 33, 53, 76, 89.  The NPCSC has authorized the SPC to interpret ordinary 
laws, but not the Constitution, to address issues related to application in concrete cases.  
Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Jiaqiang Falü Jieshi Gongzuo de 
Jueyi [Resolution of the NPCSC on Strenthening the Work of Legal Interpretation] (issued 
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 10, 1981, effective June 10, 1981), at 
art. 2 (LawInfoChina, Peking Univ. Beida Fabao series CLI.1.1006), available at 
http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=2249. 
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between the Constitution and state practice) gives constitutional argument 
special resonance in the political sphere. 
Legal reformers express guarded optimism about the long-term 
impact of these efforts even in the midst of institutional reform setbacks 
and political tightening.  While concluding that China’s rule of law is in 
“major retreat,” one veteran Chinese legal scholar acknowledges that he is 
an optimist.  According to Jiang Ping, recent cases demonstrate that the 
“people’s sense of private rights has awakened.”  He concludes:  “[a]dd 
the role of lawyers and the awakening sense of rights consciousness in 
ordinary people and that is something extremely powerful.”215  Teng Biao, 
writing about the repression of rights defense lawyers, expresses similar 
long-term optimism: 
 
The letter of the law remains on our side.  Moreover, the 
growing appetite of the Chinese people for the idea of 
“rights” is easily apparent on the Internet as well as 
through the many demonstrations, large and small, that 
happen almost every day in one part of China or another.  
We feel that history is on our side, and we put our faith in 
the proverb that says “The darkest hour is right before the 
dawn.”216 
 
The ultimate success of citizen movements elsewhere in East Asia 
and in Eastern Europe helps to sustain this guarded optimism. 217  
Reformers are not naïve about the obstacles to reform and acknowledge 
uncertainty about outcomes.218  However, there seems to be a general 
recognition that without consciousnesses building and collective popular 
demands, there is little hope for establishing the Constitution as a legal 
restraint on the Party-state. 
Party-state responses to collective demands help to explain 
interest in such long-term processes.  As numerous scholars have 
                                                 
215 Jiang Ping, supra note 5. 
216  Teng Biao, supra note 5.  For a similar sentiment, see Rebecca MacKinnon’s 
description of her discussions with rights defense lawyers and their long-term goals.  
Rebecca MacKinnon, What does Charter 08 Mean? Too soon to tell…, RCONVERSATION 
(Jan. 20, 2009, 12:54 AM), http://rconversation.blogs.com/rconversation/2009/01/what-
does-charter-08-mean-too-soon-to-tell.html. 
217 Zhang Qianfan, supra note 178 (stating that Taiwan’s constitutionalism was won 
through perseverance and struggle).  Teng Biao’s writing has been heavily influenced by 
the writings of Czech dissident Vaclav Havel.  Teng Biao, Wei Zhengzhi Wenming ji 
Gexian er Fendou—Teng Biao Lüshi de Weiquan zhi Lu [Struggle for Civilized Politics 
and a Standard Line—The Rights-Defense Road of Lawyer Teng Biao], BOXUN (Nov. 1, 
2010), http://blog.boxun.com/hero/201011/tengb/1_1.shtml. 
218 See, e.g., Zhang Qianfan, supra note 67, at § 6 (acknowledging that the rights defense 
struggle will be “arduous and difficult and the price high” and that “the possibility of 
victory is small”). 
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demonstrated, the Party-state is more likely to respond with concessions to 
large collective claims advanced simultaneously through multiple 
channels. 219   The cost of ignoring or even suppressing claims by 
individuals or small groups is low.220   In contrast, collective action 
involving a large number of citizens undermines social stability and 
increases pressure on Party-state actors to settle disputes or end 
resistance.221   Party leaders also recognize that they need the voluntary 
support of other social groups to advance their modernization agenda and 
preserve governing legitimacy.222  As perceived stability challenges in 
China have grown, central leaders have emphasized the concept of a 
harmonious society, the need to be more responsive to citizen complaints, 
and the importance of diffusing “mass incidents” before they fester.223  In 
recent years, Party-state officials have exhibited some willingness to 
address a range of collective disputes through consultation, negotiation, 
and mediation rather than through violence and repression.224 
The 2007 Xiamen PX incident provides an example of Party-state 
responsiveness to collective pressures, scholar efforts to constitutionalize 
such incidents, and open discussion of the Constitution in Chinese media.  
The PX incident involved a local government plan to build a paraxylene 
(PX) chemical plant only a few kilometers from the city of Xiamen in 
                                                 
219 O’BRIEN & LI, supra note 15, at 32–33, 61–62; Yang Su & Xin He, Street as 
Courtroom: State Accommodation of Labor Protest in South China, at 3, 15, 17, available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1447131. 
220 Yang Su & Xin He, supra note 219, at 14–15. 
221 Id. at 15, 17; Minzner, supra note 187, at 151–56; Cai Yongshun, Power Structure and 
Regime Resilience: Contentious Politics in China, 38 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 411, 418–22 (2008). 
222 Zhu Suli, supra note 88, at 28; Dowdle, Of Parliaments, supra note 17, 48–49; 
Peerenboom, supra note 126, at 95. 
223 Hu Shuli, Heeding the Lessons of China’s Civil Unrest, CAIJING [FINANCE] (July 7, 
2009), http://english.caijing.com.cn/2009-07-07/110194415.html; Chris Buckley, China 
Vows to Punish Officials Who Fuel Protests, REUTERS (July 25, 2008, 2:35 AM), 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/07/25/uk-china-protest-idUKPEK3407420080725; 
Minzner, supra note 1, at 943, 947–48. 
224 See, e.g., Yang Su & Xin He, supra note 219, at 3, 17–19 (highlighting a pattern of state 
concessions but noting that protests with political implications have been repressed); Fu 
Hai, Chuzu Che Bagong Fengbao Xijuan Zhongguo [Taxi Strike Tempest Rolls Over 
China], YAZHOU ZHOUKAN [ASIA WEEKLY], Dec. 7, 2008, 
http://www.yzzk.com/cfm/Content_Archive.cfm?Channel=ae&Path=2194602562/48ae1a.
cfm; “Liaowang” Jizhe Diaoyan Duihualu: Tigao Yingdui Quntixing Shijian Nengli 
[“Outlook” Reporter Investigation and Research Transcript: Raise Mass Incident 
Response Ability], XINHUA NET (Jan. 6, 2009, 9:37 AM), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newmedia/2009-01/06/content_10610696.htm (noting that both 
citizens and local governments are conscious of the fact that negotiation, compromise, and 
peaceful methods of dispute resolution are much less costly than violence).  Of course, 
there are limits to such tolerance.  The Party-state will repress collective actions that 
involve high political costs or represent threats to core Party-state interests.  Cai Yongshun, 
supra note 221, at 413, 419, 427. 
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Fujian province.225  After news about the plan became public, some 
Xiamen residents raised concerns about the health and environmental 
impacts of the plant but were pressured to withdraw their objections.  
Officials also ignored a proposal to halt the project drafted by a leading 
scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and signed by more 
than 105 members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC).  The proposal was submitted to the national 
CPPCC meeting and reported widely in Chinese media.226 
This publicity crystallized public opposition to the Xiamen project.  
In May, angry residents used text messages, the Internet, and other social 
media to call for a “collective stroll” (jiti sanbu) in front of the Xiamen 
city government.227  Over a period of several days, an estimated 10,000 to 
15,000 residents participated in the demonstration.228  Although local 
officials deployed police and threatened to punish participants, the 
demonstrations remained largely peaceful.  The city government agreed to 
hold hearings on the PX plant and later abandoned its plan to build the 
plant in Xiamen.  Chinese media reported openly on the incident, and 
Southern Weekend named Xiamen residents its “persons of the year.”229  
Subsequently, residents in Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Dalian used similar 
tactics to pressure local governments to shelve projects that raised 
environmental or property concerns.230 
                                                 
225 The description of the Xiamen incident is based on the following accounts:  Fujian 
Xiamen PX Xiangmu Shijian [The Fujian Xiamen PX Project Incident], in 2007 TYPICAL 
CASES, supra note 198, at 94–109; Official Media on Popular Opinion in the Xiamen PX 
Affair, DANWEI.ORG (June 18, 2007, 10:51 AM), 
http://www.danwei.org/state_media/xiamen_px_sms_china_newsweek.php (translating 
Xie Liaobing, Xiamen PX Incident: Expression of Popular Opinion in the New Media Era, 
CHINA NEWSWEEK, June 6, 2007, and other official media on the PX Incident); Zhang 
Qianfan, supra note 67, at § 5(2); Edward Cody, Text Messages Giving Voice to Chinese, 
WASH. POST, June 28, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/06/27/AR2007062702962.html. 
226 Official Media on Popular Opinion in the Xiamen PX Affair, supra note 225. 
227 The euphemism “collective stroll” was used to shield participants from accusations that 
they were organizing and participating in an illegal demonstration. 
228 Cody, supra note 225 (reporting 8,000–10,000 participants on the first day of the 
demonstration, and around 5,000 on the second day). 
229 Southern Weekend praised both Xiamen residents, who accomplished something that 
“shocked the heavens and shook the earth,” and Xiamen officials, who shifted from a 
stance of resistance to one of compromise.  Nanfang Zhoumo 2007 Niandu Renwu: Xiamen 
Ren [Southern Weekend 2007 Persons of the Year: the People of Xiamen], NANFANG 
ZHOUMO [S. WEEKEND] (Dec. 26, 2007, 8:39 PM), http://www.infzm.com/content/9749. 
230 In 2007, Shanghai residents engaged in a collective stroll to protest the construction of a 
maglev train line.  In 2009, Guangzhou residents protested the planned construction of an 
incinerator.  Zhang Qianfan, supra note 67, at § 5(2).  In 2011, Dalian residents protested 
and won promises that a PX plant in that city would be moved.  Christina Larson, The New 
Epicenter of China’s Discontent, FOREIGN POLICY, Aug. 23, 2011.  Residents of 
Zhengzhou, Fujian were unsuccessful in resisting the relocated Xiamen PX plant.  A series 
of violent clashes took place there, and organizers were arrested.  Edward Cody, Protest 
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In the aftermath of events in Xiamen, Chinese legal scholars, 
commentators, and even official media actively constitutionalized the 
incident.  Chapters on the PX incident were included in compilations of 
constitutional cases for both academic and popular audiences.231  Scholars 
explained that Xiamen citizens were exercising their constitutional rights 
and cited constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to petition and 
criticize; the rights to expression, assembly, and association; and state 
responsibilities to protect and improve the living environment.  They also 
justified what was technically an unlawful assembly by noting that earlier 
citizen efforts to exercise the rights of supervision and criticism had been 
disrespected and blocked.232  Zhang Qianfan praised the “Xiamen model” 
as a milestone for constitutionalism in China.233  Chinese media and 
websites, including official media sources such as Xinhua and Legal Daily, 
included the PX incident in lists of top constitutional events for 2007 and 
openly characterized the PX incident as an exercise of rights endowed by 
the Constitution.234 
As the discussion in this section illustrates, an understanding of 
constitutional disputes and the significance of the Constitution in China 
requires a shift in focus from the individual legal to the collective political 
dimension of constitutional law.  Constitutional arguments may be raised 
in the context of individual legal actions, but for Chinese reformers they 
constitute just one element in a long-term process of constitutionalizing 
the Chinese polity.  Constitutional argument has the potential to fuel two 
important and interrelated collective political dynamics.  First, 
constitutional argument builds collective consciousness of the 
                                                                                                               
Over Factory Spreads in China, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2008, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/03/03/AR2008030301072.html. 
231 See, e.g., ZHONGGUO XIANFA SHILI YANJIU (SAN) [STUDY OF CHINA’S CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW  CASES (THREE)] 147 (Han Dayuan ed., 2009); 2007 TYPICAL CASES, supra note 198, 
at 94–109. 
232  2007 TYPICAL CASES, supra note 198, at 100–03; STUDY OF CHINA’S CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW CASES (THREE), supra note 231, at 145–46.  These materials reference Articles 2, 26, 
35, and 41 of the PRC Constitution. 
233 See, e.g., Zhang Qianfan, supra note 67, at § 5(2); Xiao Shu, Zhuyuan Xiamen PX 
Shijian Chengwei Lichengpai [Hoping the Xiamen PX Incident Becomes a Milestone], 
NANFANG ZHOUMO [S. WEEKEND] (Dec. 19, 2007, 8:38 PM), 
http://www.infzm.com/content/8664. 
234 Chinese media sources listed the PX incident in compilations of constitutional events.  
See, e.g., 2007 Zhongguo Shida Xianfa Shili Chulu: Heizhuan Yao, PX Xiangmu deng 
Ruxuan [China’s Ten Major Constitutional Cases for 2007 Revealed: Black Brick Kiln, PX 
Project, and Others are Chosen], XINHUA NET (Jan. 7, 2008, 9:02 AM), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-01/07/content_7376578.htm; 2007: Zhongguo 
Shida Xianfa Shijian [2007: China’s Ten Major Constitutional Incidents], FAZHI RIBAO 
[LEGAL DAILY] (Jan. 30, 2008), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/zbzk/2008-
01/30/content_839455.htm.  This article was reprinted on other websites including that of 
China Daily and Procuratorial Daily. 
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Constitution as the legal standard to which Party-state acts must conform, 
and it promotes common understanding and expectations regarding the 
content of constitutional provisions. 235   Second, as constitutional 
arguments are repeated over time and in different forums (in part, a 
product of consciousness building), they cumulatively take the form of 
collective demands that the Party-state may feel pressured to address 
through some type of deliberation or accommodation.236  As Fu Hualing 
has argued, legal reformers in China face a difficult choice between 
advocating for rights on the margins of China’s authoritarian system and 
articulating the type of “transformative agenda of political change” 
necessary for effective advocacy. 237   Long term conditioning of the 
Chinese polity through constitutional argument provides a middle path 
that helps reformers navigate the difficult and uncertain terrain between 
defending a limited range of rights on the margins of political life and 
advancing direct and risky demands for political change.  Part IV analyzes 
examples of such dispute resolution patterns and Party-state responses to 
collective pressures in the context of constitutional disputes. 
IV. BARGAINING, CONSULTATION, AND MEDIATION IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL DISPUTES 
Patterns of bargaining, consultation, and mediation are evident 
across a range of both intra-state and collective citizen-state constitutional 
disputes in China.  As the examples below demonstrate, a key to 
recognizing such patterns in the citizen-state context is to focus on Party-
state responses to collective citizen constitutional demands rather than 
remedies for individual claims in formal legal proceedings.  In some cases, 
the Party-state has allowed discourse about constitutional matters to 
proceed in domestic media and has responded to collective constitutional 
demands indirectly through commentary and legal or policy reforms.  In 
other cases, including constitutional disputes over property rights and the 
dispute over electoral reform in Hong Kong, Party-state representatives 
engaged in direct consultations with citizens who raised constitutional 
demands.  The outcomes of these disputes reflect a complex balancing of 
grassroots political pressures, constitutional arguments, governance 
interests, and economic concerns. 
 
                                                 
235 Hand, supra note 58, at 18. 
236 Dowdle, supra note 180, at 214 (defining constitutionalism as a product both of elite 
intentions and evolving collective understandings); Zhang Qianfan, supra note 67, at § 2 
(explaining that even if the Constitution is not implemented, citizens are still using the 
Constitution to pressure the Party-state). 
237 Fu Hualing, supra note 189, at 354–55. 
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A. Intrastate Constitutional Disputes 
1.  Legislative Conflicts 
Legislative conflicts involve two types of constitutional disputes.   
Lower-level legislation may directly conflict with provisions of the 
Constitution.  Lower-level legislation may also conflict with higher-level 
legislation and thus challenge the allocation of legislative authority set out 
in the Constitution.  Under the Constitution, the NPCSC is vested with the 
power to supervise the Constitution and annul State Council 
administrative regulations, local people’s congress regulations, and 
autonomous region regulations that conflict with (1) the Constitution, (2) 
national law adopted by the NPC or its Standing Committee, or (3), in the 
case of lower-level regulations, State Council administrative 
regulations.238  The PRC Legislation Law, a constitutional statute adopted 
after seven years of contentious bargaining, provides detailed rules and 
procedures for resolving conflicts.239  In China’s reform era, the number of 
such legislative conflicts has grown rapidly.240  The current procedures for 
NPCSC review (the Working Procedures) were adopted in 2005 and 
establish a complex, multistage review process that emphasizes 
consultation and consensus building. 241   The NPCSC’s practice in 
applying these procedures highlights the premium that Chinese institutions 
place on consultative processes even when constitutional authorities are 
clear. 
                                                 
238 The State Council is vested with the power to annul rules issued by ministries, 
commissions, and local governments.  XIANFA art. 89.  Local people’s congresses are 
empowered to annul local government rules and the resolutions of lower-level people’s 
congresses.  XIANFA arts. 67, 89, 104.  These reviews involve different procedures and are 
not addressed here. 
239 PRC Legislation Law arts. 78–92.  The difficult Legislation Law drafting process itself 
provides an example of bargaining and consultation over constitutional divisions of power.  
See generally Laura Paler, China’s Legislation Law and the Making of a More Orderly and 
Representative Legislative System, 182 CHINA Q. 301–18 (June 2005). 
240 Constitutionality Review Procedure Clarified, supra note 193; Zeng Jinsheng, Li 
Huijuan Shijian Zai Diaocha [Another Investigation of the Li Huijuan Incident],  
SHIDAI CHAO [CHINESE TIMES], no. 10, 2004, at 38–39, available at 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper83/12252/1102665.html. 
241 Xingzheng Fagui, Difangxing Fagui, Zizhi Tiaoli he Danxing Tiaoli, Jingji Tequ Fagui 
Beian Shencha Gongzuo Chengxu [Working Procedures for Filing and Review of 
Administrative Regulations, Local Regulations, Autonomous Region Regulations and 
Rules, and Special Economic Zone Regulations] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong. Oct. 16, 2000, effective Oct. 16, 2000, amended Aug. 15, 2003 & 
Dec. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Working Procedures], available at 
http://falvshen.fyfz.cn/art/336265.htm.  As Jianfu Chen notes, these were viewed as 
“internal working procedures.”  Jianfu Chen, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT AND 
TRANSFORMATION 197 n.113 (2008) (citing to Chinese sources). 
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A brief review of the Working Procedures demonstrates the 
complexity of interactions involved in the review process.  The procedures 
provide both for active review and passive review (in response to a request 
from another state organ or a citizen).242  Potential conflicts are first sent 
to one of the nine specialized committees of the NPC and the NPC 
Legislative Affairs Commission (LAC) (a large, professional staff office 
of legal specialists) for study and review.  During this process, the 
committees may invite the organ that promulgated the regulation to offer 
explanations.  If, after these exchanges, the specialized committee or LAC 
determines that the regulation conflicts with the Constitution or national 
law, it may engage in consultations with the promulgating organ and offer 
its opinion on the conflict.  If the promulgating organ amends or repeals 
the regulation, the result is reported to the NPCSC and the review process 
ends. 
If the promulgating organ refuses to address the conflict, a new 
stage of review and consultation begins.  The specialized committee 
reports its review opinion to the NPCSC General Secretary.  Upon 
approval of the General Secretary, the matter is then transferred to the 
NPC Law Committee for study.  If the Law Committee disagrees with the 
review opinion of the specialized committee or LAC and does not find a 
conflict, the result is reported to the NPCSC General Secretary for 
approval.  If the Law Committee agrees that there is a conflict, it reports 
its opinion to the NPCSC General Secretary.243  Upon approval of the 
NPCSC General Secretary, the specialized committee then submits its 
written opinion to the promulgating organ with a suggestion for 
amendment or repeal.  The promulgating organ is permitted two months to 
study the matter, respond with feedback, and indicate whether it will 
follow the recommendation. 
In the event that the promulgating organ refuses to amend or 
repeal the regulation, the Working Procedures provide that the specialized 
committee may offer a resolution to annul the regulation to a meeting of 
the NPC Chairman’s Council.244  The Chairman’s Council then decides 
whether to submit the resolution to the full NPCSC for deliberation and 
decision.  The NPCSC’s meeting procedures provide for further rounds of 
reporting and deliberation.245  Representatives of other state and local 
                                                 
242 The initial handling procedures vary slightly depending on whether review is active or 
passive (and, if passive, whether the review request comes from another state organ or 
from a citizen).  Working Procedures arts. 1–7. 
243 The procedures provide for the option of a joint review meeting involving both the Law 
Committee and the relevant specialized committee.  Working Procedures art. 11. 
244 The Chairman’s Council consists of the Chairman, thirteen Vice-Chairmen, and the 
NPCSC Secretary-General. 
245  Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu 
Weiyuanhui Yishi Guize [Rules of Procedure for the NPCSC] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 24, 1987, effective Nov. 24, 1987, amended 
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government organs may attend and offer reports, the resolution may be 
tabled for further study, and special investigation committees may be 
appointed.  Chinese scholars report that similar exhaustive procedures for 
review of and consultations on legislative conflicts (with some variations) 
were in place both prior to the adoption of the Legislation Law in 2000 
and prior to the adoption of the current version of the Working Procedures 
in 2005.246 
Despite the fact that the NPCSC is vested with the constitutional 
authority to annul conflicting regulations, both formal procedure and 
practice place a premium on bargaining and consultation.  Through the 
procedure outlined above, the promulgating organ has numerous 
opportunities to engage NPC decision makers in consultations, provide 
feedback, and work with different NPC subunits and leaders to suspend 
further consideration of a conflict.247  Chinese scholars note that the 
NPCSC prefers to address conflicts through internal coordination and 
requests for voluntary compliance to preserve the “face” of the 
promulgating organ and because Chinese practice emphasizes resolving 
such matters through “political” rather than “legal” channels.248  The Sun 
Zhigang incident reviewed in Part IV(B) and one published Hebei 
government decision provide case-specific evidence of such internal 
consultation practices.249  The fact that the NPCSC has issued no formal 
public decisions to annul lower-level regulations, despite the large number 
of legislative conflicts in China, is further evidence of such practices.  In 
some cases, the NPCSC simply drops the matter if, after consultations, the 
promulgating organ refuses to amend or repeal conflicting provisions.250 
 
                                                                                                               
Apr. 24, 2009) (LawInfoChina), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/huiyi/cwh/1108/2009-
04/24/content_1499846.htm. 
246 Zhu Guobin, supra note 57, at 636–38; WANG ZHENMIN, supra note 37, at 117–25.  This 
complex review process resembles the consultative process for adopting NPC legislation.  
See generally Michael W. Dowdle, The Constitutional Development and Operations of the 
NPC, 11 COLUMBIA J. ASIAN L. 1 (1997). 
247 A decision by any of the various committees or leaders not to advance the matter 
effectively ends the review process.  WANG ZHENMIN, supra note 37, at 121–22. 
248 Prior to the adoption of the Legislation Law, the NPCSC avoided issuing written 
opinions and instead coordinated with lower-level institutions by phone.  Id. at 114–15, 
120, 126.  See also Huang Li, supra note 41; Cai Dingjian, Social Transformation and the 
Development of Constitutionalism, in CHINA’S JOURNEY TOWARD RULE OF LAW, LEGAL 
REFORM, 1978–2000, at 63 (Cai Dingjian and Wang Chenguang, eds. 2010). 
249  Guanyu “Hebei Sheng Tudi Guanli Tiaoli” Xiuzheng An (Caoan) Shuoming 
[Explanation on the (Draft.) Amendment of the Hebei Province Land Administration 
Regulation], Sept. 7, 2005 (noting an NPCSC letter explaining that the Hebei regulation 
conflicted with national law and requesting that the regulation be amended).  This 
explanation, the decision itself and other related notices are available at 
http://zfxxgk.lf.gov.cn/content.jsp?code=741543379/2008-00052&name=. 
250 Zhu Guobin, supra note 57, at 637–38.  See also WANG ZHENMIN, supra note 37, at 126. 
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2.  Conflicts Between People’s Congresses and the Courts 
A mundane civil case provides an example of a second type of 
intrastate constitutional conflict involving the respective powers of courts 
and people’s congresses.  Under China’s constitutional structure, courts 
are subject to the supervision of people’s congresses and do not exercise 
the power of judicial review.  In 2003, an Intermediate People’s Court in 
Luoyang, Henan province challenged this constitutional allocation of 
powers.251  In adjudicating a civil case over a seed contract, a trial judge 
determined that a local people’s congress regulation provided a standard 
for seed pricing that conflicted with the standard set out in the PRC Seed 
Law.  The compensation in the case differed significantly depending on 
which standard was applied.  Instead of simply applying the higher-level 
Seed Law (the controlling provision under the conflicts rules in the 
Legislation Law), Judge Li Huijuan took the additional step of declaring 
the local regulation “spontaneously invalid” (ziran wuxiao).  Chinese 
sources report that the municipal government, the local Party political-
legal committee, and leaders of the Luoyang court were consulted and 
approved the decision, suggesting that Judge Li was aware of the potential 
for conflict and sought consensus prior to issuing her judgment.252 
The Luoyang court’s decision sparked a national controversy.  
The Legal Affairs Office of the Henan Provincial People’s Congress 
reacted furiously, claiming that there was no legislative conflict, that the 
court had unlawfully reviewed the local regulations, and that the court’s 
“serious illegal action”  had “violated China’s people’s congress system 
and encroached on official powers of an authoritative state organ.”  It 
demanded that the municipal people’s congress exercise its supervisory 
powers over the court, correct the illegality, and sanction both the judge 
responsible and her superiors. 253   The Provincial People’s Congress 
General Office then issued a formal notice to the Henan Higher People’s 
Court accusing the Luoyang court of a knowing violation of law and 
demanding that the court “earnestly and severely deal with this serious 
                                                 
251 This account draws on Malmgren, supra note 38, at 6–7 (and sources cited therein); 
Balme, supra note 34, at 21–22; Han Junjie, Henan Li Huijuan Shijian Zai Qi Bolang, 
Jiedao Huiyuan Gongzuo Tongzhi [Henan Li Huijuan Incident Again Makes Waves: Work 
Notice to Return to Court Received], ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO [CHINA YOUTH DAILY], 
Feb. 6, 2004 [hereinafter Henan Li Huijuan Makes Waves], available at 
http://news.qq.com/a/20040206/000116.htm. 
252 Henan Zhongzi An—Fayuan yu Renda Guanxi [Henan Seed Case—The Relationship 
Between Courts and People’s Congresses], XIANFA XUE [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STUDIES] 
(Apr. 12, 2006), http://xfx.jpkc.gdcc.edu.cn/show.aspx?id=196&cid=66; Qiu Feng, Cong 
Li Huijuan Dao Fagui Shencha Beianshi [From Li Huijuan to Legislative Review and 
Recording Office], NANFANG WANG [SOUTHERN NET] (June 24, 2004, 9:54 PM), 
http://www.southcn.com/weekend/top/200406240081.htm. 
253 Han Junjie, supra note 251. 
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illegal action.”254  People’s Congress officials stated that although the 
judge had the discretion to choose which legal provision to apply, she had 
no power to declare the local regulation invalid.255  Following these 
criticisms, court leaders revoked the judicial credentials of Judge Li and 
the vice-head of the civil tribunal in which the case was adjudicated.256  
Scholars debated the case and its implications, with some noting in media 
interviews that Judge Li had been treated too harshly.257  A group of 
lawyers also filed a legislative review proposal asking the NPCSC to 
invalidate the conflicting local regulation.258 
By late 2004, the “Seed Case,” the professional status of the 
judges involved, and the issue of the conflicting regulation had all been 
resolved.  The SPC, validating the general (but not universal) consensus of 
leading scholars and legislative officials, concluded that in the event of 
such conflicts, the court should simply apply the higher-level law to 
decide the case.259  On the basis of this guidance, the Henan Higher 
People’s Court upheld the substantive result in the case on appeal but 
criticized Judge Li for declaring the local regulation invalid.260  The 
Chinese Women’s Judges Association arranged for Judge Li to be sent to 
Beijing, where she spent several months “recuperating” out of the 
spotlight.261  The Luoyang Municipal People’s Congress subsequently 
                                                 
254 Id. 
255 Jim Yardley, A Judge Tests China’s Courts, Making History, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 
2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/28/international/asia/28judge.html?pagewanted=all.  It is 
not entirely clear why Judge Li did not argue that the Legislation Law itself declares that 
such local regulations are invalid.  Article 64 of the Legislation Law provides that local 
people’s congresses may “first formulate local regulations on all other affairs for which the 
State has not yet formulated any laws or administrative regulations. Once the laws or 
administrative regulations formulated on such matters by the State Council come into 
effect, the provisions in local regulations which contradict the said laws or administrative 
regulations shall be null and void, and the organs that have formulated such regulations 
shall promptly amend or annul the provisions.”  PRC Legislation Law art. 64 (emphasis 
added).  Instead of citing to this provision, which would have grounded the declaration of 
invalidity in the NPC’s Legislation Law provision, Judge Li based her declaration of 
invalidity on her application of the conflicts rules in Chapter V. 
256 Han Junjie, supra note 251. 
257 Tsinghua University organized a seminar on the case that many scholars attended.  Id. 
258  Lüshi Jianyi Quanguo Renda dui “Luoyang Zhongzi An” Jinxing Lifa Shencha 
[Lawyers Propose that the NPC Undertake Legislative Review of the “Luoyang Seed 
Case”], RENMIN FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT NET] (Nov. 30, 2003, 3:23 PM), 
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=92886 [hereinafter Lawyers Propose 
Review]. 
259 Malmgren, supra note 38, at 7 (citing SPC reply).  For general (but not universal) 
consensus on this approach, see STUDIES OF CHINA’S CONSTITUTIONAL CASES (VOL. 1), 
supra note 198, at 301–02; Judge Sows Seeds of Lawmaking Dispute, RENMIN WANG, Nov. 
24, 2003, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200311/24/print20031124_128871.html; 
Lawyers Propose Review, supra note 258. 
260 Yardley, supra note 255. 
261 Henan Li Huijuan Makes Waves, supra note 251. 
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stated that after an investigation, it had determined that the judge had not 
“twisted the law” and that the controversy had been a problem of “written 
expression.”  The Henan Provincial People’s Congress decided that the 
judicial credentials of the judges need not be canceled and simply advised 
the court to pay attention to the issue and avoid such conflicts in the 
future.262  In April 2004, the Henan Provincial People’s Congress annulled 
the conflicting regulation and adopted a new local regulation to implement 
the Seed Law.263  This resolution bears the unmistakable imprint of a 
mediated outcome in which all sides gave ground and reached a consensus. 
The consensus reached in the Luoyang Seed Case has been 
incorporated into SPC notices.  A 2004 notice publicized the results of a 
judicial “discussion meeting” on administrative cases and provided that 
when faced with an apparent legislative conflict, people’s courts should 
make a judgment on the conflict, consult the Legislation Law conflicts 
provisions, and simply apply the controlling law to the case.264  Courts are 
advised to consult the relevant legislative organ only in major cases or 
cases in which there are different opinions on the conflict and the court 
cannot make a clear determination.  In 2009, the SPC published provisions 
on the citation of legal sources in judicial judgments that reinforce this 
basic approach and provide specifically that people’s courts may not make 
explicit statements on the validity of conflicting legal provisions in their 
judgments. 265   A 2011 people’s court decision in Jiangsu province 
indicates that these principles are being applied in practice.  In the “Salt 
Case,” a Jiangsu court found that a local government rule implementing an 
                                                 
262 Id. 
263 See Malmgren, supra note 38, at 7 (provincial people’s congress passed the new 
regulation on April 1, 2004). 
264 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Yinfa “Guanyu Shenli Xingzheng Anjian Shiyong Falü 
Guifan Wenti de Zuotanhui Jiyao” de Tongzhi [SPC Notice on the “Summary of a 
Discussion Meeting on Problems in Applying Legal Standards in Adjudicating 
Administrative Cases”] (issued May 18, 2004, effective May 18, 2004) 2004 FA [SUP. 
PEOPLE’S CT. NOTICE] no. 96, available at 
http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/1300/12/21723/2006/4/li05621540241924600211475-
0.htm. 
265 SPC Provisions on Legal Citation, supra note 37, art. 7.  The text of Article 7 reads as 
follows:  “When the normative legal documents that a people's court truly must cite to in 
formulating judgment documents conflict with each other and  the court cannot cannot 
select which one to apply according to the  Legislation Law and related legal provisions, it 
should submit [the  matter] to the organ with decisionmaking authority for a ruling 
in  accordance with law, and is not permitted on its own to make a determination on the 
validity of the normative legal document in its judgment document.”  This provision could 
be interpreted to mean that courts are only prohibited from making a determination on the 
validity of a normative legal provision in a judgment if they cannot determine which of 
two or more conflicting provisions to apply.  In the context of longtime PRC practice, the 
controvery over the Seed Case, and the resolution of the constitutional dispute the Seed 
Case generated, it is the judgment of the author that the ambiguity here is the product of 
poor drafting and that Article 7 is intended to prohibit courts from making statements 
about the validity of normative legal provisions in their judgments in all cases. 
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industrial salt monopoly conflicted with the PRC Administrative 
Licensing Law.  Instead of declaring the local rule invalid in its judgment, 
the court solicited the opinion of the Supreme People’s Court on the 
legislative conflict and, in accordance with the SPC’s instructions, applied 
the Administrative Licensing Law and overturned the seizure of a local 
company’s salt.266 
Both the NPCSC’s procedures and practices for dealing with 
legislative conflicts and the course of events in the Seed Case demonstrate 
a strong proclivity for bargaining, consultation, and compromise in 
intrastate constitutional disputes.  Even when the constitutional authority 
of state institutions is clear, such institutions prefer consultative processes 
and negotiated outcomes over formal adjudication and public decision-
making.  As Jiang Shigong concludes, intrastate disputes are not resolved 
by “constitutional review according to the written constitution” but 
through consultative conventions embodied in the principle of democratic 
centralism.267  The Sun Zhigang incident provides further evidence of such 
intrastate dispute resolution preferences and an example of state responses 
to collective citizen constitutional demands. 
B. The Sun Zhigang Incident 
The Sun Zhigang incident erupted in March 2003 following the 
tragic death of a young university graduate in Guangzhou.268  Local 
authorities mistakenly believed that Sun Zhigang was an unlawful 
domestic migrant and detained him in a custody and repatriation (C&R) 
center.  C&R was a controversial detention system that public security 
bureaus used to enforce China’s residence registration system and to 
control internal migration from rural to urban areas.  Sun died in the 
detention center under mysterious circumstances. 
After local media exposed the tragedy, reports circulated 
nationwide and triggered a wave of public outrage.  Netizens posted 
protests online and called both for justice in the case and reform of the 
C&R system.  Three legal scholars leveraged this wave of public opinion 
                                                 
266  Sifa Panjue Dapo Gongyeyan Xingzheng Longduan [Judicial Decision Breaks 
Industrial Salt Administrative Monopoly], CAIXIN WANG [CAIXIN NET] (June 9, 2011, 6:17 
PM), http://china.caixin.cn/2011-06-09/100267770.html.  For the SPC’s instructions, see 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Jingying Gongye Yong 
Yan Shifou Xuyao Banli Gongye Yan Zhunyun Zheng deng Qingshi de Dafu [Reply of the 
PRC Supreme People’s Court Concerning Whether it is Necessary to Have Import-Export 
Licenses for Engaging in Business in Industrially-Used Salt] (issued by the Sup. People’s 
Ct., 2010) 2010 XING TAZI [PROVINCIAL CIVIL CASES] no. 82, available at 
http://www.ccin.com.cn/ccin/news/2011/06/14/183685.shtml.  The author is indebted to 
Professor Donald Clarke for his translation of this reply. 
267 Jiang Shigong, supra note 21, at 31–37. 
268 For a detailed account of the incident, see generally Hand, supra note 16. 
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and filed a constitutional review proposal with the NPCSC challenging the 
legality and constitutionality of the 1982 Measures on Custody and 
Repatriation of Vagrants and Beggars (C&R Measures), the State Council 
administrative regulation that governed the system.  The scholars’ review 
proposal, which was discussed approvingly in both official and unofficial 
media, presented simple but compelling arguments that the C&R 
Measures violated both the Constitution and national law.  It also put the 
NPCSC in the politically difficult position of either ignoring the review 
proposal in the midst of a national outcry or formally reviewing and 
possibly annulling a State Council administrative regulation. 
Faced with extreme public pressure, the central government 
responded.  After a local court convicted twelve C&R detainees and 
guards for involvement in the beating of Sun Zhigang, the State Council 
announced that it was unilaterally repealing the C&R Measures and 
replacing them with a regulation that established a voluntary system of aid 
shelters for vagrants.  Chinese scholars concluded that the NPCSC and 
State Council engaged in behind-the-scenes consultations to reach an 
acceptable response consistent with the existing state power structure.269  
By voluntarily repealing the C&R Measures, the State Council dodged an 
NPCSC review decision that would have undermined its institutional 
authority and eased pressure on the NPCSC to pursue a formal inquiry.270  
The Party-state also avoided publicly responding to the specific 
constitutional and legal arguments in the review proposal.  Tong Zhiwei 
concludes that Chinese leaders were concerned about establishing a 
precedent that would have encouraged similar challenges to the re-
education through labor system or the residence registration system 
itself.271  Chinese citizens expressed a mix of elation at the repeal of the 
C&R Measures and disappointment that their proposal had failed to 
establish a formal constitutional review precedent.272 
The Sun Zhigang incident and the Review Proposal triggered a 
broad public discussion about the Constitution and the need for a more 
                                                 
269 Teng Biao, Sun Zhigang Shijian: Zhishi, Meiti yu Quanli [The Sun Zhigang Incident: 
Knowledge, Media, and Power] (Oct. 22, 2004) (unpublished ms.) (on file with author); 
Tong Zhiwei, Ziyou, Chengxu, Guize—Sun Zhigang An de Falü Sikao [Freedom, Practice, 
and Rules—Reflections on the Legal Issues in the Sun Zhigang Case], ZHONGGUO FAXUE 
[CHINA LEGAL SCI.], no.7, 2003, at 6.  An NPC official noted that if the NPCSC found a 
conflict, it would most likely issue an opinion to the State Council and allow the State 
Council to decide on an appropriate response.  Niu Longyun, Cong Sun Zhigang Shijian 
Toushi Zhongguo Weixian Shencha Zhi [Gaining Perspective on China’s Constitutional 
Review System Through the Sun Zhigang Incident], LIAOWANG ZHOUKAN [OUTLOOK 
WKLY.], June 5, 2003, http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/OP-c/341247.htm. 
270  New NPC Body to Address Law Conflicts, RENMIN WANG, June 21, 2004, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200406/21/eng20040621_146986.html [hereinafter New 
NPC Body]. 
271 Tong Zhiwei, supra note 269, at 6. 
272 Hand, supra note 16, at 127–30. 
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robust constitutional review mechanism. Scholars, media commentators 
and even officials discussed the review proposal mechanism, the 
importance of constitutional consciousness, deficiencies in China’s 
constitutional review process, and a range of potential reform models.273  
The incident also encouraged a wave of new constitutional claims in the 
courts and constitutional review proposals.274 
The Party-state responded to these collective demands with partial 
reform of this constitutional review system.   In 2004, the NPCSC 
established a new office for reviewing and processing legislative conflicts 
and the NPC adopted a constitutional amendment confirming that the state 
respects and safeguards human rights.275  In 2005, the NPCSC adopted 
revised Working Procedures for resolving legislative conflicts and 
expanded constitutional review to include SPC judicial interpretations.276  
These reform steps were tied explicitly to the Sun Zhigang incident and 
collective concerns about the need for more robust constitutional review 
procedures.277  At the same time, the Party-state took steps to limit some 
constitutional reform discussions and confirmed that the Constitution was 
not a subject for litigation. 
Patterns of bargaining, consultation, and mediation were evident 
on several levels of the incident.  Consistent with its approach to other 
legislative conflicts, the NPCSC and the State Council addressed the C&R 
Measures in a manner that saved institutional face for the State Council.  
The citizen demands to repeal C&R represented a collective citizen-state 
constitutional dispute.  Through the review proposal and widespread 
media discussion and commentary, an indirect process of citizen-state 
consultation took place.  Although Party-state officials were careful not to 
publicly validate the specific constitutional arguments citizens had raised, 
they did acknowledge the review proposal and discuss the importance of 
the Constitution generally.  The Party-state response to these collective 
demands represented a compromise; the C&R system was dismantled, but 
no formal constitutional review precedent was established. 
Citizen discussion of the deficiencies of the existing constitutional 
review mechanism and the need for a more robust process (bolstered by a 
wave of constitutional review proposals and constitutional claims in the 
                                                 
273 For discussion of this discourse and for citations to a broad range of Chinese sources, 
see Hand, supra note 16, at 122–26, 148–53. 
274 Id. at 151. 
275 Liao Weihua, Zhongguo Shouci Chengli Zhuanmen Jigou Jinxing Weixian Shencha 
[China for the First Time Establishes a Special Body to Engage in Constitutional Review], 
XINJING BAO [BEIJING NEWS], June 19, 2004, available at 
http://www.boxun.com/news/gb/china/2004/06/200406191347.shtml. 
276 Constitutionality Review Procedure Clarified, supra note 193.  Provisions on the review 
of judicial interpretations were later enshrined in the PRC Supervision Law.   See supra 
note 66. 
277 Hand, supra note 16, at 152; New NPC Body, supra note 270. 
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courts and constitutional review proposals) represented a collective 
constitutional demand on the Party-state.  Here again, a consultative 
discourse (with some limits) was permitted in the official media, and the 
Party-state responded to these collective citizen demands by imposing a 
constitutional compromise.  While the Party-state limited efforts to 
judicialize the Constitution and declined to implement a more transparent 
process for NPCSC constitutional review, it adopted new institutions and 
procedures that represented incremental improvements to the existing 
NPCSC constitutional review mechanism. 
The Sun Zhigang incident also provides an example of the 
consciousness building dynamics discussed in Part III.  The incident 
triggered a broad public discussion of constitutional issues, and 
commentators used this discourse to raise constitutional consciousness.  
The apparent reform victory also empowered citizens and catalyzed the 
refinement of popular “rights defense” and “impact litigation” 
strategies.278  Reformers subsequently applied the “Sun Zhigang model” to 
promote reforms with some success, establishing a crucial populist 
pathway for constitutional demands.  Through their collective demands, 
citizens achieved repeal of the C&R Measure and incremental reform of 
the constitutional review system, realized symbolic citizenship gains, and 
built a foundation for a new wave of citizen constitutional activism. 
C. Constitutional Disputes Related to Property Rights 
Disputes related to property rights provide a compelling example 
of consultation, bargaining, and mediation in the resolution of 
constitutional claims.  The Constitution empowers the state to expropriate 
property in the “public interest.”279  Although compensation must be 
provided for such takings, no constitutional requirements for 
compensation are specified, and until recently there was no legal 
definition of public interest.  Citizen constitutional argument has been a 
core element of citizen demands for enhanced protection of property rights 
that have been advanced through review proposals,280 lawsuits, and public 
                                                 
278 Hand, supra note 16, at 158–62; Zhang Qianfan, supra note 67, at § 4, para. 3, 4; Cai 
Dingjian, supra note 133, at 14–15. 
279 XIANFA arts. 10(3), 13(3).  Under China’s current legal framework, only the state or 
village collectives may own land.  However, citizens may own long-term land-use rights 
and structures on the land.  XIANFA arts. 6, 10, 13; Tudi Guanli Fa [PRC Land 
Administration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 25, 
1986, rev’d Dec. 29, 1988, Aug. 29, 1998 & Aug. 28, 2004, effective Aug. 28, 2004), arts. 
2, 8, 10 (LawInfoChina, Peking Univ. Beida Fabao series CLI.1.54997), available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=3673. 
280 Since 2003, citizens have filed review proposals challenging the constitutionality and 
legality of state regulations and judicial decisions related to property rights.  For examples, 
see Liu Jincheng et al., Letter to the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong.: Dui 
Guowuyuan he Hangzhou Shi de Chaiqian Tiaoli Zuo Weixian Shencha de Jianyishu: 
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protests.281  As discussed below, constitutional issues related to takings 
have also been the focus of extensive media discussion. 
A constellation of factors has generated a wave of takings in 
China over the past two decades.  China’s rapid economic growth, urban 
development and expansion, skyrocketing land prices, and local 
corruption have fueled demand for land and in turn have led to mass 
displacements.  Because the market value of land is often significantly 
higher than the compensation paid, local governments expropriate 
property and resell it to commercial developers at a large profit.282  Tax 
reforms that required local governments to remit a larger portion of 
revenues to the central government left local governments heavily 
dependent on such land transfers.283  Unlawful takings, embezzlement, 
                                                                                                               
Hangzhou Baiwei Gongmin Lianming Tijiao Quanguo Renda de Jianyishu [Proposal for 
Constitutional Review of the State Council and Hangzhou Municipality Demolition and 
Relocation Regulations: A Proposal a Hundred Hangzhou Citizens Sign and Submit to the 
National People’s Congress] (July 14, 2003); Zhiyi Zuigaoyuan 38 Hao Wenjian, Xi’an 
Gongmin Shenqing Weixian Shencha [Calling into Question SPC Document no. 38, a 
Xi’an Citizen Applies for Constitutional Review], SINA.COM (Dec. 8, 2004, 10:17 AM), 
http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2004-12-08/10174464663s.shtml; Letter from Qiu Jiandong, 
Fujian Province Longyan City Hai Ping Mian Law Office, to the Standing Comm. of the 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Guanyu Yifa Qidong Weixian Shencha Chengxu, Shencha Zuigao 
Renmin Fayuan Sifa Jieshi de Gongmin Jianyishu [Citizens’ Proposal for Initiating a 
Constitutional Review Procedure to Examine the SPC’s Judicial Interpretations in 
Accordance with Law] (Jan. 9, 2008), available at 
http://news.boxun.com/news/gb/china/2008/01/200801101247.shtml; Shen Kui et al., 
Guanyu dui “Chengshi Fangwu Chaiqian Guanli Tiaoli” Jinxing Shencha de Jianyi 
[Proposal to Engage in Constitutional Review of the “Urban Building Demolition and 
Relocation Management Regulations”] (Dec. 7, 2009), available at 
http://article.chinalawinfo.com/Article_Detail.asp?ArticleID=51366; Zhang Xingkui, Dui 
Tudi Chubei Zhidu he “Tudi Chubei Guanli Banfa” Jinxing Weixian Shencha De Jianyi [A 
Proposal for Constitutional Review of the Land Reserve System and the “Land Reserve 
Management Measures”] (Apr. 26, 2010), available at http://www.world-
china.org/newsdetail.asp?newsid=3082. 
281 Chinese sources also document cases of citizens clutching copies of the Constitution as 
they protest forcible takings of their homes.  Zhang Qianfan, supra note 67, at § 2, para. 1.  
In 2003, a Hangzhou teacher protesting a taking was arrested for walking around in a white 
jacket emblazoned with the words “[e]veryone has a responsibility to safeguard the 
Constitution.”  Hangzhou Tuixiu Jiaoshi Shen Chuan Bai Dagua Xuanchuan Xianfa Bei 
Juliu 10 Tian [Retired Hangzhou Teacher Detained for 10 Days for Wearing a White Coat 
Promoting the Constitution], BOXUN (Jan. 25, 2004), 
http://boxun.com/news/gb/china/2004/01/20040 1252306.shtml. 
282 CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA [CECC], 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, 92 [hereinafter CECC 
2004 REPORT], available at 
www.cecc.gov/pages/annualRpt/annualRpt04/CECCannRpt2004.pdf; Yuan Jian, Chaiqian 
Zhong de Zhengzhi Jingji Xue [Political and Economic Study of Demolition and 
Relocation], NANFANG ZHOUMO [S. WEEKEND] (Dec. 2, 2009, 11:12 PM), 
http://www.infzm.com/content/38294. 
283 Willy Lam, Beijing’s Record Revenue Haul Exacerbates Central-Local Tensions, 10.14 
CHINA BRIEF (The Jamestown Found., Washington, D.C.), July 9, 2010, at 3, 
http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/cb_010_67.pdf. 
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collusion between government officials and developers, manipulation of 
weak legal protections, intimidation and physical violence against existing 
land users, and other abuses are common in the takings process.284  Such 
abuses have generated widespread public anger and social instability in 
both urban and rural China.285 
Since 2000, the Party-state has implemented three major waves of 
reform related to property rights.  In the early 2000s, instability related to 
takings was clearly on the rise and citizens filed a series of constitutional 
review proposals challenging the legal framework for urban takings and 
land use.286  As collective pressure related to takings mounted, the Party-
state adopted measures to address public anger and alleviate conflicts.  In 
2003 and 2004, the State Council and its subordinate ministries issued a 
series of regulations and circulars mandating reductions in land seizures, 
tightening supervision over land management, banning abusive practices, 
improving appraisal procedures for urban takings, and strengthening 
sanctions for local officials and companies that violated rules.287  The 
                                                 
284 CECC 2004 REPORT, supra note 282, at 91–94; Demolished: Forced Evictions and the 
Tenants’ Rights Movement in China, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Mar. 24, 2004, at 8–16, 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/china0304.pdf [hereinafter Demolished]; 
Michael Wines & Jonathan Ansfield, Trampled in a Land Rush, Chinese Resist, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 26, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/27/world/asia/27china.html?pagewanted=all. 
285 It should be noted that both the legal rules governing land use and ownership, as well as 
the legal rules and standards governing takings of land and buildings, are different 
depending on whether the property is located in an  urban or rural area.  The consequences 
of such takings also vary.  When rural arable land is seized for development, peasants lose 
not only their residences but also their livelihoods. 
286 Liu Feng, Jianshe Bu: Jinnian Shangbannian Zhengdi Chaiqian Shangfang Chaoguo 
Qunian Zongliang [Construction Bureau: Petitions on Land Requisition and Demolition 
and Relocation in the First Half of this Year Exceed the Number for All of Last Year], 
RENMIN WANG (July 5, 2004, 4:58 PM), 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian/2618209.html; Explosive Public Indignation 
Arising From Forced Evictions Alarms Central Government, MING PAO, Nov. 12, 2003, 
available in FBIS.  State Council circulars acknowledged that property disputes were 
“serious, widespread, and influencing social stability and the normal order of production 
and life.”  See, e.g., Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Renzhen Zuohao Chengzhen 
Fangwu Chaiqian Gongzuo Weihu Shehui Wending de Jinji Tongzhi [State Council 
General Office Urgent Notice on Earnestly Conducting Building Demolition and 
Relocation Work in Cities and Towns and Safeguarding Social Stability] (promulgated by 
the St. Council Gen. Office, Sept. 19, 2003, effective Sept. 19, 2003) 2003 GUO BAN FA 
MING DIAN [ST. COUNCIL GEN. OFFICE PUB. NOTE] no. 42, available at http://www.law-
lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=81071. 
287 In addition to the circular listed in note 286, see Guotu Ziyuan Guanli Xitong 
Xingzheng Wei Min Cuoshi [Measures on Administering the State Land and Resources 
Management System for the People]; Guotu Ziyuan Guanli Xitong Gongzuo Renyuan 
Jinling [Prohibitions on Personnel from the State Land and Resources Management 
System] (promulgated by the Ministry of Land and Res., Jan. 14, 2004, effective Mar. 1, 
2004) 2004 GUOTU ZI FA [ST. LAND & RES. NOTICES] no. 11, available at 
http://www.nnland.gov.cn/show.aspx?id=162&cid=282; Guanyu Zuohao “Lianghui” 
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NPC also adopted historic constitutional amendments in 2004 specifying 
that rights to legally obtained private property must not be violated and 
that compensation must be paid when land and structures are 
expropriated. 288   Although the constitutional standard for such 
compensation was not defined, the amendment and related discourse 
represented a confirmation of the Party-state’s commitment to property 
rights, focused public attention on the constitutional dimensions of the 
property rights issue, and expanded political space for reform activism.289 
 Party-state efforts to adopt a comprehensive Property Law 
generated a second wave of constitutional contention in 2005 and 2006.  
The Property Law, which was eventually adopted in 2007, strengthened 
the legal status of private property rights, implemented the 2004 
constitutional amendments in statutory form, and introduced new 
protections for citizens subject to takings.  However, a draft of the law 
was subjected to a public constitutional attack led by Gong Xiantian, a law 
professor at Peking University.  Professor Gong issued an open letter 
arguing that the draft law violated the principles of socialism enshrined in 
the Constitution and several constitutional provisions.290  The letter ignited 
public controversy and derailed plans to adopt the Property Law at the 
March 2006 NPC session.291  A second open letter from Professor Gong, 
                                                                                                               
Qijian Guotu Ziyuan Xinfang Gongzuo de Jinji Tongzhi [Urgent Notice on Conducting 
Land and Resources Petition Work During the “Two Meetings” Period] (promulgated by 
the Ministry of Land and Res., Feb. 11, 2004, effective Feb. 11, 2004) (no official reporter 
info. available), available at 
http://www.chinaacc.com/new/63/74/2004/2/ad84162450111112400226946.htm; 
Chengshi Fangwu Chaiqian Gujia Zhidao Yijian [Guidance Opinion on Valuation of 
Urban Building During Demolition and Relocation] (promulgated by the Ministry  of 
Constr., Dec. 3, 2003, effective Jan. 1, 2004) 2003 JIAN ZHU FANG [CONSTR. & HOUS. 
NOTICES] no. 234, available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jingji/1037/2235641.html. 
288 XIANFA amends. (promulgated at the Second Sess. of the Tenth Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Mar. 14, 2004), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/pc/11_4/2007-
12/05/content_1617611.htm (making amendments, for example, to Article 10 to specify 
that the State may expropriate and requisition land “and provide compensation” in 
accordance with law, and Article 13 to indicate that the State may “expropriate or 
requisition private property for its use and provide compensation”). 
289 NPC Chairman Wu Bangguo stated that “we should avail ourselves of the occasion of 
the constitutional amendment to publicize and study the Constitution” and initiated a 
Party-state campaign to that effect.  Nailene Chou Weist & Josephine Ma, Constitutional 
Amendments Are Given the Seal of Approval, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 15, 2004 
(available on Westlaw at 2004 WLNR 5985297).  See also The Impact of the Constitution 
Amendment on Chinese Society, LIAOWANG [OUTLOOK], Mar. 14, 2004, available in FBIS.  
For expansion of political space, see Demolished, supra note 284, at 34 (citing an 
interview with a Chinese activist on the impact of the amendments). 
290 Open Letter from Gong Xiantian, Professor, Beijing Univ., Yi Bu Weibei Xianfa he 
Beili Shehui Zhuyi Jiben Yuanze de “Wuquan Fa” Caoan [A Property Law (drft.) that 
Violates the Constitution and Basic Principles of Socialism], Aug. 12, 2005, translated by 
Eva Cheng for LINKS: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SOCIALIST RENEWAL and available 
therein at http://links.org.au/node/221. 
291 Yi Fengxin Dangzhu Wuquan Fa Caoan? [One Letter Blocked the Property Law 
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issued in late 2006 and signed by more than 700 scholars and former 
officials, triggered further public debate.292 
The Party-state, facing an unexpected leftist challenge to a major 
legislative initiative to enhance private property rights, took 
unprecedented steps to address Professor Gong’s concerns.  Several weeks 
after he published his first open letter, Professor Gong was invited to a 
meeting with the NPCSC to engage in consultations on the Property Law 
and the concerns expressed in his letter.293  Official media noted the 
important role of citizens in raising constitutional issues, and the NPC 
subsequently revised the draft to protect against fraudulent asset sales and 
strengthen language on public ownership, two key concerns that Professor 
Gong had raised.294  Having validated Professor Gong’s concerns, the 
Party-state launched a vigorous and public constitutional defense of the 
draft law.295  These official responses represented a rare instance in which 
                                                                                                               
Draft?], NANFANG WANG [SOUTHERN NET] (Feb. 23, 2006, 1:40 PM), 
http://www.southcn.com/weekend/top/200602230112.htm; Zhao Lei, Gong Xiantian: 
Yingxiong Haishi Zuiren?—“Ta Zhuding bei Zairu Zhongguo Lifa Shi” [Gong Xiantian: 
Hero or Sinner?—“Destined to Be Entered into the Annals of China’s Legislative 
History”], NANFANG ZHOUMO [S. WEEKEND] (Feb. 23, 2006, 12:59 PM), 
http://www.southcn.com/weekend/commend/200602230093.htm; Irene Wang, Bill to 
Reignite Ownership Debate: NPC Decision Paves Way for Law on Private Property Amid 
Row over Selling Out to Capitalism, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 10, 2006 (available on 
Westlaw at 2006 WLNR 19494283).  For a discussion of the constitutional implications of 
Professor Gong’s efforts, see Hand, supra note 58, at 17–18. 
292 Beida Jiaoshou Gong Xiantian Zai Jiu Wuquan Fa Cao an xiang Renda Di Gongkai 
Xin [Peking University Professor Gong Xiantian Again Sends an Open Letter to the NPC 
Over the Draft Property Law], ZHONGGUO WANG [CHINA NET] (Dec. 21, 2006), 
http://www.china.com.cn/news/txt/2006-12/21/content_7537943.htm; Gong Xiantian, Zhi 
Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo Gongkai Xin [Open Letter to Hu Jintao and Wu Bangguo], 
CHINALAWINFO.COM (Dec. 26, 2006), 
http://article.chinalawinfo.com/Article_Detail.asp?ArticleID=35906. 
293 See One Letter Blocked the Property Law Draft?, supra note 291 (citing statements by 
NPCSC officials that the meeting was the first time an individual scholar had been invited 
to engage in such consultations). 
294 Cheng Jishan, Lengjing Kandai Wuquan Fa Shenyi Jincheng Yanchi [A Sober Look at 
the Delay in Deliberations over the Property Law], XINHUA NET (Feb. 21, 2006, 1:57 PM), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2006-02/21/content_4207585.htm; Wu Bangguo: 
Xiugai Hou de Wuquan Fa Cao an Fuhe Zhongguo Guoqing he Shiji [Wu Bangguo: After 
Revision, the Draft Property Law Is Consistent with the Reality of China’s National 
Condition], ZHONGGUO XINWEN WANG [CHINA NEWS NET] (Mar. 11, 2007), 
http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2007/03-11/888570.shtm [hereinafter Wu Bangguo: 
Property Law Consistent]. 
295 Chinese official media published scholarly defenses of the constitutionality of the 
statute and websites offering detailed explanations of the draft, the legislative process, and 
controversial issues.  Hand, supra note 58, at 17.  For scholarly defenses, see, e.g., 20 Duo 
Wei Zhiming Faxue Jia Congshen Wuquan Fa Baohu Yuanze Wanquan Fuhe Xianfa 
[More Than 20 Legal Scholars Reaffirm that the Property Law’s Protection Principles Are 
Fully in Accord with the Constitution], ZHONGGUO WANG [CHINA NET] (Jan. 16, 2007), 
http://www.china.com.cn/news/txt/2007-01/16/content_7664928.htm; Zhang Qianfan, 
Xuezhe Guandian: Wuquan Fa Zhong de Xianfa Wenti  [Scholar’s View: Constitutional 
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the NPCSC directly engaged citizen constitutional arguments in the public 
sphere.  The Party-state eventually suppressed further public debate on the 
Property Law.296  Nonetheless, by delaying the law and publicly defending 
the constitutionality of the statute, Chinese officials legitimized Professor 
Gong’s constitutional claim and reinforced the concept that laws must 
have a constitutional basis.297 
As Chinese officials considered further revisions to takings 
regulations, unlawful takings, petitions, and protests continued.298  Several 
of these incidents generated widespread public attention and outrage.299  
                                                                                                               
Problems in the Property Law], XINHUA NET (May 22, 2006, 2:29 PM), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2006-05/22/content_4583677.htm.  For official 
websites on the Property Law, see, e.g., JUJIAO WUQUAN FA [FOCUSING ON THE PROPERTY 
LAW], available at http://npc.people.com.cn/GB/28320/50638/index.html; and ZHONGHUA 
RENMIN GONGHEGUO WUQUAN FA [PRC PROPERTY LAW], available at 
http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2007-03/19/content_554452.htm.  NPC officials also issued 
public statements confirming the constitutionality of the revised law.  See, e.g., Renda 
Changweihui Fagongwei: Wuquan Fa Caoan Fuhe Xianfa Guiding [NPCSC Legal Affairs 
Commission: Property Law Draft Is Consistent with Provisions of the Constitution], 
XINHUA NET (Dec. 29, 2006, 10:01 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2006-
12/29/content_5548199.htm; Wu Bangguo: Property Law Consistent, supra note 294. 
296 Joseph Kahn, China Backs Property Law, Buoying Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/16/world/asia/16china.html. 
297 Hand, supra note 58, at 18. 
298 For example, the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) identified 96,000 new illegal 
land cases in 2006, a sharp increase over the prior year.  In the first half of 2010, the MLR 
reported 22,000 unlawful land projects.  Shangban Nian Quanguo Faxian Weifa Yongdi An 
2.2 Wan Jian—Weifa Yongdi Mianji Shangsheng [22,000 Instances of Illegal Land Use 
Discovered in First Half of Year—Area of Illegally-Used Land on the Rise], XINHUA NET 
(July 15, 2010, 9:24 PM), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-
07/15/c_111959523.htm.  For increases in mass incidents and leadership concerns about 
general stability trends, see Wines & Ansfield, supra note 284; Shao Daosheng, Chuli 
“Tufaxing Qunti Shijian” Bixu Zunshou de Liu Da Yuanze [Six Major Principles That 
Must Be Observed in Handling “Sudden Mass Incidents”], GUANGMING GUANCHA 
[GUANGMING OBSERVER] (Mar. 9, 2009, 10:49 AM), http://guancha.gmw.cn/content/2009-
03/09/content_895809.htm; Steve Hess, Nail Houses, Land Rights, and Frames of Injustice 
on China’s Protest Landscape, 50 ASIAN SURVEY, no. 5 (Sept.–Oct. 2010), at 908–26. 
299 In 2005, for example, shocking video footage of a forcible eviction involving an armed 
attack on villagers leaked out.  Philip P. Pan, Chinese Peasants Attacked in Land Dispute: 
At Least 6 Die as Armed Thugs Assault Villagers Opposed to Seizure of Property, WASH. 
POST, June 15, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/06/14/AR2005061401542_pf.html.  Chinese media reported the 
incident.  See, e.g., Shu Bai Ren Chi Lieqiang Gou Dao, Xiji Dingzhou Cunmin Duo 6 
Ming [Hundreds of People Attack Dingzhou Villagers With Hunting Rifles and Sharpened 
Pipes, Leaving Six Dead], XINJING BAO [BEIJING NEWS] (Jun. 13, 2005, 2:08 AM), 
http://news.thebeijingnews.com/china/2005/0613/005@105208.htm.  In 2007, the plight of 
a family resisting eviction in Chongqing became a cause célèbre in China.  Kent Ewing, 
The Coolest Nail House in History, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Mar. 31, 2007, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/IC31Cb01.html.  In late 2007 and 2008, 
more than 120,000 farmers in four Chinese provinces signed statements protesting land 
abuses and declaring ownership over their land.  Josephine Ma & Vivian Wu, Village Land 
Claim Could Shake Core Principle of Collectivism, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 24, 
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Citizens actively constitutionalized such incidents and filed new 
constitutional review proposals challenging the legal framework for 
takings.300  Such events took place in the context of growing Party-state 
concern over social stability. 
Against this backdrop, a dramatic event catalyzed new legislative 
action.  In December 2009, a woman named Tang Fuzhen self-immolated 
in an act of protest against workers who had arrived to tear down her 
former Chengdu home.  The incident was captured on video and widely 
reported by Chinese media.301  Leveraging public discourse over the 
incident, Chinese scholars filed a new constitutional review proposal with 
the NPCSC challenging the constitutionality of China’s regulation on 
urban takings.302  The proposal offered sophisticated, nuanced, and policy-
oriented arguments that identified constitutional and legal infirmities in 
the existing regulatory framework and tied them to social instability.  The 
scholars cited both the 2004 constitutional amendments and the Property 
Law and explained that the existing takings regulations undermined the 
policy goals behind these legal reforms. 
State institutions and media immediately engaged these scholars.  
In the month following the review proposal, the scholars were invited to 
the State Council and the NPC Legislative Affairs Commission to consult 
with officials on the constitutional issues raised in the proposal and the 
drafting of a new takings regulation.303  The scholars viewed this response 
                                                                                                               
2007 (available on Westlaw at 2007 WLNR 25326845); Jamil Anderlini, Losing the 
Countryside, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 20, 2008, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3aacef56-
df56-11dc-91d4-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1bpG5pZCH. 
300 2007: China’s Ten Major Constitutional Cases, supra note 200; 2007 TYPICAL CASES, 
supra note 198, at 1–5.  Citizens filed new constitutional review proposals related to land 
issues in 2008, 2009, and 2010.  See generally supra note 280. 
301 For an English translation of the transcript of CCTV “News 1+1” special on the 
incident, see The Chengdu Self Immolation, DONG NAN XI BEI [EAST SOUTH WEST NORTH], 
available at http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20091204_1.htm; Wei Kang Chaiqian er Zifen 
Chengdu Nü Qiye Jia Shang Zhong Qushi [Self-Immolating to Protest Demolition and 
Relocation: a Chengdu Entrepreneur Dies from Serious Injuries], NANFANG ZHOUMO [S. 
WEEKEND] (Dec. 1, 2009, 3:02 PM), http://www.infzm.com/content/38147; Xinjing Bao: 
“Tang Fuzhen Shijian” Heyi Ruci Zaogao [Beijing News: How Could the “Tang Fuzhen 
Incident” Be Such a Mess], RENMIN WANG (Dec. 4, 2009, 8:16 AM), 
http://opinion.people.com.cn/GB/10507600.html. 
302 Reaction to the Tang Fuzhen incident was powerful and played a major role in 
catalyzing subsequent legal reforms.  Zhang Qianfan, supra note 67, at § 4, para. 4.  For 
the proposal, see Shen Kui, supra note 280. 
303 Jianyan Shencha Chaiqian Tiaoli de 5 Wei Beida Xuezhe Huoyao Renda Zuotan: Qidai 
Renda Huifu Gongmin Jianyi “Chengxuhua” [5 Peking University Scholars Who Advised 
on Review of the Demolition and Relocation Regulations Receive Invitation for 
Discussions at the NPC: Expect an NPC Response on “Proceduralization” Proposed by 
Citizens], RENMIN WANG (Dec. 29, 2009, 9:54 AM), 
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/10671523.html [hereinafter 5 Scholars Receive 
Invitations]; Xin “Banqian Tiaoli” Nengfou Zhongjie Baoli Chaiqian? [Can the New 
“Relocation Regulation” End Violent Demolitions and Relocations?], DONGFANG ZAOBAO 
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as precedent-setting.  Wang Xixin, one of the signatories, praised it as 
“extremely constructive” and a “positive change,” and he expressed hope 
that as a result of the event, the process of responding to citizen review 
proposals would be “proceduralized.”304  The scholars were also invited to 
share their expertise on takings issues on Chinese central television and in 
official print and online media.305  One month later, the State Council 
released a draft regulation for public comment that addressed several key 
constitutional concerns that the scholars had raised.306  Noting progress, 
the scholars signaled flexibility on some constitutional issues, such as the 
State Council’s constitutional power to issue the takings regulation.  If the 
new regulation “satisfies the demands and hopes of the masses,” noted 
Shen Kui, they would not necessarily focus on “legal technicalities.”307 
Release of the draft regulations in January 2010 triggered a year 
of consultations involving multiple actors.  Central authorities engaged in 
extended and difficult negotiations with local government leaders, who 
were concerned about the impact of a more restrictive takings process on 
local finances, development plans, and official evaluations.308  As this 
                                                                                                               
[E. MORNING NEWS], Mar. 10, 2010, available at 
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304 5 Scholars Receive Invitations, supra note 303. 
305 See, e.g., Beida 5 Xuezhe zhi Wang Xixin, Shen Kui: Xiugai Chaiqian Tiaoli Yao Nachu 
Chengyi [Of the 5 Peking University Scholars, Wang Xixin and Shen Kui: Demolition and 
Relocation Regulation’s Amendment Must be Sincere], RENMIN WANG, Jan. 4, 2010, 
available at http://news.sohu.com/20100129/n269907103.shtml; Xinwen 1+1, Chaiqian 
Bianfa, Zhengzai Jiasu [News 1+1, Demolition and Relocation Legal Amendments Are 
Presently Gaining Speed ], CNTV.COM (Mar. 31, 2010), available at 
http://news.cntv.cn/program/xinwen1jia1/20100331/105034.shtml (full transcript of this 
program is available at http://news.cntv.cn/program/xinwen1jia1/20100401/106607.shtml).  
See also Jiaodian Fangtan Jiedu “Guoyou Tudi Shang Fangwu Zhengshou yu Buchang 
Tiaoli [Focal Point Interprets: “Regulation on Expropriation of and Compensation for 
Buildings on State-Owned Land”], Jan. 27, 2011, available at 
http://news.cntv.cn/china/20110127/113677.shtml (video and transcript available). 
306 “Xin Chaiqian Tiaoli” Zheng Minyi, Shouci Xianding Gonggong Liyi Fanwei [Public 
Comments are Solicited on “New Demolition and Relocation Regulations,” Scope of 
Public Interest is Defined for the First Time], XINHUA NET (Jan. 28, 2010, 11:45 PM), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2010-01/28/content_12894935.htm.  In particular, the 
draft included a definition of public interest, requirements that the government itself 
formally expropriate property rights and obtain agreements for compensation before 
issuing demolition permits to developers, and provisions requiring compensation to be paid 
or substitute housing to be provided before forced demolition begins.  Id. (citing draft 
regulation articles 3, 8–16, 20–21, and 28). 
307 Can the New Relocation Regulation End Violent Demolitions and Relocations?, supra 
note 303. 
308 Id.; Guo Shaofeng, Xin Chaiqian Tiaoli Bu Hui Si [New Demolition and Relocation 
Regulations Will Not Die], XINJING BAO [BEIJING NEWS], July 27, 2010, available at 
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process played out, local governments launched a new round of takings, 
suggesting that they were drawing out the process in part to secure time to 
expropriate property under the old, more permissive regulatory regime.309  
Citizens raised additional comments and concerns about both the January 
draft and a second draft released for public comment in December 2010.310  
As these events indicate, efforts to finalize the new regulations involved a 
complex balancing of interests.311 
In January 2011, the State Council announced the adoption of a 
revised takings regulation.312  Chinese official media emphasized the 
consultative nature of the drafting process and the need for the final 
regulation to balance conflicting interests.313  While the final regulation 
retains many features of the original draft and addresses several core 
constitutional issues that the legal scholars raised, it leaves other concerns 
unresolved.  Some commentators expressed concern that the regulation 
had been watered down or would be ineffective.314   Days after the 
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100,000 comments on the two drafts.  New House Demolition Rules Balance Development, 
CHINA DAILY (Jan. 27, 2011, 9:12 PM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-
01/27/content_11930061.htm (available on Westlaw, titled “New House Expropriation 
Rules Balance Development, Home Owners' Interests”). 
311 Chinese sources discussed the complexity of this process.  See, e.g., Huang Xiuli, supra 
note 308; Ruan Zhanjiang, Chaiqian Ruhe “Wu Kui yu Baixing” [How Can Demolition 
and Relocation “Be Worthy of the Common People”?], XINJING BAO [BEIJING NEWS] (Aug. 
16, 2010, 8:59 AM), available at http://star.news.sohu.com/20100816/n274234424.shtml; 
Yuan Jian, supra note 282. 
312 Guojia Xin Chaiqian Tiaoli Gongbu Shixing, Zhengshou Fangwu Xian Buchang Hou 
Banqian [New National Demolition and Relocation Regulations Published and 
Implemented, Compensation to Be Paid Prior to Relocation When Expropriating 
Buildings], ZHONGGUO WANG [CHINA NET], Jan. 22, 2011, 
http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2011-01/22/content_21796175.htm.  For the full text 
of the new regulation, see Guoyou Tudi Shang Fangwu Zhengshou Buchang Tiaoli 
[Regulation for Expropriation and Compensation for Buildings on State-Owned Land], 
(promulgated by the State Council, Jan. 21, 2011, effective Jan. 21, 2011), ZHONGHUA 
RENMIN GONGHEGUO GUOWUYUAN LING [PRC ST. COUNCIL DIRECTIVE] no. 590, available 
at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2011-01/21/content_1790111.htm. 
313 New House Demolition Rules Balance Development, supra note 310. 
314 See, e.g., Cheng Xueyang, Jinbu, Yuandi Tabu, yu Tuibu: Ping “Guoyou Tudi Shang 
Fangwu Zhengshou Buchang Tiaoli Di Er Ci Yijiangao” [Progress, Marching in Place, 
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adoption of the final regulation, Chinese media announced plans to 
experiment with a new property tax in selected local jurisdictions.315  
Although the experiments were tied to efforts to curb real estate 
speculation rather than the adoption of the new takings regulation, the 
timing of the announcement, the massive debts that local governments 
have incurred, and the importance of land sales for local government 
finances suggest that consideration of a property tax was in part the 
product of bargaining with local governments over the new takings 
regulation. 
Ongoing reform of the legal framework for takings in China 
provides a powerful example of the consultative dynamics identified in 
this article.  In response to collective constitutional demands, the Party-
state undertook a multi-stage, incremental reform of the property law 
framework.  The Party-state engaged not only in a series of indirect, 
collective consultations in the public sphere but also unprecedented direct 
consultations with legal scholars who had mounted public constitutional 
challenges on various issues related to property rights.  The resulting 
reforms represented a balancing of Party-state concerns about social 
stability and regime legitimacy, ongoing legal and economic reform 
imperatives, interpretations of existing constitutional and legal 
requirements, local governance and taxation issues, and collective citizen 
constitutional claims both supporting and challenging stronger legal 
protections for private property rights.  As the third wave of reform 
illustrates, bargaining and consultation to resolve constitutional disputes 
may be found even in the midst of the heightened Party-state repression 
and politicization of legal institutions of the past several years. 
Constitutional disputes over property rights also illustrate the 
benchmarking dynamics discussed in Part III.  Following the third wave of 
reform, plans to introduce a property tax generated new, more expansive 
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Weilai Zaiyu Minzhong Canyu [The Future of Constitutionalism Is the Participation of the 
People], CAIJING WANG BOKE [FINANCE NET BLOG] (Jan. 6, 2011, 2:53 PM), 
http://blog.caijing.com.cn/expert_article-151521-15400.shtml. 
315  Geoff Dyer, Chinese Cities to Pilot Property Tax, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2011, 
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citizen discourse.  Chinese citizens have raised public questions about the 
legal basis for a tax on state-owned land and demanded greater public 
participation, transparency, and supervision of local government to ensure 
that any new tax revenues are spent properly.316  Each Party-state response 
in this multistage process has resolved a constitutional dispute, but has 
also created benchmarks for new constitutional claims and reinforced the 
legitimacy of constitutional demands, a ratcheting effect that appears 
likely to continue.317 
D. Electoral Reform in Hong Kong 
Negotiations over procedures for electing Hong Kong’s 
Legislative Council (LegCo) provide a fifth example of consultation and 
bargaining in constitutional disputes.  Hong Kong maintains a special 
constitutional status within China.  Since sovereignty over Hong Kong 
reverted to the PRC in July 1997, Hong Kong has been governed under 
the Basic Law, a domestic statute adopted by the NPC in July 1990.318  
The Basic Law establishes Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region 
of the PRC (HKSAR), sets out the political structure of the HKSAR and 
the rights of HKSAR residents, and guarantees the HKSAR a high degree 
of autonomy and preservation of its capitalist system for fifty years.319  As 
both a PRC domestic statute and the constitutional text of the HKSAR, the 
Basic Law has a dual nature and is often referred to as the HKSAR’s 
                                                 
316 See, e.g., Su Ling, Zhengshou Fangchan Shui: Weishenme? Ping Shenme? [Collecting 
Real Estate Tax: Why? On What Basis?], NANFANG ZHOUMO [S. WEEKEND] (June 9, 2010, 
9:41 PM), http://www.infzm.com/content/46182. 
317 As this article was going to publication, thousands of villagers angry over the seizure of 
their land and related abuses expelled local officials in Wukan village, Guangdong 
province.  The tense standoff in Wukan attracted world attention and ended with a 
negotiated settlement.  In the wake of the Wukan protest, Chinese commentators have 
publicly discussed the constitutional dimensions of the incident.  Premier Wen Jiabao has 
also confirmed that reforms incorporated into the January 2011 regulation on urban 
property seizures should in principle be applied to rural land requisistions.  For a 
discussion of the Wukan incident and its contitutional implications, see Keith Hand, 
Constitutionalizing Wukan: The Value of the Constitution Outside the Courtroom, 12.3 
CHINA BRIEF (The Jamestown Found., Washington, D.C.), February 3, 2012, at 5, available 
at http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/cb_02_03.pdf. 
318 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s 
Republic of China, adopted Apr. 4, 1990, effective July 1, 1997 (H.K.) [hereinafter Basic 
Law], available at http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext.  The NPC issued a 
concurrent decision permitting the establishment of Special Administrative Regions under 
the PRC Constitution.  Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin 
Gonghe Guo Xianggang Tebie Xingzheng Qu Jiben Fa de Jueding [Decision of the Nat’l 
People’s Cong. on the Basic Law of the H.K. Special Admin. Region of the PRC] 
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 4, 1990, effective Apr. 4, 1990) 
(LawInfoChina), available at http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/attached_2.html. 
319 Basic Law chs. I & II.  This formula is commonly referred to as “one country, two 
systems.” 
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“mini-constitution.”320  The power to amend the Basic Law is vested in the 
NPCSC, subject to the limitation that amendments may not “contravene 
the basic policies of the PRC toward the HKSAR.”321 
The Basic Law vests both the HKSAR courts and the NPCSC 
with authority to interpret the Basic Law.  In adjudicating cases, HKSAR 
courts are authorized to interpret provisions of the Basic Law “within the 
limits of the autonomy of the Region.”322  However, ultimate authority to 
interpret the Basic Law is vested with the NPCSC.323  Although the scope 
of the NPCSC’s interpretive power under the Basic Law was the subject 
of controversy in several early cases,324 the HKSAR Court of Final Appeal 
has recognized that the Basic Law confers the power of interpretation on 
the NPCSC in “general and unqualified terms” and that NPCSC 
interpretations are “binding on the courts of the HKSAR.”325 
The constitutional dispute examined here concerns Basic Law 
provisions on the procedures for electing LegCo.  Article 68 of the Basic 
Law provides: 
 
The method for forming the Legislative Council shall be 
specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance 
with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The 
ultimate aim is the election of all the members of the 
Legislative Council by universal suffrage. 
 
Annex II of the Basic Law establishes the method for electing 
LegCo.  Under the original procedure, 30 members of LegCo were 
directly elected in geographic constituencies, while 30 members were 
elected by so-called “functional constituencies,” which represent industry 
                                                 
320 Johannes Chan, Basic Law and Constitutional Review: The First Decade, 37 H.K. L. J. 
407, 409 (2007).  For characterizations of the Basic Law, see, e.g., Wang Zhenmin, 
Constitutional Conflict and the Role of the National People’s Congress, FOUNDATION FOR 
LAW, JUSTICE AND SOCIETY, at 2, 
www.fljs.org/uploads/documents/Zhenmin%231%23.pdf; Jiang Shigong, supra note 21, at 
40 (characterizing the Basic Law as a constitutional statute). 
321 Basic Law art. 159. 
322 Basic Law art. 158(2). 
323 Basic Law art. 158(1). 
324  See generally Chan, supra note 320; Danny Gittings, Hong Kong’s Courts Are 
Learning to Live with China, H.K. J., July 1, 2010, 
http://www.hkjournal.org/archive/2010_fall/2.htm. 
325 Lau Kong Yung v. Director of Immigration, [1999] 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 300 (C.F.A.) 
(H.K.), paras. 57–62, available at   
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federations, chambers of commerce, and business groups.326  Annex II 
provides that after 2007, the method for electing the LegCo may be 
changed with a two-thirds vote of LegCo, the consent of the HKSAR 
Chief Executive, and reporting to the NPCSC “for record.”327  These 
broad provisions have been the subject of ongoing controversy over the 
HKSAR’s political future, with an array of democratic parties in the 
HKSAR pushing for implementation of the Basic Law’s promise of 
universal suffrage for all LegCo seats.328 
As these debates progressed, the NPCSC asserted its authority 
over changes to the LegCo election procedures.  In an official 
interpretation of the Basic Law issued in 2004, the NPCSC stated that it 
must determine whether there is “a need” for amendments to the 
procedure before such amendments are submitted to LegCo for debate.329  
This interpretation generated significant controversy, since the text of 
Annex II provides only that a decision to amend the LegCo procedures 
must be submitted to the NPCSC “for record.”330  In 2007, the NPCSC 
issued a decision confirming that universal suffrage would not be adopted 
                                                 
326  About LegCo: Legislative Council Today, LEGCO.GOV.HK, 
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ASIA TIMES ONLINE, June 29, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LF29Ad02.html. 
327 Basic Law annex II, § III. 
328 Ma Ngoc, The Beginning of a Thaw—or a Fatal Split in the Democracy Movement?, 
H.K. J., July 1, 2010, at 1–7, 
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focuses on the LegCo procedure. 
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Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the PRC by the NPCSC] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 6, 2004, effective Apr. 6, 
2004) (LawInfoChina, Peking Univ. Beida Fabao series CLI.1.52226), available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=3462. 
330 Basic Law annex II, § III.  In contrast, Annex I provides that changes to the method of 
choosing the Chief Executive shall be submitted to the NPCSC “for approval,” but only 
after approval by LegCo and the Chief Executive.  Basic Law annex I.  The NPC is the 
supreme organ of state power in the PRC, and the NPCSC’s interpretative power over the 
Basic Law is general and unqualified.  Given such powers, the requirement that an election 
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or the relationship between Central Authorities and the HKSAR.  For information about 
the controversy regarding Annex II, see Gittings, supra note 324. 
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in the 2010 LegCo election and that the existing ratio of half geographic 
constituencies and half functional constituencies would be maintained in 
2012.331  The NPCSC’s decision and a subsequent HKSAR proposal for 
reform of the 2012 electoral procedures disappointed Hong Kong political 
parties pushing for realization of the Basic Law’s stated goal of universal 
suffrage.  The developments also raised concerns about the prospects for 
universal suffrage in 2017 or 2020.332 
In the wake of this NPCSC decision, pro-democracy groups in 
Hong Kong were divided over the steps to pressure the mainland 
government.333  One group proposed that LegCo representatives from 
geographic constituencies resign their seats in two progressive steps, 
triggering replacement elections that would serve as referendums on the 
HKSAR’s electoral policies.  Representatives of the older, more 
established Democratic Party refused to participate in this plan and 
advocated direct negotiations with the mainland government.  The 
mainland government denounced the referendum strategy, and the 
replacement elections were marred by boycotts and low turnout. 
The mainland government took advantage of the split in Hong 
Kong’s pro-democracy forces.  For the first time, mainland government 
representatives engaged in direct consultations with the Democratic Party 
in an effort to reach consensus on an electoral reform package.  After five 
months of difficult negotiations, Party General Secretary Hu Jintao 
approved a compromise package that called for an increase in the number 
of LegCo seats to 70, with 40 seats to be chosen by direct popular vote.334  
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334  When considered in the context of LegCo’s voting procedures, the Mainland’s 
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LegCo is required for changes to LegCo’s election procedures.  Basic Law annex II.  For 
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LegCo subsequently approved the package.  The compromise created a 
severe rift among Hong Kong’s pro-democracy forces, with many 
expressing concern that the Democratic Party had abandoned its 
commitment to universal suffrage.  However, public approval of the 
moderate faction’s lead negotiator rose after the deal.335 
The LegCo compromise provides a vivid example of the Party-
state’s willingness, within limits, to resolve constitutional disputes through 
consultations and compromise.  As both a practical and legal matter, the 
mainland government could control the outcome of the ongoing 
constitutional dispute over the implementation of Basic Law provisions on 
LegCo.  While the Basic Law establishes universal suffrage as an 
“ultimate goal,” the language of Article 68 leaves broad room for 
interpretation on the conditions for this change.  The NPCSC exercises 
ultimate authority over both the interpretation and amendment of the Basic 
Law.  More importantly, because both the HKSAR Chief Executive and 
two-thirds of LegCo members must approve any change to election 
procedures, the mainland government could have blocked the adoption of 
any plan it opposed.336 
Nevertheless, the mainland government engaged in consultations 
and accepted a compromise on a core constitutional issue.  By adopting 
this approach, the government exacerbated splits in Hong Kong’s pro-
democracy camp and reduced the likelihood that moderate pro-democracy 
forces in Hong Kong would radicalize.337  Hong Kong’s pro-democracy 
forces had demonstrated their ability to generate massive street protests 
over the HKSAR’s Anti-Subversion Law in 2002.338  By engaging in 
dialogue and making limited concessions, the mainland government 
reinforced its credibility in Hong Kong and prevented a repeat of the 2002 
showdown.  Leveraging these political pressures and negotiating against 
the background of the Basic Law provisions on universal suffrage, 
moderate pro-democracy forces succeeded in engaging Beijing in a direct 
political dialogue, building trust, and pushing reform of LegCo beyond 
                                                                                                               
both members representing functional constituencies and members representing geographic 
constituencies are required for passage.  Id. 
335 Ewing, supra note 333, at 104. 
336 The mainland government dominates the process for choosing the Chief Executive, and 
half of LegCo seats were in the hands of conservative functional constituencies.  Tom 
Mitchell, Hong Kong By-Election Thwarted by Beijing, FINANCIAL TIMES, May 16, 2010, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5064a87e-6114-11df-9bf0-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1bpG5pZCH. 
337 Ma Ngoc, supra note 328. 
338 NAT’L DEMOCRATIC INST. FOR INT’L AFFAIRS, NDI HONG KONG REPORT NO. 8: THE 
PROMISE OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN HONG KONG: THE IMPACT OF JULY’S PROTEST 
DEMONSTRATIONS ON THE NOVEMBER 23 DISTRICT COUNCIL ELECTIONS—A PRE-ELECTION 
REPORT 2 (2003). 
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that set out in the 2007 NPCSC decision.339  With little chance of forcing 
reforms through litigation or a LegCo vote, moderates settled for limited 
concessions and an expanded political base from which to push for 
universal suffrage in 2020. 
 While the dispute over election procedures in the HKSAR 
revolved around the Basic Law, rather than the PRC Constitution, the 
dispute provides insights into the resolution of constitutional disputes on 
the mainland.  Although it exercised ultimate control over the political-
legal outcome of the dispute, the Party-state engaged in bargaining and 
offered tactical concessions on a core constitutional question in an effort 
to appease moderate reformers and maintain stability.  This pattern is 
consistent with that in the mainland examples discussed above.  In the 
context of the HKSAR’s separate and more open political system, 
however, the Party-state demonstrated a willingness to engage in direct 
consultations and bargaining with a moderate political adversary.  The 
LegCo example provides an indication of how the Party-state might 
approach constitutional disputes at a future stage of China’s transition in 
which greater political openness is tolerated. 
E. Additional Examples and Limitations 
Additional disputes could be cited as examples of these patterns.  
For instance, citizens have challenged various forms of discrimination by 
advancing arguments based on Article 33 of the Constitution, which 
provides that “all citizens are equal before the law.”  To address 
discrimination against Hepatitis B carriers, citizens have advanced 
constitutional arguments in constitutional review proposals, litigation, and 
the media.  These efforts, which have been documented in detail 
elsewhere, have prompted some legal and policy concessions.340  On a 
broader level, the continued disparate treatment of urban and rural 
residents remains an active zone of constitutional contention.  In addition 
to challenging the C&R Measures, citizens have raised constitutional 
arguments to challenge the residence registration (hukou) system, 341 
                                                 
339 Ma Ngoc, supra note 328, at 4–5. 
340 See Hand, supra note 58, at 236–38; Kellogg, supra note 16, at 237–45; Cai Dingjian, 
supra note 32, at § 2.  For an official acknowledgement of such citizen impacts, see Chen 
Chao, Public Opinion Defeats HBV Discrimination, CHINA INTERNET INFORMATION 
CENTER (Sept. 23, 2004), http://www.china.org.cn/english/2004/Sep/107886.htm. 
341 Hu Xingdou, Professor, Beijing Inst. of Tech. Dep’t of Econ.: Dui Eryuan Hukou Tizhi 
ji Chengxiang Eryuan Zhidu Jinxing Weixian Shencha de Jianyishu [Proposal to Conduct 
Constitutional Review of the Dual Residence Registration System and the Dual System for 
Cities and Towns] (Nov. 6, 2004), available at 
http://www.huxingdou.com.cn/hukouweixian.htm; Henan 10 Ming Lüshi Zhi Xin Renda, 
Jianyi Chexiao Zanzhu Zheng [Ten Lawyers Send a Letter to the NPC and Propose 
Cancellation of Temporary Residence Permits], SINA.COM (Dec. 26, 2006, 7:52 PM), 
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allocations of people’s congress delegates that disadvantage rural 
residents,342 disparate injury compensation standards for urban and rural 
residents, 343  and related issues.  Such challenges create legitimacy 
problems for a regime that claims to represent workers and peasants and 
emphasizes “balanced” development. 
Of course, consultative dispute resolution patterns are not evident 
in some constitutional disputes.  The suppression of Charter 08, the 
prosecution of lead Charter 08 organizer Liu Xiaobo for subversion, the 
aggressive suppression of rights lawyers and activists, and the Party-
state’s efforts to block independent candidates for local people’s 
congresses are ongoing reminders that there are limits to the consultative 
dynamics illustrated here. 344   Nevertheless, Chinese leaders have 
demonstrated a willingness to bargain even on some issues of great 
political sensitivity.  For example, officials have approached citizens 
whose relatives died in the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations and who 
engaged in sustained calls for reform to discuss the possibility of 
compensation.345  While the gesture was almost certainly an effort to quiet 
                                                                                                               
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/l/2006-12-26/195211890939.shtml.  In March 2010, thirteen 
Chinese news outlets published editorials on the constitutionality of the residence 
registration system.  See Don Clarke, The Famous Hukou Editorial, CHINA LAW PROF 
BLOG (Mar. 26, 2010), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/china_law_prof_blog/2010/03/the-famous-hukou-
editorial.html. 
342 2007 TYPICAL CASES, supra note 198, at 80–93. 
343 Letter from Hu Xingdou, Professor at Beijing Inst. of Tech., and Li Fangping, Atty., to 
the SPC: Guanyu Xiaochu Chengxiang Chabie Daiyu, Tongyi Renshen Sunhai Peichang 
Biaozhun de Gongmin Jianyishu [Citizen Proposal on Dismantling the Disparate 
Treatment of City and Countryside and Unifying the Compensation Standard for Personal 
Injury] (Mar. 12, 2006), http://www.huxingdou.com.cn/renshenpeichang.htm; Proposal 
from Zhou Yuzhong, Head of Zhongshi Law Office, Guangdong Province: Guanyu 
Qingqiu Dui Zuigao Renmin Fayuan “Guanyu Renshen Sunhai Peichang Anjian Shiyong 
Falü Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi” (Fashi (2003) 20 Hao) Jinxing Shencha de Gongmin 
Jianyishu [Proposal Requesting Constitutionality Review of the SPC “Interpretation of 
Some Issues in Applying the Law in Personal Injury Cases” (2003 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. 
INTERP. no. 20)] (Jan. 1, 2007), available at http://blog.law-
star.com/blog/cgi/shownews.jsp?id=750002447.  For further analsyis of these efforts, see 
Hand, supra note 58, at 238–39. 
344 See supra notes 2, 4, 5 and 208 and accompanying text; Willy Lam, Local Elections 
Open for All but the Independent Candidates, 11.17 CHINA BRIEF (The Jamestown Found., 
Washington, D.C.), Sept. 16, 2011, at 3, 
http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/cb_11_42.pdf. 
345 In June 2011, Hong Kong media reported that government authorities had, for the first 
time, approached relatives of one of the victims of the Tiananmen incident and offered 
compensation.  Payout Discussed With Family of June 4 Victim, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 
June 1, 2011, http://topics.scmp.com/news/china-news-watch/article/Payout-discussed-
with-family-of-June-4-victim.  For nearly two decades, the “Tiananmen Mothers,” a group 
of people with relatives who died in 1989, have issued numerous public statements on 
politically sensitive issues.  In March and May 2011, the Tiananmen Mothers issued open 
letters demanding an investigation into the deaths, compensation for victims’ families, and 
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citizen claimants at a sensitive time and was rejected as insufficient, it 
highlights the fact that consultative dynamics may be present even in the 
context of some highly sensitive issues. 
By shifting focus from the individual legal to the collective 
political dimension of constitutional law, we can observe patterns of 
bargaining, consultation, and mediation in intrastate and some citizen-state 
constitutional disputes.  An understanding of these dynamics helps to 
explain why Chinese commentators speak of a “latent” constitutional 
review mechanism and characterize the exercise of constitutional rights as 
a “negotiation” or “dialogue” with the state.  As Part V demonstrates, 
emerging approaches to administrative law disputes and complex 
collective disputes provide evidence of convergence between general 
dispute resolution practices and informal patterns of dispute resolution in 
the constitutional law context. 
V. EMERGING DISPUTE RESOLUTION MODELS IN CHINA AND 
THEIR RELEVANCE TO CONSTITUTIONAL DISPUTES 
In an effort to address rising instability, perceived threats to Party 
power, and an overwhelmed court system, Party and judicial leaders have 
strengthened controls over courts and other legal institutions; instructed 
them to consider political and social effects, in addition to the law, in 
resolving disputes; and promoted alternative dispute resolution processes.  
An analysis of two core components of this program provides insights into 
how the political-legal system is coping with problems that also arise in 
the context of constitutional disputes.  The first component is a push to 
mediate administrative lawsuits.  The second is the promotion of grand 
mediation (大调解), an integrated dispute resolution mechanism designed 
to settle collective or difficult cases at the local level.  Such an analysis 
reveals a zone of convergence between China’s informal practices for 
resolving constitutional disputes and broader dispute resolution trends.  
This convergence, considered in the broader context of Party-state 
interests and political conditions that are motivating experimentation with 
new consultative and deliberative practices, raises the possibility that the 
                                                                                                               
steps to hold those responsible legally accountable.  They also invited dialogue.  Liu Si 
Sinanzhe Jiashu Zhi Xin Lianghui Yaoqiu Diaocha “Liu Si” [Family Members of June 
Fourth Victims Send a Letter to the Two Meetings [the NPC and the National Committee 
of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference] Demanding an Investigation 
into “June Fourth”], DEUTSCHE WELLE (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.dw-
world.de/dw/article/0,,14880136,00.html; Zhang Xianling: Peichang ye Yao Xian Jiang Ge 
Shifei Duicuo [Zhang Xianling: Before Compensation There Must be a Discussion of Right 
and Wrong], BBC ZHONGWEN WANG [BBC CHINESE NET] (May 31, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/chinese_news/2011/05/110531_tiananmen_zhangxi
anling.shtml. 
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Party-state could adapt its grand mediation model to create an indigenous 
mechanism for resolving constitutional disputes. 
A. China’s Mediation Drive 
The contemporary emphasis on mediation in China has deep 
historical roots.  Mediation is often characterized as a traditional dispute 
resolution method grounded in the Chinese cultural emphasis on 
harmony. 346   Under Mao Zedong, the Party continued to practice 
mediation in part as a tool of political education.347  Maoist mediation 
exhibited some coercive elements.348  In the post-Mao era (particularly in 
the 1990s), political-legal institutions shifted their focus to adjudication as 
the Party-state constructed a comprehensive legal system, introduced 
reforms to professionalize the judiciary and improve legal procedure, and 
promoted the concept of a socialist rule of law state.349 
Over the last decade, however, China has steadily revived the 
status of mediation as a preferred mechanism for resolving a broad range 
of disputes.350  Political-legal institutions initiated this revival in 2002.351  
As concerns about social stability and related threats to Party power 
intensified, Party leaders strengthened their emphasis on mediation.352  By 
2007, the SPC had introduced the work principle of “giving priority to 
                                                 
346 See Randall Peerenboom & Xin He, Dispute Resolution in China: Patterns, Causes, 
and Prognosis, 4 EAST ASIA L. REV. 1, 24 (2009); Zuo Weimin, Tanxun Jiufen Jiejue de 
Xin Moshi—yi Sichuan “Da Tiaojie” Moshi wei Guanzhu Dian [Exploring New Models 
for Dispute Resolution—with a Special Focus on “Grand Mediation” in Sichuan], 2010 
FALÜ SHIYONG [J. OF L. APPLICATION], no. 2–3, at 112, available at 
http://www.studa.net/faxuelilun/101125/1422188.html. 
347 LUBMAN, supra note 139, at 40–70.  Mediation was applied to resolve “non-antagonistic” 
disputes among the people.  Donald C. Clarke, Dispute Resolution in China, 5 J. CHINESE L. 
245, 286–88 (1991). 
348 LUBMAN, supra note 139, at 59–63;  Clarke, supra note 347, at 273–74, 286–88. 
349 Zhu Suli, supra note 12, at 5–6. 
350 See generally Minzner, supra note 1, pt. I; Peerenboom & Xin He, supra note 346, at 
24–26. 
351 Peerenboom & Xin He, supra note 346, at 26. 
352 See, e.g., Zui Gao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Renmin Fayuan Minshi Tiaojie Gongzuo 
Ruogan Wenti de Guiding [SPC Provisions on Several Issues in the Civil Mediation Work 
of the People’s Court] [hereinafter SPC Provision on Civil Mediation Work] (issued by the 
Sup. People’s Ct., Aug. 16, 2004, effective Nov. 1, 2004) 2004 FA SHI [SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. 
INTERP.] no. 12, available at 
http://eng.chinalawinfo.com/NetLaw/display.aspx?db=law&sen=rLdDdW4drLdDdWndrh
dydWdd/hdvdWnd9DdFdWcdrDdvdWud/Ld5dWrd/LdGdWud/ddTdWud9Dd+&Id=3735
&; Wang Quanbao, Shanghai de “Datiaojie” Shiyan [Shanghai’s “Grand Mediation” 
Experiment], ZHONGGUO XINWEN ZHOUKAN [CHINA NEWSWEEK] (Sept. 16, 2010, 2:26 PM), 
available at http://newsweek.inewsweek.cn/magazine.php?id=412 (noting Luo Gan’s 2004 
speech as a pivotal point in the future of mediation). 
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mediation and combining mediation and adjudication.”353  A 2010 circular 
explains the motivations behind this policy: 
 
Strengthening mediation work in all respects is the 
inevitable demand of the inheritance of the Chinese 
people’s elegant culture and development of the fine 
traditions of the people’s administration of justice, of 
giving play to the political superiority of a socialist 
judicial system with Chinese characteristics, of upholding 
sociality stability and harmony, and of giving play to the 
professional role of the people’s courts.354 
 
In the context of this drive, Chinese leaders have revived Maoist dispute 
resolution practices that emphasize populism and political education.355  
Mediation quotas have created significant pressure to mediate cases, have 
led to sharp increases in the ratio of cases resolved through mediation, and 
have raised concerns that parties are being forced to compromise their 
legal rights.356 
Chinese leaders have promoted mediation in a variety of cases.  
Official statements emphasize mediation as a tool not only for resolving 
private disputes, but also public law issues such as administrative lawsuits 
and minor criminal cases.357  They also instruct courts to make efforts to 
mediate cases that (1) involve difficult, complex, or collective disputes; 
(2) require the cooperation of government organs; (3) influence social 
harmony and stability; (4) involve legal rules that are unclear, difficult to 
apply, or may be difficult to enforce; (5) involve sensitive issues of 
                                                 
353 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Jin Yi Bu Fahui Susong Tiaojie Zai Goujian Shehui 
Zhuyi Hexie Shehui Zhong Jiji Zuoyong de Ruogan Yijian [Several Opinions of the SPC 
on Progressively Giving Play to the Positive Role of Litigation Mediation in the Building 
of a Socialist Harmonious Society] [hereinafter SPC Opinions on Positive Role of 
Mediation] (issued by the Sup. People’s Ct., Mar. 6, 2007, effective Mar. 6, 2007) 
(LawInfoChina, Peking Univ. Beida Fabao series CLI.3.89041), available at 
http://www.chinabaike.com/law/zy/sf/fy/1338426.html. 
354 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Jin Yibu Guanche Tiaojie Youxian, Tiaopan Jiehe 
Gongzuo Yuanze de Ruogan Yijian [SPC Several Opinions on Further Implementing the 
Work Principle of “Giving Priority to Mediation and Combining Mediation with 
Judgment”] [hereinafter SPC Opinion on Giving Priority to Mediation] (issued by the Sup. 
People’s Ct., June 7, 2010, effective ) 2010 FAFA [SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. CIRCULAR] no. 16, 
para. 1,  available at http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/sfwj/yj/201008/t20100811_8489.htm. 
355 See Minzner, supra note 1, Part II (describing revival of Maoist practices); Zhao Lei, 
Sifa Gaige Zui Re Zhengyi: Ma Xiwu Fuhuo [The Hottest Controversy in Judicial Reform: 
The Resurrection of Ma Xiwu], NANFANG ZHOUMO [S. WEEKEND] (June 10, 2010, 10:49 
PM), http://www.infzm.com/content/29885 (describing the controversy around reviving 
Ma Xiwu model in legal practice). 
356 Minzner, supra note 1, at 943–46, 955–59, 963. 
357 SPC Opinion on Positive Role of Mediation, supra note 353, at § 2. 
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common concern to society; or (6) involve extreme emotions.358  Chinese 
leaders have promoted mediation by people’s mediation committees, 
administrative organs, and other government and social entities in addition 
to court mediation.359 
This trend is the product of several factors.  Stresses related to 
China’s rapid development and rising citizen legal consciousness have led 
to sharp increases in both the number and complexity of disputes.360  The 
sheer volume of cases has placed significant stress on the judicial 
system. 361   Chinese courts, which face chronic difficulties enforcing 
judgments, also lack the capacity and authority to provide adequate 
remedies for many complex cases that involve collective or politically 
sensitive socio-economic claims, vague legal provisions, or complex, 
intersecting interests of multiple parties and levels of the Party-state.362  
Growing social conflict and deficiencies in the legal process have 
contributed to a large number of petitions, collective protests, and mass 
incidents that have aggravated Party-state concerns about instability.363  
Political-legal leaders note that judicial and extrajudicial mediation, 
consultation, and guidance are key components of a multifaceted social 
management system designed to release such pressures, promote the 
settlement of disputes before they intensify, and ensure social harmony.364 
In implementing this social management system, Party leaders 
have infused speeches and directives with instructions to integrate the 
consideration of political, social, and legal factors.  For example, Hu 
Jintao’s “Three Supremes” slogan calls on state institutions to “take as 
                                                 
358 Id. at § 5. 
359 For discussions linking people’s mediation, administrative mediation, and judicial 
mediation, see infra Part V(C) and accompanying notes. 
360 Zuo Weimin, supra note 346, at 112; Geng Baojian, Xingzheng Jiufen Jiejue Jizhi de 
Lujing Xuanze: Yi Ge Duoyuanhua de Shejiao [A Choice in the Path for the Mechanism of 
Resolving Administrative Disputes: A Multifaceted View], in ZHONGGUO JICENG 
XINGZHENG ZHENGYI JIEJUE JIZHI DE JINGYAN YANJIU [AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN LOCAL CHINA] 250–54 (Wang Qinghua ed., 
2010). 
361 For Chinese discussions of these pressures, see, e.g., Zuo Weimin, supra note 346, at 
112; Zhu Suli, supra note 12, at 5–7; Zhao Lei, Zhongguo Zui Mang de Fating [China’s 
Busiest Judicial Tribunal], NANFANG ZHOUMO [S. WEEKEND] (Dec. 4, 2008, 8:39 AM), 
http://www.infzm.com/content/20845. 
362 Peerenboom, supra note 1, at 191; Zhu Suli, supra note 12, at 5–7, 15–16.  From 2000–
2010, the enforcement rate was around 43%.  Zuo Weimin, supra note 346, at 112.   
363 Willy Lam, Beijing’s Blueprint for Tackling Mass Incidents and Social Management, 
11.5 CHINA BRIEF (The Jamestown Found., Washington, D.C.), Mar. 25, 2011, at 3, 
http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/cb_11_5.pdf. 
364  See, e.g., Zhou Yongkang, Shenru Tuijin Shehui Maodun Huajie, Shehui Guanli 
Chuangxin, Gongzheng Lianjie Zhifa, Wei Jingji Shehui You Hao You Kuai Fazhan Tigong 
Gengjia Youli de Fazhi Baozhang [Deeply Push Forward the Settlement of Social 
Contradictions, Innovation in Social Management, Clean and Just Law Enforcement, and 
Provide a More Powerful Legal Guarantee for Better and Faster Economic and Social 
Development], 4 QIU SHI [SEEKING TRUTH], Feb.16, 2010. 
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supreme the Party’s cause, the people’s interest, and the Constitution and 
laws.”  Party and judicial leaders also stress the importance of recognizing 
the “organic unity” of “legal, social, and political effects” and the “organic 
unity” of “the leadership of the Party, the people as masters of their own 
house, and ruling the country in accordance with law.”365  In resolving 
cases, courts are instructed to consider not only the content of the 
Constitution and law, but also the opinions of the masses, community 
norms, government interests and relationships, the political interests of the 
Party, public policy and economic development, social stability, and other 
factors.366  As Wang Qinghua argues, many cases in China affect multiple 
strands in this web of often conflicting interests and extra-legal factors.367  
Political-legal policy thus magnifies the polycentric characteristics of a 
broad range of disputes. 
Western legal theorists have recognized that alternative dispute 
resolution may offer advantages in addressing these types of problems.  
Lon Fuller has discussed the limitations of adjudication, and the 
advantages of hybrid and consultative processes, in resolving complex 
polycentric disputes.368  Alternative dispute resolution provides greater 
flexibility to take account of non-legal factors and develop creative 
remedies that may not be available to a court applying legal rules in an 
adjudication setting.369  This flexibility may promote more productive 
                                                 
365 See, e.g., Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Jin Yi Bu Zuohao 2009 Nian Renmin Fating 
Gongzuo de Tongzhi [SPC Notice on Progressively Improving the Work of People’s 
Tribunals in 2009] (issued by the Sup. People’s Ct., Feb. 11, 2009, effective Feb. 11, 2009) 
2009 FAFA [SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. CIRCULAR] no. 94, at para. 5(5) (LawInfoChina, Peking 
Univ. Beida Fabao series CLI.3.113487), available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=7466. 
366 Wang Qinghua, supra note 125, at 514–15, 532; Wang Shengjun, Shenru Xuexi Shijian 
Kexue Fazhan Guan, Jianchi Wei Daju Fuwu Wei Renmin Sifa [Deeply Study the 
Implementation of a Scientific Development Outlook, Persist in Judicial Administration for 
the People and the Overall Situation], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], Feb. 16, 2009 
availiable at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64094/8809139.html; Zuigao Renmin 
Fayuan Yinfa “Guanyu Jianli Jianquan Susong yu Fei Susong Xiang Xianjie de Maodun 
Jiufen Jiejue Jizhi de Ruogan Yijian” de Tongzhi [SPC Distributes Notice on “Several 
Opinions on Constructing a Contradiction and Dispute Resolution Mechanism that Links 
Litigation with Non-Litigation”] [hereinafter SPC Opinion on Linking Litigation and Non-
Litigation] (issued by the Sup. People’s Ct., July 24, 2009, effective July 24, 2009) 2009 
FAFA [SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. CIRCULAR] no. 45, para. 17 (LawInfoChina, Peking Univ. Beida 
Fabao series CLI.3.119924), available at 
http://www.court.gov.cn/qwfb/sfwj/yj/201003/t20100330_3550.htm; Political-Legal 
Textbook, supra note 118 (Party political-legal training manual integrating emphasis on 
Party leadership, mass opinion, social stability). 
367 Wang Qinghua, supra note 125, at 521. 
368 Fuller, supra note 26, at 395–410 (“Polycentric problems can often be solved . . . by 
parliamentary methods which include an element of contract in the form of a political 
‘deal’”). 
369 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is it Anyway? A Philosophical and Democratic 
Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L. J. 2662, 2677 (1995); Brian Ray, 
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dispute resolution outcomes than would be possible through adjudication.  
Parties faced with an all or nothing adjudication based on legal rules may 
harden their positions in a manner that intensifies, rather than dissipates, 
conflict. 370   Losing parties may undermine compliance by exacting 
revenge or pursuing alternative channels of resistance.371  In contrast, 
consultative processes at least have the potential to facilitate reciprocal 
acceptance and greater willingness to explore adaptive solutions.372 
Law may play a role in the context of bargaining and consultation.  
Legal rules provide “bargaining endowments” that shape the framework 
for negotiation outside of the adjudicative process.373  Legal rules that are 
pliable, vague, or conflicting leave room for a broader range of negotiated 
options and may thus have less value as “bargaining chips” that shape 
negotiations.  In situations where the law is vague or disputed, however, 
adaptive solutions reached through consultation and negotiation may 
facilitate new understandings or consensus on the content of unclear legal 
standards and create expectations that similar approaches will be applied 
to future disputes.374  Moreover, in disputes in which adjudication is 
unavailable and bargaining power is disparate, the act of compromise 
involves an implicit recognition of the legitimacy of the claims of weaker 
parties and a commitment to accommodation.  While uncertain or 
conflicting laws may provide only broad parameters for bargaining, the 
process of bargaining and accommodation may strengthen legal rules over 
time by dissipating perceived short-term threats, generating legal 
understandings, and raising public expectations for future settlements.375 
Chinese legal scholars emphasize such dynamics.  Chinese judges 
are obliged to decide cases in accordance with the law.376  The injection of 
                                                                                                               
Extending the Shadow of the Law: Using Hybrid Mechanisms to Develop Constitutional 
Norms in Socioeconomic Rights Cases, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 797, 802–4 (2009). 
370 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 369, at 2670.  See also Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis 
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950, 
982 (1979). 
371 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Litigation Is Not the Only Way: Consensus Building and 
Mediation as Public Interest Lawyering, 10 WASH. U. J. L.& POL’Y 37, 49 (2002).   
372 Id. at 42, 51, 56; Lon L. Fuller, Mediation: Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV 
305, 325–27 (1971).  Fuller argues that “mediation” is subject to the limitation that it 
generally cannot be employed to resolve disputes involving more than two parties.  
However, he acknowledges consultative approaches to multiparty problems and 
characterizes them as exhibiting “mediational” aspects. 
373 See generally Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 370. 
374  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Variable Morality of Constitutional (and Other) 
Compromises: A Comment on Sanford Levinson’s Compromise and Constitutionalism, 38 
PEPP. L. REV. 903, 912–13 (2011). 
375 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 369, 2680–82. 
376 FAGUAN FA [Judges Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
July 1, 1995, effective July 1, 1995, amended June 30, 2001) (LawInfoChina, Peking Univ. 
Beida Fabao series CLI.1.35754), arts. 1, 3, 5, 7, available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=1861. 
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non-legal factors in the adjudication context places courts in a difficult 
position, raises questions about improper interference, and may generate 
conflicts between courts and other Party-state institutions.377  Although 
Chinese law requires mediation to be consistent with law and policy, this 
requirement has been interpreted flexibly in practice and leaves room for 
creative settlements.378  As such, Chinese scholars argue that mediation 
facilitates the consideration of both legal and non-legal outcomes.379 
Chinese legal scholar Zhu Suli goes further and argues that an 
insistence on adherence to the law in mediated settlements undermines the 
advantages of mediation over adjudication and should be relaxed to allow 
the parties to facilitate consensus-based outcomes.  Legal provisions, he 
concludes, can play a role through the entire mediation process as a 
bargaining chip for the parties.380  Other Chinese sources note that “grand 
mediation” (discussed below) has altered past reliance on the “supremacy 
of law” in social management and introduces a flexible method for parties 
that changes the “rigidity” of the law.381  While law is one factor that 
shapes the bargaining process, political-legal personnel overseeing 
mediation may persuade or even pressure parties to agree to outcomes that 
are consistent with the imperatives of stability maintenance and the 
political interests of the Party-state.382 
                                                 
377 Wang Qinghua, supra note 125, at 517; Zuigaoyuan Hen Shengqi, Guotuting Hen 
“Danding,” Shaanxi Guotuting Kangfa Shijian Diaocha [SPC Very Angry, MLR Very 
“Calm,” and an Investigation into the Incident Where the Shaanxi Land Administration 
Bureau Resisted the Law], NANFANG ZHOUMO [S. WEEKEND] (Aug. 4, 2010, 10:33 PM), 
http://www.infzm.com/content/48526. 
378 Clarke, supra note 347, at 292.  See Chen Jilan, Shi Lun Wo Guo Minshi Susong Hejie 
Zhidu de Gaige [China’s Civil Litigation Reconciliation System Reforms], LAW-LIB.COM 
(June 10, 2010), http://www.law-lib.com/lw/lw_view.asp?no=11524 (noting that 
regulations about reconciliation are vague and leave room for parties to avoid 
reconciliation altogether, and even violate the law in reconciliation negotiations). 
379  Feng Qijiang, Xingzheng Shenpan Tiaojie zhi Yunzuo yu Jiantao [Operation and 
Review of Mediation in Administrative Adjudication], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA 
COURT NET] (Jan. 5, 2006, 7:06 PM), 
http://www.chinacourt.org/html/article/200601/05/191312.shtml. 
380 See Zhu Suli, supra note 12, at 11–13 (criticizing the legalism of courts and the failure 
of lawyers and legal institutions to recognize the political and economic dimensions of 
their cases). 
381 Wang Quanbao, supra note 352 (citing Renmin University Professor Fan Yu). 
382 Chinese commentators have raised concerns that such practices undermine the authority 
of the law, the legal rights of the parties, the neutrality of courts, and the voluntariness of 
the mediation process.  See, e.g., Huang Xiuli, Tiaojie Tiaojie Zai Tiaojie: Sifa Tiaojie 
Youxian Huajie Shehui Maodun [Mediation, Mediation, and More Mediation: Give 
Priority to Judicial Mediation and Resolve Social Contradictions], NANFANG ZHOUMO [S. 
WEEKEND] (Mar. 4, 2010, 11:42 AM), http://nf.nfdaily.cn/nfzm/content/2010-
03/04/content_9744376.htm; 150 Wan Min Gao Guan Anjian Tuidong Zhongguo Fazhi 
Jincheng [1,500,000 Citizen Lawsuits Against Officials Propels China’s Rule of Law 
Process], JIANCHA RIBAO  [PROCURATORIAL DAILY] (Oct. 1, 2010, 8:35 AM), 
http://news.jcrb.com/jxsw/201009/t20100930_450739.html [hereinafter 1.5 Million Citizen 
Lawsuits].  Damaska notes that the legal proceedings of an activist state must be designed 
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B. “Reconciliation” of Administrative Litigation Cases 
Two core components of China’s mediation drive provide insights 
into how China’s political-legal system is coping with tensions in cases 
that share attributes with constitutional disputes.   The first is the effort to 
resolve administrative lawsuits through “reconciliation” (和解 ) or 
“coordination” (协调).  Under the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL), 
citizens have the right to challenge a limited range of administrative acts 
in the people’s courts. 383   Although the ALL formally prohibits 
“mediation,” political-legal institutions have actively promoted judicial 
“reconciliation” or “coordination” of administrative lawsuits. 384  Court 
leaders place special emphasis on reconciliation processes involving local 
people’s congresses and Party institutions as a preferable mechanism for 
resolving “major” or “difficult” administrative lawsuits with significant 
social impacts.385 
                                                                                                               
to incorporate facts and interests beyond those advanced by the parties and ensure that state 
policy is implemented.  Damaska, supra note 11, at 87, 169.  In Damaska’s purely “activist” 
ideal type, compromise and mediated solutions are problematic.  Id.  Post-Mao China does 
not fit the activist ideal type perfectly.  For an activist but pragmatic Chinese Party-state, 
mediated outcomes may be useful if they facilitate the injection of extra-legal factors and 
the realization of core objectives such as stability maintenance and Party political control. 
383 Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Xingzheng Susong Fa [PRC Administrative Litigation 
Law] [hereinafter ALL] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 4, 1989, effective 
Oct. 1, 1990) (LawInfoChina, Peking Univ. Beida Fabao series CLI.1.4274), available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=1204. Constitutional violations 
are not included within the scope of ALL review.  ALL arts. 2, 11. 
384 SPC Opinion on Giving Priority to Mediation, supra note 354, at paras. 6, 7.  For the 
legality of mediation, see ALL art. 50.  The SPC began to promote administrative 
reconciliation in 2006.  1.5 Million Citizen Lawsuits, supra note 382.  Some Chinese 
sources suggest that while mediation emphasizes the role of the judicial mediator, 
reconciliation places greater emphasis on the role and communication of the parties.  See, 
e.g., Zhang Xiaohua, Guanyu Xingzheng Susong Hejie Zhidu de Sikao [Reflections on the 
Reconciliation System for Administrative Lawsuits], ZHONGGUO WANG [CHINA NET] (Mar. 
19, 2008), http://www.china.com.cn/law/txt/2008-03/26/content_13604843.htm.  Others 
acknowledge that they are really the same type of process and that it is an ”open secret” 
that courts are using mediation to resolve a large number of administrative lawsuits.  Min 
Gao Guan, Hejie Chu Shuangying [In Citizen Suits Against the Government, 
Reconciliation Produces a Double Win], SHANXI XINWEN WANG [SHAANXI NEWS NET] 
(July 2010), http://www.dzwww.com/rollnews/news/201007/t20100704_6274779.htm 
[hereinafter Reconciliation Produces a Double Win]. 
385 See SPC Opinion on Giving Priority to Mediation, supra note 354, at § 6 (“In major 
crises and influential cases, the Court must proactively strive for the cooperation of the 
local Party Committee, People’s Congress and upper-level administrative organs, and 
invite relevant local government organs to participate and coordinate. In administrative 
cases where concrete government actions were taken that were illegal, or were legal but 
were not reasonable, the court should, in the course of coordination, and to the greatest 
extent possible, urge the government organ involved in the lawsuit to revoke those illegal 
actions on its own accord, or to acknowledge the actions as invalid, or to make a new 
determination.”).  See also Courts Asked to Better Handle Lawsuits Against Administrative 
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Administrative lawsuits pose acute problems for courts.  As noted 
in Part III, local governments have numerous ways to exert pressure on 
courts. 386   Administrative organs pressure courts not to accept 
administrative cases, interfere with the adjudication process, and refuse to 
implement judgments.387  According to official statistics, enforcement 
rates in administrative lawsuits dropped from 74% in 1992 to 21% in 
2004.388  Administrative organs also intimidate lawyers and plaintiffs.389  
Officials exert these pressures in part because they fear that losing an 
administrative lawsuit will result in loss of face, undermine their 
governance authority, and negatively impact their performance 
evaluations.390  The difficulties courts face in adjudicating administrative 
cases and enforcing judgments in turn undermine judicial authority and 
can generate destabilizing citizen discontent and petitions.391 
Administrative lawsuits also present problems of legal 
interpretation.  Chinese laws and regulations are drafted flexibly to leave 
administrators significant discretion.  Terms such as “public interest” or 
“appropriate” present interpretive challenges for courts and leave room for 
administrative organs to argue that their actions were in fact lawful.392  
Many administrative orders (China’s ubiquitous “red-hatted” documents) 
occupy a legal grey zone and do not fall clearly within the scope of the 
                                                                                                               
Orders, XINHUA NET (Apr. 3, 2007), available at 
http://www.legalinfo.gov.cn/english/News1/content/2009-
01/20/content_1024056.htm?node=7604. 
386 The reduction in litigation fees in 2007 aggravated these tensions, as courts became 
more dependent on local government funding and faced a new wave of lawsuits.  Zhang 
Xiaohua, supra note 384. 
387 See generally Wang Qinghua, supra note 125, 521–30.  Chinese sources often refer to 
these problems as the “three difficulties.”  Zhang Xiaohua, supra note 384; Reconciliation 
Produces a Double Win, supra note 384.  For an English-language discussion of such 
issues, see Joseph Kahn, When Chinese Sue the State, Cases Are Often Smothered, N. Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 28, 2005, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A02E5D71230F93BA15751C1A9639C8
B63&pagewanted=all. 
388 ZHONGGUO FALÜ FAZHAN BAOGAO [CHINA LEGAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT] 247 (Zhu 
Jingwen, ed. 2007). 
389 See Dan Shibing, Min Gao Guan Anjian Qicheng Baisu de Yuanyin [The Reasons 
Citizens Lose Lawsuits Against the Government 70% of the Time], ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN 
ZAIXIAN [CHINA YOUTH ONLINE] (Oct. 29, 2008), http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2008-
10/29/content_2408651.htm. 
390 Zhang Xiaohua, supra note 384. 
391 See, e.g., Cheng Gang, Renda Daibiao Tijiao Yian Xiugai Xingzheng Susuong Fa—
Xingzhen Susong Fa Ying Baohu Gongmin Quanyi er Fei Zhengfu Quanwei [NPC 
Delegate Raises Resolution to Amend the ALL—ALL Should Protect the People’s Rights 
and Interests and Not the Government’s Authority], ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN ZAIXIAN [CHINA 
YOUTH ONLINE] (Mar. 22, 2008), http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2008-
03/22/content_2113716.htm; Reconciliation Produces a Double Win, supra note 384. 
392 Feng Qijiang, supra note 379. 
2011]  RESOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL DISPUTES IN CHINA         141      
 
ALL.393  As Wang Qinghua observes, courts facing the many pressures 
discussed here “vacillate between law and policy, pragmatism and 
formalism, protecting government authority and realizing individual 
rights.”394  Collectively, these pressures have contributed to a high rate of 
withdrawal of administrative lawsuits.395 
In an effort to cope with problems in administrative litigation, 
courts have turned to reconciliation.  Reconciliation gives courts a 
platform for reaching “efficient” and “harmonious” settlements that 
preserve the authority of government institutions, take account of non-
legal factors such as social stability and local political power, and protect 
courts from administrative resistance that undermines their authority.396  
In the words of one Chinese commentator: 
 
By engaging in reconciliation under the direction of the 
court, one’s own interests are satisfied and a rigid 
deadlock in the relationship with administrative organs 
does not occur.  This is consistent with the psychological 
requirement of the plaintiff.  At the same time, 
reconciliation in the litigation process is consistent with 
the needs of administrative entities.  Due to the idea of 
prioritizing one’s own power, which has more or less 
existed for a long period of time, administrative organs are 
not willing to participate in litigation.  If they lose a 
lawsuit, not only do they lose face, but there are also 
impacts on the professional evaluation of their 
departments.  Although they may win an administrative 
lawsuit, dissatisfied plaintiffs may petition and influence 
the normal work of the administrative organ.  
Administrative organs need a stable and harmonious 
social environment . . . .  Therefore, under the 
preconditions of legality and not harming the public 
interest, it is absolutely possible for administrative organs 
to give ground and agree to reconciliation.397 
 
As this passage indicates, while administrative organs have numerous 
reasons to resist administrative litigation, their interest in efficient 
                                                 
393 Cheng Gang, supra note 391. 
394 Wang Qinghua, supra note 125, at 513. 
395 Feng Qijiang, supra note 379 (citing typical annual withdrawal rates of about 33%); 
Geng Baojian, supra note 360, at 252 (citing 57% withdrawal rate one year and citizen 
belief that officials simply protect each other). 
396 See generally Zhang Xiaohua, supra note 384; Wang Qinghua, supra note 125, at 519–
21. 
397 Zhang Xiaohua, supra note 384.  For a very similar passage discussing the experience 
of courts in Shaanxi, see Reconciliation Produces a Double Win, supra note 384. 
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governance and stability provides incentives for reaching mediated 
settlements.  Moreover, while administrative discretion creates problems 
for court adjudication, it creates space for such settlements.398 
Some Chinese commentators even conclude that reconciliation 
settlements strengthen the authority of courts and the law.  In the view of 
these commentators, such settlements preserve at least some legal rights, 
involve an implicit acknowledgement of improper administrative conduct, 
and are more likely than judgments to be implemented.  As such, they 
strengthen the authority of courts and the law.399  Such assessments may 
strike outsiders as exaggerated.  In the context of a system in which only 
20% of administrative litigation decisions are actually enforced, however, 
settlements may be viewed as coping mechanisms that preserve some 
authority for the law and legal institutions. 
Coordination may begin even before a case is filed.  In his survey 
work on administrative litigation, Wang Qinghua found that courts 
commonly maintain a façade of legality but consult with Party committees, 
local governments, people’s congresses, and higher-level courts to 
coordinate outcomes before cases are accepted for filing. 400   When 
government actions are clearly illegal, the law is in tension with Party 
policy, or cases may impact social stability, judges view such coordination 
as essential.401 
Ongoing problems in administrative litigation provide a window 
into issues that would arise (and likely be aggravated) in the context of 
constitutional adjudication. 402   Many constitutional disputes, like 
administrative lawsuits, involve citizen legal challenges to the Party-state 
and exhibit polycentricism.  The dynamics of resistance present in 
administrative lawsuits would almost certainly be heightened in 
constitutional adjudications involving sensitive human rights issues and 
constitutional restraints on Party-state power.403  In addition, like the 
elastic terms in some administrative regulations, abstract and conflicting 
constitutional provisions present significant challenges for adjudication 
institutions and leave space for negotiated outcomes.404  Finally, the SPC 
                                                 
398 Zhang Xiaohua, supra note 384. 
399 Feng Qijiang, supra note 379; Zhang Xiaohua, supra note 384.  See Wang Qinghua, 
supra note 125, at 525 (explaining that local courts refuse to file difficult cases in part to 
protect the authority of the law). 
400 Wang Qinghua, supra note 125, at 522–23. 
401 Id. at 520–23. 
402 At least one commentator has suggested that administrative law is a kind of substitute 
constitutional law in China.  He Xin, Administrative Law as a Mechanism for Political 
Control in Contemporary China, in BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA, supra note 22, 
at 160–61. 
403 Constitutional adjudication would catalyze resistance and interference not only from 
local actors, but also from central Party organs. 
404 Balme, supra note 34 at 15 (noting that “the more technical a legal text appears, the less 
the Party is able first of all to impose a strictly political interpretation of it.”).  According to 
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has instructed courts to do everything possible to mediate complex or 
collective cases that involve sensitive issues.  Most constitutional disputes 
exhibit similar characteristics.  In short, the same pressures that have 
prompted China’s beleaguered courts to turn to reconciliation in the 
administrative litigation context would create significant challenges for 
constitutional adjudication. 
C. China’s Grand Mediation Mechanism 
“Grand mediation” (大调解) is a core component of the Party-
state’s effort to maintain stability.  Definitions of grand mediation vary, 
but all emphasize grand mediation as a comprehensive stability 
maintenance and dispute resolution mechanism that incorporates (1) top-
down integration and deployment of state, Party, and social resources, and 
(2) a synthesis of people’s mediation, administrative mediation, and 
judicial mediation designed to resolve complex disputes at the basic level 
and ensure social stability.405  China’s leaders introduced grand mediation 
in 2002 and have progressively intensified their emphasis on the model 
over the past decade.406  In April 2011, Party-state institutions issued a 
joint notice on grand mediation, and the model features prominently in 
official notices on dispute resolution.407 
                                                                                                               
Li Buyun, local government respresentatives argued that the Legislation Law should 
provide more explicit standards for determining when a local regulation contradicts the 
Constitution.  Scholars included such a provision in the expert draft of the law, but the 
provision was dropped later in the drafting process.  Li Buyun, supra note 46, at 228. 
405 See, e.g., Zhu Suli, supra note 12, at 5; Chen Hanfei & Mou Naidong, “Da Tiaojie” 
Jizhi Zhong Fayuan de Juese Dingwei [Defining the Role of Courts in the “Grand 
Mediation” Mechanism], 11 XINAN ZHENGFA DAXUE XUEBAO [SW U. POL. SCI. L.J.] 128, 
134 (2009); Guanyu Shenru Tuijin Maodun Jiufen Da Tiaojie Gongzuo de Zhidao Yijian 
[Guiding Opinion on Deepening and Pushing Forward Grand Mediation Work for 
Contradictions and Disputes] [hereinafter Guiding Opinion on Grand Mediation] (jointly 
issued by the Centr. Comm. for Comprehensive Mgmt. of Pub. Sec., the Sup. People’s Ct. 
& 15 other agencies, Apr. 22, 2011), at para. 1, available at 
http://www.dffy.com/faguixiazai/ssf/201105/22812.html. 
406 Wu Yingzi, “Da Tiaojie” de Gongneng Ji Xiandu [Functions and Limits of “Grand 
Mediation”], 20 ZHONGWAI FAXUE [PEKING U. L.J.] 309 (2008).  See Wang Hongchao & 
Wang Shiwei, Chengdu Shi Dayi Xian “Da Tiaojie” Xinjiu Liandong Gongzuo Jizhi Bijiao 
[Comparison of the New and Old Integrated Work Mechanism for Grand Mediation in 
Dayi County, Chengdu City], 11 XINAN ZHENGFA DAXUE XUEBAO [SW U. POL. SCI. L.J.] 
122, 127 (2009) (LawInfoChina, Peking Univ. Beida Fabao series CLI.A.1144226) 
(explaining that the structure and operation of the grand mediation mechanism has evolved 
over time). 
407 Guiding Opinion on Grand Mediation, supra note 405.  For examples of other circulars, 
see Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiaqiang Fazhi Zhengfu Jianshe de Yijian [State Council Opinion 
on Strengthening the Construction of Rule of Law Government] (issued by the St. Council, 
Oct. 10, 2010, effective Oct. 10, 2010) 2010 GUO FA [ST. COUNCIL NOTICES] no. 33, para. 
23, available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010-11/08/content_1740765.htm; SPC Opinion 
on Giving Priority to Mediation, supra note 354, at paras. 26, 27. 
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Grand mediation emphasizes integrated, top-down stability 
maintenance practices.  Under the current structure, local Party 
committees and government leaders provide unified leadership and 
guidance; comprehensive stability management offices (综治部门) at 
each level organize grand mediation platforms, investigate disputes, and 
coordinate responses; and functional departments and social organizations 
keep Party-state leaders informed, direct disputes to appropriate channels, 
and carry out dispute resolution work.408  Chinese sources emphasize the 
top-down nature of this system and the central role of the Party-state as a 
proactive (rather than passive) force for dispute resolution.409  The focus 
of grand mediation is on the local level, where political-legal institutions 
are instructed to actively detect and resolve complex, collective disputes at 
the “germination” stage before they spread to higher levels of the 
system.410 
Grand mediation emphasizes a synthesis of Party, government, 
and social resources to resolve complex disputes.  For example, directives 
on grand mediation highlight the importance of winning the support and 
participation of a range of stakeholders such as Party committees, local 
people’s congresses, people’s political consultative conferences, and local 
administrative units in major or difficult cases.411  In applying grand 
mediation, the Party-state deploys not only a broad range of government 
departments, but also social organizations such as people’s mediation 
committees, village and resident committees, Communist Youth League 
units, labor unions, the women’s federation, industrial associations, and 
other organizations.412  This practice allows Party-state leaders to tap the 
expertise, capacity, and influence of a range of social-political actors, 
adopt extra-legal settlement methods, and ensure that the interests of 
multiple actors are represented in forging dispute resolution outcomes. 
Local courts play a central role in the grand mediation structure.  
Basic-level courts keep local leaders informed about conflicts, guide cases 
to people’s mediators and other organizations, and undertake judicial 
mediation at different stages of the litigation process.413  Court leaders sit 
                                                 
408 Guiding Opinion on Grand Mediation, supra note 405, at paras. 19, 20, 21.  For a 
detailed description of a county grand mediation structure with over twenty Party-state 
entities, see Wang Hongchao & Wang Shiwei, supra note 406, at 123–24. 
409 Zuo Weimin, supra note 346, at 112–13. 
410 Chen Hanfei & Mou Naidong, supra note 405. 
411 SPC Opinion on Giving Priority to Mediation, supra note 354, at para. 6; Guiding 
Opinion on Grand Mediation, supra note 405, at para. 6. 
412 See, e.g., SPC Opinion on Giving Priority to Mediation, supra note 354, at para. 26; 
Guiding Opinion on Grand Mediation, supra note 405, at paras. 5, 18. 
413 Guiding Opinion Grand Mediation, supra note 405, at para. 6; Zhu Suli, supra note 12, 
at 5; Chen Hanfei & Mou Naidong, supra note 405, at 132. 
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on leadership groups that direct grand mediation work and thus play a role 
in shaping dispute resolution outcomes.414 
Within this structure, judges contribute professional skills and 
legal expertise.  Judges provide Party and government leaders with 
opinions on the legal rules implemented in disputes and guidance to non-
judicial mediators on legal questions and dispute resolution techniques.415  
In this context, courts are not simply unitary and detached forums for 
adjudication.  Instead, they constitute the “legal” component of an 
integrated state governance and dispute resolution structure.416  Legal 
provisions give courts a source of argument and crucial support in shaping 
such consultations.417  Court views on the law may not be dispositive, but 
they are significant.  Rising citizen legal consciousness and growing legal 
demands enhance the guiding position of the courts and law in this 
multifaceted balancing process.418 
Domestic reports on grand mediation cases provide a sense for 
how the mechanism works in practice.  Carl Minzner characterizes these 
exchanges as “political conferences” that are designed to coordinate Party-
state responses and may or may not involve the parties themselves.419  
Domestic reports on grand mediation cases confirm this general 
characterization.  In one example, a woman in a rural township argued that 
a village had improperly transferred her land use rights to a local company 
and won a court judgment.  She rebuffed efforts by the township 
government to mediate, and, in cooperation with her extended family, 
repeatedly obstructed the operation of the company.  After a violent 
altercation and petitions by all parties, county Party and state leaders 
ordered the county grand mediation coordinator to organize an integrated 
investigation and settlement process.  The coordinator convened a meeting 
involving local Party, government, court, public security, and Letter and 
Visits Bureau officials to analyze the dispute and develop a settlement 
plan.  Mediation personnel then engaged in a series of exchanges with the 
parties in which they applied “persuasion and guidance . . . from the 
perspectives of emotion, reason, and law,” identified key interests, and 
convinced the woman, the village, and the company to agree to a 
                                                 
414 Wang Hongchao & Wang Shiwei, supra note 406, at 124. 
415 Long Zongzhi, Chongjian Minzhong Dui Sifa de Xinrengan, Dangqian Sifa de Nanti ji 
Yingdui [Rebuild the Confidence of the Masses in Judicial Administration, Present 
Difficulties and Responses in Judicial Administration], NANFANG ZHOUMO [S. WEEKEND] 
(July 15, 2010, 8:54 AM), http://www.infzm.com/content/47673; SPC Opinion on Giving 
Priority to Mediation, supra note 354, at para. 28; SPC Opinion on Linking Litigation and 
Non-Litigation, supra note 366, at para. 2; Chen Hanfei & Mou Naidong, supra note 405, 
at 130. 
416 Long Zongzhi, supra note 415.  See also Yang Su & Xin He, supra note 219. 
417 Wang Qinghua, supra note 123, at 525. 
418 Chen Hanfei & Mou Naidong, supra note 405, at 130. 
419 Minzner, supra note 1, at 946–48 and accompanying notes. 
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compromise settlement.420  In this idealized depiction of grand mediation, 
the role of Party-state pressure and the integration of legal, political, and 
social factors are evident. 
Citizens seeking to protect their legal rights and interests are not 
without leverage in this process.  An important goal of the Party-state’s 
mediation drive is to preserve social stability and in turn eliminate 
potential threats to Party power.  While the Party-state possesses the raw 
power to impose whatever settlement it wishes in a given case, its 
evaluation of whether a settlement takes account of competing interests 
and serves overriding stability goals will influence its decision regarding 
the appropriate outcome.421  The threat of group petitioning, collective 
discussion in mainstream and alternative media, protests, or other non-
institutionalized or illegal actions provide parties with meaningful 
leverage to bargain and secure at least partial realization of rights and 
interests at issue.422 
Administrative reconciliation and grand mediation highlight a 
zone of convergence between existing informal patterns of bargaining, 
consultation, and mediation in constitutional disputes and broader trends 
in China’s political-legal system.  To cope with the range of challenges 
posed by citizen-state and complex disputes that are also present in 
constitutional disputes, China has imposed a Party-supervised process of 
consultation and mediation.  While some commentators have 
characterized China’s mediation drive as a “turn against law,” in the 
context of constitutional disputes this drive reveals a potential path 
forward.  China has never implemented a robust mechanism for formal 
adjudication of constitutional disputes, and the Party-state has made it 
clear that it will not permit further incremental movement towards the 
establishment of such a mechanism for the foreseeable future.  Abstract 
constitutional provisions, tensions between constitutional rights provisions 
and provisions enshrining Party leadership, and offsetting rights and duties 
provisions leave room for a wide range of constitutional interpretations 
and make constitutional disputes fertile ground for bargaining and 
consultation.  Grand mediation provides an indigenous dispute resolution 
model that is consistent with the demands and limitations of China’s 
current political environment and would regularize existing, informal 
constitutional dispute resolution practices that emphasize these dynamics. 
                                                 
420  See, e.g., Ebian Xian Yunyong “Da Tiaojie” Jizhi Chenggong Huajie Yiqi Sheji 
Sanfang de Zhandi Buchang Jiufen [Ebian County Utilizes “Grand Mediation” 
Mechanism to Successfully Settle a Land Compensation Dispute Involving a Third Party], 
EBIAN XINWEN WANG [EBIAN NEWS NET] (Apr. 19, 2010), 
http://eb.leshan.cn/zt/HTML/2071.html. 
421 Clarke, supra note 347, at 270. 
422 Id.; Minzner, supra note 1, at 960–61.  See also sources cited, supra note 221. 
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D. Grand Mediation as a Transitional Model for Resolving 
Constitutional Disputes 
The convergence highlighted above raises the possibility that the 
Party-state could adapt its grand mediation model to create a transitional 
mechanism for resolving constitutional disputes.  Although grand 
mediation is designed to contain disputes at the local level, the tensions 
and dynamics that the mechanism is designed to address are present in the 
context of constitutional disputes.  Grand mediation involves consultation 
among multiple Party, state, and social institutions with intersecting 
interests.  Grand mediation also gives judges roles as legal advisors, 
creates limited space for citizen bargaining, and facilitates the integrated 
consideration of legal, political, and social interests in settlement 
outcomes.  The abstract nature of China’s constitutional text, the inherent 
and unresolved tensions between provisions about rights and duties, the 
tension between provisions about rights and Party leadership, and the 
weakness of judicial institutions make it particularly difficult to generate 
principled “black and white” constitutional interpretations.  In China’s 
one-party state, a transitional constitutional dispute resolution mechanism 
arguably must address these tensions and dynamics. 
Of course, emphasis on consultative processes and negotiation in 
resolving constitutional disputes is not novel.  In the United States, the 
political question doctrine provides that a range of constitutional disputes 
involving political issues are non-justiciable and leaves the resolution of 
such disputes to the political process.423  American Supreme Court justices 
bargain and compromise on constitutional interpretations to reach 
majorities and forge consensus that may be important for preserving the 
Court’s institutional authority. 424   The theories of popular 
constitutionalism discussed in Part III, both by tracing historic patterns of 
political mobilization and bargaining in the resolution of constitutional 
disputes, and by advocating a greater role for the political processes in 
interpreting and enforcing the constitution, also highlight such dynamics.  
Larry Kramer offers a constitutional model under which adjudication is 
but one element in a broader process of political-legal decision-making. 
Legal scholars have noted the potential advantages of alternative 
or hybrid processes for resolving some difficult constitutional issues.  In 
the United States, Carrie Menkel-Meadow has argued that a willingness to 
consider compromise solutions to intractable constitutional disputes may 
be more productive than insisting on “principled” outcomes that lack 
legitimacy or generate backlash.425  Brian Ray contends that a hybrid 
dispute resolution process blending elements of both adjudication and 
                                                 
423 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
424 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 374, at 909–13. 
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negotiation/mediation could be an effective model for resolving disputes 
over constitutional socio-economic rights provisions.426  Ray, drawing on 
the work of Lon Fuller, characterizes socio-economic rights cases as 
classic polycentric disputes involving the “complex and intersecting sets 
of relationships” that are difficult to resolve through adjudication.  His 
model is based in part on the experience of the South African 
Constitutional Court, which has avoided issuing substantive 
interpretations of constitutional provisions on  socio-economic rights and 
instead ordered parties to engage in negotiations that consider 
constitutional values, state duties, and practical considerations. 427  
Collective disputes over land expropriations in China provide examples of 
a type of constitutional dispute that exhibits similar polycentric 
characteristics. 
Such thinking is beginning to percolate in the English-language 
literature on Chinese law.  For example, Peerenboom (also drawing on the 
experience of the South African Constitutional Court) argues that 
institutionally weak Chinese courts should emphasize cooperative 
processes rather than confrontational or assertive decision-making in 
handling complex socio-economic claims.428  Dowdle has argued that the 
consultative dynamics of legislatures are more conducive to constitutional 
development than adjudication and has observed that the Party-state’s 
recent emphasis on populism and mediation may open new pathways for 
China’s constitutional development even as it closes others.429  In a recent 
study on basic-level courts, Stephanie Balme finds that judges prohibited 
from citing the Constitution in formal judgments are using the space 
created by judicial mediation to integrate constitutional principles into 
dispute resolution outcomes.430 
China’s existing grand mediation framework provides a rough 
guide for how a hybrid mechanism for resolving constitutional disputes 
might be structured.  A small group made up of senior Party, 
administrative, legislative, and judicial figures could provide leadership 
and oversight for such a mechanism.  As constitutional disputes are 
referred from lower levels, central leaders could decide whether to take up 
the dispute and organize consultation meetings with Party-state 
institutions that have technical expertise or interests in the disputes.  
Coordination of constitutional dispute resolution could be carried out 
                                                 
426 See generally Ray, supra note 369.  Ray’s model relies on elements of judicial 
supervision and transparency that may be absent in the Chinese context. 
427 The Constitutional Court has applied the “engagement remedy” in a series of cases 
involving the constitutional right to housing.  Ray, supra note 369, at 834–43. 
428 Randall Peerenboom, Economic and Social Rights: The Role of Courts in China, 12 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 303, 319–20 (2011). 
429 Dowdle, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 17, at 9–12. 
430  Stephanie Balme, Ordinary Justice and Popular Constitutionalism in China, in 
BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA, supra note 22, at 196. 
2011]  RESOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL DISPUTES IN CHINA         149      
 
within the central comprehensive security management office or by 
central Political-Legal Committee.  However, NPC leaders do not play a 
major role in either of these institutions as currently constituted.  Because 
the NPC and the NPCSC are the state entities formally charged with 
constitutional supervision, NPC leaders would arguably need to play a 
central role in a coordination entity.  As constitutional disputes are 
referred from lower levels, central leaders would decide whether to take 
up the dispute and organize consultation meetings with Party-state 
institutions with technical expertise or interests in the dispute. 
Dispute resolution groups would negotiate and reach consensus on 
a preferred solution that balances concerns regarding the constitutional 
text, collective demands, stability and Party power, and other governance 
and institutional interests.  In this process, the SPC would draw on its 
professional competence as China’s highest judicial organ and act as a 
legal advisor, offering interpretations of the constitutional provisions for 
Party-state leaders to consider.  As in the property rights examples, legal 
scholars and citizen participants might contribute, discuss ways to balance 
conflicting concerns, and comment on draft laws or regulations.  Party 
leaders could provide oversight, mediate conflicting interests, and ensure 
that solutions are consistent with China’s political structure.  Officials and 
scholars could then use domestic media and  representative institutions 
such as the NPC and CPPCC to explain the measures. 
A grand mediation model for constitutional disputes would be 
consistent with China’s political-legal traditions and policies.  Deeply 
rooted historical traditions provide a foundation for deliberative 
institutions.  As numerous scholars have shown, consultation and 
consensus building are core features of both contemporary Chinese 
legislative and policymaking processes and China’s approach to 
international disputes. 431   Over the past decade, the Party-state has 
emphasized citizen participation, consultation, and supervision; expanded 
controlled channels for such participation; and experimented with new 
deliberative institutions and practices to build consensus and promote 
good governance.432  Finally, Party leaders have introduced the concepts 
                                                 
431 See, e.g., Chen Shenyong, The Native Resources of Deliberative Politics in China, in 
THE SEARCH FOR DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN CHINA, supra note 14, at 161–73; Jiang 
Shigong, supra note 21, at 31–37; Dowdle, Of Parliaments, supra note 17, at 164–68, 
174–80; He Baogang, Participatory and Deliberative Institutions in China, in THE SEARCH 
FOR DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN CHINA, supra note 14, at 175–96; CHINESE PEOPLE’S 
POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE, 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/archiveen/27750.htm.  For Chinese emphasis on 
negotiation and consultation, and avoidance of adjudicative institutions in the resolution of 
international disputes, see JUNWU PAN, TOWARD A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR PEACEFUL 
SETTLEMENT OF CHINA’S TERRITORIAL AND BOUNDARY DISPUTES 113, 115 (2009). 
432 He & Warren, supra note 169, at 276–78.  For an overview of this rhetoric and new 
efforts to promote hearings and solicitation of public comment on legislation in China, see 
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of “scientific development” and “building a harmonious society.”  Both of 
these concepts involve a balancing of socio-political interests and an 
emphasis on stability.433  A constitutional dispute resolution model that 
emphasizes consultation and consensus building would be consistent with 
these cultural traditions, emerging political practices, and governance 
themes, and would reinforce them. 
Such a mechanism would take account of the realities of China’s 
current system.  As demonstrated in Part IV, patterns of bargaining, 
consultation, and mediation are already evident across a range of 
constitutional disputes in China.  In the context of administrative and 
complex collective disputes, the Party-state is mandating the adoption of 
similar dispute resolution practices in an effort to maintain stability and 
ensure that outcomes incorporate political, social, and legal considerations.  
A grand mediation model for constitutional disputes would be consistent 
with these trends.  Party-state institutions could activate the mechanism on 
a discretionary basis, and the Party would play an integrated leadership 
and coordination role.  In such a context, the mechanism might not pose 
the same type of “latent threat” to Party power that judicial application the 
Constitution was deemed to pose.  Party-state actors would engage in a 
political-legal dialogue and reach consensus-based outcomes that take 
account of China’s constitutional text but do not involve formal rulings 
that might undermine the power of Party-state institutions or generate new 
concerns about stability. 
A grand mediation model for constitutional disputes could 
enhance the role and authority of courts in constitutional dispute 
resolution without generating conflicts over the respective constitutional 
powers of courts and legislatures.  Under the current framework, judicial 
institutions do not play a formal role in constitutional interpretation.  The 
creation of a constitutional court (or the vesting of constitutional review 
power with the SPC) would require a constitutional amendment and would 
almost certainly trigger both NPC resistance and a sensitive public debate 
over China’s constitutional structure.434  Under the current framework, 
judicial institutions do not play a formal role in constitutional 
interpretation.  In the context of a grand mediation model for 
constitutional disputes, judicial officials would act as legal advisors in 
multiparty political negotiations with legal dimensions.  Justices would 
draw on the SPC’s status as China’s highest judicial organ and contribute 
legal opinions on the Constitution as one of multiple factors to be 
                                                                                                               
Jamie Horsley, The Development of Public Participation in the People’s Republic of China, 
in THE SEARCH FOR DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN CHINA supra note 14. 
433  Alice Miller, Beijing Prepares to Convene the 17th Party Congress, THE CHINA 
LEADERSHIP MONITOR, Oct. 5, 2007, at 5–7. 
434 WANG ZHENMIN, supra note 37, at 378.  For an example of the type of constitutional 
debate such a move might provoke, see generally Tong Zhiwei, supra note 38. 
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considered.  Such contributions would not involve formal challenges to 
the NPCSC’s constitutional authority or formal rulings that would place 
justices in direct conflict with more powerful Party-state institutions.  
Instead, justices would apply legal arguments to shape interpretation of 
the Constitution and dispute resolution outcomes.  By integrating legal 
and political actors into a multifaceted dispute resolution mechanism, a 
grand mediation model could give courts a limited but more meaningful 
role in shaping official understandings of the Constitution than they 
presently enjoy.435 
A mechanism organized along these broad lines would address 
some gaps in the current range of alternative or hybrid models that 
scholars have proposed.  By involving a constellation of Party-state actors, 
the grand mediation model alleviates the perceived threats posed by a 
formal constitutional adjudication institution, whether it be a court, the 
NPCSC, or an NPC commission.  While acknowledging the current 
realities of Party leadership, the model preserves a meaningful role for 
courts and takes an incremental step toward institutionalizing Party efforts 
to mediate constitutional tensions.  In contrast to Backer’s model, which 
would validate the Party’s monopoly on constitutional interpretation, a 
grand mediation model would preserve a role for the bottom-up citizen 
demands and related consultations that have become an important 
component of China’s constitutional trajectory.  A constitutional grand 
mediation mechanism draws on the consultative elements of Pan Wei’s 
hybrid governance model.  At the same time, it would provide an interim 
or transitional stage that could help to bridge the wide gap between 
China’s current practice and the independent court Pan envisions as a core 
feature of a consultative rule of law regime.  Finally, while giving full 
play to the political and consensus-building processes that Dowdle 
emphasizes, grand mediation would not be constrained by the current 
institutional limitations of China’s people’s congresses and would 
incorporate legal institutions in a consultative dispute resolution 
framework. 
Why might the Party-state consider such a model?  Given the 
Party-state’s priorities and existing national conditions, it might consider 
the model to be a appropriate fit for China.  However, the simple answer 
may be to buy time.  As collective demands grow and constitutional 
arguments diffuse through the Chinese polity, the Party-state faces a 
dilemma.  Repression may eliminate immediate threats.  However, if the 
Party-state represses or ignores underlying problems, dismisses 
constitutional rules, or imposes one-sided settlements, it may catalyze an 
                                                 
435 RULE BY LAW, supra note 150, at 20–21 (noting that judges in authoritarian systems 
may preserve some ability to “champion rights at the margins of political life” by 
containing activist impulses and avoiding challenges to core regime interests); Balme, 
supra note 430. 
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escalation and intensification of disputes, radicalize moderate reformers 
otherwise inclined to work within the system, and undermine China’s 
long-term stability.436  Repression also undermines a pillar of the Party-
state’s governing legitimacy by revealing the gap between the 
Constitution and political reality.  Abandoning or altering the 
constitutional text to address the tension between rights/rule of law 
provisions and the reality of Party-state power would involve similar 
legitimacy costs.437  On the other hand, accommodation and concessions 
validate and reinforce evolving public views of the Constitution, establish 
precedents for compromise settlements, and encourage new, more 
expansive constitutional arguments.438  Concessions to address collective 
constitutional demands may also encourage citizens to make further 
demands through collective action, thus leading to further  instability.439 
A grand mediation model for constitutional disputes would not 
resolve these dilemmas, but it could buy time for the Party-state by easing 
some of the tensions embodied in the difficult choices above.  Deliberative 
institutions can provide safety valves that ease pressure on the state and 
create perceptions of responsiveness that build legitimacy.440  For example, 
Party leaders have experimented with controlled legislative hearings as a 
way to allow citizens to vent frustration and participate in decision-
making without threatening Party-state authority.441  A more  organized 
and defined process for responding to collective constitutional demands 
and reaching consensus on outcomes consistent with Party, local 
government, and social interests would be more efficient than current 
practices as a means of alleviating grassroots pressures on particular issues. 
The Party-state might also view such a mechanism as a relatively 
safe concession that would reinforce its governing legitimacy.  The failure 
of the judicialization movement, the recent shifts away from judicial 
professionalism and adjudication, and the wave of repression against legal 
                                                 
436 Cai Yongshun, Social Conflicts and Modes of Action in China, 59 THE CHINA J. 418 
(2008); Cai Dingjian, supra note 133, at note 82; Wang Qinghua, supra note 125, at 525; 
Peerenboom & Xin He, supra note 346, at 56; Fu Hualing, supra note 189, at 357.  
Chinese social scientist Yu Jianrong argues that a “rigid stability” based on a closed 
political system and absolute social order poses a great risk of undermining social stability.  
Yu Jianrong, Professor and Dir. of the CASS Rural Dev. Inst. Soc. Issues Research Ctr., 
Annual Yanshan Lecture at China Univ. of Admin. and Law: Rigid Stability—an 
Explanatory Framework for China’s Social Situation (May 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.boxun.us/news/publish/china_comment/Rigid_Stability_An_Explanatory_Fra
mework_for_China_s_Social_Situation (translated by David Kelly). 
437 See Zhang Qianfan, supra note 67, at § 2, para. 3; Peerenboom, supra note 97, at 39–40. 
438 Cai Yongshun, supra note 221, at 417–18; Yang Su & Xin He, supra note 219, at 19; 
Hand, supra note 16, at 158–62. 
439 Minzner, supra note 1, at 963–64. 
440  He & Warren, supra note 14 at 280–81; He Baogang, supra note 431, at 178, 188; Min 
Jiang, supra note 207, at 266–67. 
441 Paler, supra note 239, at 314–15 (citing motivations of Guangdong Province Party 
leaders). 
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activists has weakened the Party’s narrative that it is building a rule of law 
system.  The so-called “fifth generation” of leaders that will take the reins 
of the Party-state apparatus in 2012 and 2013 (or a faction within the new 
leadership team) could be motivated to explore ways to reinvigorate this 
narrative.442  In establishing a grand mediation model for constitutional 
disputes, China’s leaders could argue that they have taken new steps to 
ensure implementation of the Constitution and institutionalize the 
resolution of constitutional disputes while continuing to marginalize  the 
“latent threat” of a formal constitutional adjudication institution.  The 
leadership might also argue that it has developed an indigenous 
mechanism that is grounded in China’s social and political traditions, 
addresses questions about “Chineseness,” and reinforces the narrative that 
China should not blindly copy Western institutions.  Certainly, some 
Chinese citizens would challenge the legitimacy and appropriateness of 
such a mechanism (just as many have raised concerns about the push to 
mediate civil and administrative cases).  Others might take pride in grand 
mediation as an indigenous innovation or interpret steps to create this 
mechanism as signs of incremental progress in an otherwise difficult 
political environment. 
Party-state leaders might also be motivated by opportunities to 
create fissures among Chinese reformers.  While repression or disregard 
of constitutional argument runs the risk of radicalizing moderate reformers, 
the creation of alternative mechanisms and greater responsiveness to 
collective constitutional demands could reinforce the resolve of moderates 
to work for incremental change.  One source of the Party-state’s resilience 
has been its effectiveness in integrating new social-political forces.443  As 
the property rights examples suggest, the Party-state might encourage 
moderate citizen to work with the regime by inviting them to participate in 
shaping responses to collective constitutional demands, thereby co-opting 
them into a “safe” mechanism.  In China’s rights defense movement, 
fissures between moderate reformers and others who advocate challenging 
the Party-state aggressively have already emerged.444  The negotiation 
over electoral reform in Hong Kong provides a striking example of how 
strategic Party-state constitutional concessions can fragment opposition 
forces.  The implementation of a grand mediation model for constitutional 
disputes in China could generate similar tensions.445 
                                                 
442 The transition from the Jiang Zemin administration to the Hu Jintao administration in 
2002–2003, and Hu’s interest in promoting a populist and reformist image, provided an 
important backdrop for the progress in constitutional reform from 2002–2004.  Hand, 
supra note 16, at 132–35.  See also Cai Yongshun, supra note 221, at 431. 
443 ELKINS ET AL., supra note 24, at 176 (noting that the endurance of the 1982 PRC 
Constitution highlights the importance of including and coopting new social forces). 
444 Hand, supra note 16, at 180–82; Pils, supra note 186. 
445 The point here is to highlight possible Party-state motivations for considering such a 
model.  If China’s constitutional reformers are fragmented, they may find it more difficult 
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At the same time, such a mechanism would not be inconsistent 
with, and could be co-opted to facilitate, the long-term efforts of 
constitutional reformers.  At present, hopes for formal constitutional 
adjudication in China have all but vanished.  In a Party-dominated 
political environment in which constitutional adjudication is viewed as a 
latent threat and courts have been excluded from the constitutional 
interpretation process, a “second-best” arrangement could give courts a 
limited but meaningful role in constitutional interpretation and 
implementation.446  A Party-state decision to adapt the grand mediation 
model in the context of constitutional disputes would advance 
constitutional reform, if incrementally, and establish a more efficient 
process for generating constructive responses to some collective 
constitutional demands.  The establishment of a consultative process that 
acknowledges the importance of social-political factors in constitutional 
interpretation and gives the Party a supervisory role might also desensitize 
a broader range of constitutional issues and create conditions more 
conducive to compromise and accommodation.  As noted above, 
concessions relieve some immediate pressures but also generate consensus 
on constitutional meaning, reinforce public expectations for settlement, 
and generate new, more expansive arguments. 
While political channels for consultation and bargaining over 
constitutional disputes are significantly more constrained in China than in 
democratic systems, they are not absent.  Participation in even heavily 
controlled consultative and deliberative processes may empower citizens 
and build consensus.447  While citizens face severe political constraints 
and bargaining disparities in constitutional disputes, they are not without 
bargaining endowments.  Even in the context of abstract or conflicting 
constitutional provisions, citizens have some leverage to pressure the 
Party-state to consider collective concerns and the constitutional text in 
shaping dispute resolution outcomes.  Citizens derive such leverage from 
public expectations that constitutional rights provisions should have some 
meaning and not simply be negated by provisions on Party leadership or 
citizen duties, the threat of new or further instability, and the prospect of 
more radical constitutional demands.  Moreover, as scholars of alternative 
                                                                                                               
to generate reform pressure on the Party-state.  Fragmentation and the existence of radical 
reform elements could strengthen the willingness of the Party-state to grant strategic 
concessions to moderate reformers and help them to maintain incremental reform 
momentum. 
446 Adrian Vermeule has explored the advantages of “second-best” constitutional designs.  
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dispute resolution in the United States have suggested, the precedential 
impact of widely publicized public law settlements may be  significant.448  
The establishment of a consultative process for resolving constitutional 
disputes would arguably facilitate citizen-state dialogue and broader 
constitutional learning.  Chinese reformers believe that such dynamics are 
crucial for building the collective expectations and political pressures 
necessary to strengthen the Constitution as a legal instrument over the 
long term. 
The following replies might be offered to address some potential 
concerns (indicated in italics) with a grand mediation model for 
constitutional disputes. 
The application of a grand mediation model for resolving 
constitutional disputes would not provide an effective legal remedy for 
individual constitutional claims.  Instead, it would legitimize Party 
dominance and undermine efforts to establish a meaningful constitutional 
adjudication institution and the rule of law.  It is true that a grand 
mediation model for constitutional disputes would facilitate Party-state 
responses to collective demands rather than provide a remedy for 
individual constitutional claims.  It is also true that the adoption of a 
hybrid or transitional mechanism could drain energy from efforts to 
establish a constitutional adjudication institution.  This author shares the 
hope of many Chinese reformers that a robust constitutional adjudication 
institution will emerge in China’s future.  In contemporary China, 
however, the political dimensions of constitutional law are dominant and 
the legal dimensions weak.  At present, Chinese citizens do not have an 
effective process for resolving individual constitutional claims, and 
prospects for constitutional adjudication are negligible.  Even if a 
constitutional adjudication mechanism were created, there would be 
severe constraints on its independence in the existing political 
environment.  In the absence of a meaningful constitutional adjudication 
option in China, questions regarding the relative merits of adjudicative 
and alternative models for resolving constitutional disputes are largely 
moot.  Identifying and evaluating the evolutionary potential of existing 
practices may be more productive than trying to resolve theoretical 
debates about the relative merits of adjudicative and non-adjudicative 
approaches. 
 In this context, it is important to consider alternative evolutionary 
pathways for constitutional dispute resolution and assess their reform 
potential. The zone of convergence between existing informal practices 
for resolving constitutional disputes and emerging Chinese practices for 
                                                 
448 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 369, at 2680–82.  The successful replication of citizen 
rights defense strategies after the Sun Zhigang incident and the string of successful citizen 
environmental protests in Xiamen, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Dalian provide clear 
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handling administrative and complex/collective claims highlights one 
potential  pathway.  Chinese reformers are focused on building 
consciousness and altering collective political expectations.  They seek to 
shape popular opinion, generate collective demands, and encourage the 
types of tectonic shifts necessary to establish the Constitution as a legal 
restraint on the Party-state in the long-term.  A grand mediation model for 
constitutional disputes could provide space for such  efforts.  As discussed 
below, it may provide even greater space than a tightly controlled 
constitutional adjudication mechanism.  Even if a grand mediation model 
is not adopted, existing practices will continue to give play to the 
dynamics identified in this article on an informal basis and may be more 
useful than a formal constitutional adjudication mechanism in facilitating 
the long-term efforts of Chinese reformers. 
Even if a constitutional court or alternative constitutional 
adjudication mechanism is ineffective in the short-term, it is important for 
China to establish and develop such an institution now to lay a foundation 
for constitutional review when and if a political opening arises in the 
future.  Although this argument seems intuitive, the record in other East 
Asian transitions is mixed at best.  Tom Ginsburg’s account of transitions 
in South Korea and Taiwan suggests that while the creation and operation 
of institutions under authoritarian governments may help to lay 
foundations for transition, such actions may also institutionalize 
conservative cultures and practices.449  Korea’s Constitutional Court was a 
new institution and a product of the 1987 constitutional bargain that paved 
the way for Korea’s political liberalization.  The court very rapidly began 
to dismantle the pillars of authoritarian governance and has become 
perhaps the most activist constitutional court in East Asia.  In contrast to 
the Korean Constitutional Court, Taiwan’s Council of Grand Justices had 
been in existence for decades prior to Taiwan’s transition and was slower 
and more cautious in asserting its constitutional role during this transition.  
In addition, the Korean Supreme Court, a pre-existing institution that 
retained the power to review the constitutionality of administrative acts 
after Korea’s constitutional bargain, continued to exercise its power 
conservatively.450  As Ginsburg concludes, the record in Taiwan and 
South Korea “suggests that prior history is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for the successful operation of a particular institution.”451 
Spain’s transition provides another example.  In 1978, Spain 
established a new Kelsenian constitutional court in part out of concern that 
leaving the power of constitutional review with a judiciary that was 
“educated in the legal dogmas of Franco’s regime” would weaken the 
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country’s new democratic constitution.452  The Court played a crucial role 
in consolidating and defending the new constitution against the 
conservative impulses of the existing political-legal class.453 
A political transition in China, when and if it takes place, may or 
may not share characteristics with transitions in South Korea, Taiwan, or 
Spain.  In some cases, constitutional courts in authoritarian regimes have 
expanded rights on the margins of political life.454  As the examples cited 
here suggest, however, reform proponents should not assume that 
establishing a constitutional adjudication institution now is a necessity.  A 
constitutional adjudication institution may even hinder future reform 
efforts.  If existing institutions are flawed or incomplete, future 
constitutional designers may face the challenge not only of creating new, 
more effective institutions, but also of battling existing institutional 
players with entrenched interests. 
One can even envision a scenario in which the establishment of a 
constitutional adjudication institution might create new constraints on the 
efforts of Chinese reformers.  At present, the Party-state has largely 
abandoned the field of constitutional argument and left it to the citizenry.  
In some cases, the Party-state responds to constitutional arguments 
indirectly through scholars with ties to the regime, strategic reform 
concessions, or censorship and repression.  In many other cases, Party-
state institutions simply ignore citizen constitutional arguments.  The 
NPCSC has issued only a handful of decisions or interpretations that relate 
to the Constitution and has yet to issue a single formal ruling on a citizen 
constitutional review proposal.455  The people’s courts and other Party-
state institutions have directly applied the Constitution in only a handful 
of cases.  As a result, there is no meaningful body of official precedent 
interpreting China’s constitutional text.  Within the constraints of China’s 
censored media (and increasingly outside of those constraints through new 
media), Chinese reformers have been left with considerable space to offer 
their own visions, arguments and interpretations of the Constitution as part 
of a long-term effort to raise consciousness and shape public expectations. 
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A constitutional adjudication institution issuing official 
interpretations could alter this dynamic.  Chinese leaders would arguably 
gain legitimacy from a decision to establish such an institution or to 
further develop the role and procedures of the NPCSC.  However, as 
discussed in Part III, the Party could maintain the façade of constitutional 
review and legality while employing numerous measures to limit the 
impact of such an institution.  To the extent that such an institution did 
issue formal interpretations of the Constitution, it likely would issue 
conservative interpretations.  Such interpretations would create the 
perception of legality and legal process but take into account the same 
political and social factors that are considered in existing informal 
practices and that would be considered in a grand mediation model.  
Although some citizens would question the reasoning or legitimacy of 
conservative interpretations, for others the decisions of a constitutional 
adjudication institution reached through legal procedure would represent a 
final, authoritative statement on the constitutional issue in dispute.  
NPCSC interpretations of the HKSAR Basic Law, some controversial, 
appear to have had such an effect.456 
A grand mediation process for constitutional disputes would not 
create this kind of legal façade.  On the contrary, it would represent an 
explicit acknowledgment of the limitations and realities of constitutional 
law in China’s current political environment.  In addition, while 
facilitating citizen-state dialogue, responses to collective demands, and 
incremental reforms, a grand mediation model for constitutional disputes 
would not produce formal constitutional interpretations.  Either within the 
current informal dispute resolution framework or under a grand mediation 
model, reform-oriented citizens could continue their efforts—in the 
absence of official interpretations—to use a variety of public forums to 
offer constitutional arguments that some segment of the population might 
accept as authoritative. 
There is no guarantee that constitutional argument will generate 
the type of popular pressures that could prompt a political opening in 
China and, in turn, the establishment of a more robust constitutional 
adjudication mechanism.  This is true.  China’s citizens may not accept 
the constitutional interpretations and the liberal constitutional vision 
advanced by some reformers.457  The Party-state, through a combination 
                                                 
456 The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal has compromised with mainland authorities on 
some politically sensitive cases and acknowledged that there are no limitations on the 
NPCSC’s final authority to interpret the Basic Law.  Gittings, supra note 324, at 4–6.  The 
NPCSC’s controversial decisions asserting authority over electoral reform have established 
boundaries for negotiation and dialogue.  Similarly, Singapore’s ruling party has used 
courts and legal processes to cloak its efforts to marginalize political opponents with the 
veneer of legality.  See generally Silverstein, supra note 150. 
457 Peerenboom, supra note 97, at 31–34; Dowdle, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 
17, at 15–17; Lorentzen & Scoggins, supra note 167, at 5. 
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of adaptation and repression, may maintain the status quo or delay 
meaningful reform for a long period of time.  Deliberation within China’s 
authoritarian framework, or state-driven shifts in rights consciousness, 
may ultimately stabilize and reinforce the regime.458  Chinese leaders 
might also manipulate nationalist sentiments to bolster their legitimacy 
and deflect attention from liberal constitutional demands.  Entrenched elite 
interests (at both the central and local level) create difficult obstacles for 
reform even under the best of conditions.  Of course, all this would be true 
even if China were to establish a constitutional adjudication institution 
that looked more familiar to Western observers. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Chinese legal reformers face a challenging political-legal 
environment, and many are suffering from the Party-state’s drive to 
contain perceived political threats.  In such an environment, constitutional 
law and adjudication face severe constraints.  Broad political reform in 
China seems unlikely for the foreseeable future.  However, if we are to 
draw a lesson from the guarded but misplaced optimism for constitutional 
adjudication that began to percolate a decade ago, it should be that 
analysis of China’s constitutional development must be qualified with a 
strong dose of humility.  Early optimism for constitutional adjudication 
may have been misplaced, but we should not replace it now with an 
excessive pessimism that obscures important trends and possibilities 
within the political-legal system.  Constitutional disputes are being 
discussed and resolved in China, and China’s constitutional reformers are 
using emerging dispute resolution patterns to advance long-term, 
collective goals.  We just need to shift our focus to recognize these 
patterns and understand their significance.  Such patterns, and efforts to 
institutionalize them, may entrench and bolster the legitimacy of the 
Party-state, but they also have the potential to generate pressure and new 
prospects for incremental change.  As they face current challenges, 
Chinese reformers may take some consolation from the knowledge that 
the Party-state itself faces difficult tensions and long-term dilemmas as it 
confronts citizen constitutional argument. 
                                                 
458 He and Warren argue that deliberative institutions could facilitate the demobilization of 
regime opponents and enhancements in governing capacity that help the Party avoid 
broader political reform.  He & Warren, supra note 169, at 282–3.  Lorentzen and 
Scoggins argue that rising rights consciousness in China has been predominantly policy 
driven and stabilizing for the regime, but they also acknowledge evidence of destabilizing 
equilibrium shifts.  Lorentzen & Scoggins, supra note 167, at 11–13. 
